Questions and Answers on Logic Transcribed by Ryan Whiteside Transcribed on Primary Source Cooperative 2025

Online version 1.

Available under Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-SA Attribution--NonCommercial--ShareAlike.
The Papers of Roger Brooke Taney Ed Bradley, David Ramsey 28 Jun 1794taney-roger-brooke Questions and Answers on Logic Dickinson College Archives & Special Collections, Carlisle, Pennsylvania Roger Brooke Taney notebook on "Logic & Metaphysics"

Hold this space for succinct statements about editorial principles here and/or link to the website with more detailed editorial descriptions.

Education
June 28th Anno Domini 1794

Logic.

1. Q. How is Philosophy defined?

A. Philosophy is by Cicero defined to be the knowledge of divine & human things, & their causes, connections & dependencies.

2. Q. How were the most ancient speculators & pretenders to knowledge called?

A. They were most commonly called σωφοi==σοφοί or wise men

3. Q. Who introduced the term philosopher?

A. Pythagoras, who conceiving the title of wise man to be too arrogant desired only to be called phylosopher or Lover of wisdom.

4. Q. In what manner did the earliest Sages deliver their instructions?

A. In loose sayings, axioms & unconnected maxims, or in fables or parables.

5. Q. When did phylosophy begin to assume the form of a system?2

A. It began to approach to a system about the time of Socrates.

6 Q. How is phylosophy divided with regard to its origin?

A. Into Barbaric & Greek.

7 Q. How is it divided with regard to the degree of evidence it pretends to?

A. Into Sceptical & Dogmatical.

8. Q. How is it divided with regard to its subject & contents?

A. Into sectarian, which contained all the maxims & doctrines of a particular sect, & Electic which contained what was best approved in each; or into rational, Natural & Moral.

9 Q. What is Rational Phylosophy?

A. That which explains & investigates the operations of the human mind which is ordinarily named Logic; as also that which of beings as to their general properties, & is denominated Metaphysics.

10 Q. What is natural phylosophy?

A. That which treats of matter, and investigates the nature & properties of Bodies.

11. Q. What is Moral phylosophy?

A. That which considers man as a moral agent, & unfolds the motives, causes, & rules of human conduct.3

12 Q. What are the operations of the mind, about which, Logic is conversant?

A. Perception, Judgment & argumentation.

13 Q. What is the difference between natural & artificial Logic?

A. Natural Logic is that exercise of the faculties of the mind, which men have by instinct without knowing what they do, but artificial Logic, is that exercise of the faculties, which we are distinctly conscious of, & which is acquired by analizing the operations, & dividing them into as many parts, as they really consist of.

14. Q. What is the use of the distinct analisis & division, of the operations of the mind.

A. It is in order for our more distinctly understanding its nature, & the manner in which it is employed about different objects, as Grammer explains Language by dividing it into Sentences, words & Letters.

15 Q. What is the general object of Logic?4

A. The discovery of truth, & the communication of it to others.

16 Q. What is the first opperation of the mind in the business of knowledge and reasoning?

A. Perception or simple apprehension.

17 Q. How many kinds of perception are there?

A. Two, Sensible & Intellectual.

18 Q. How many sources of simple apprehension has nature afforded us?

A. Two principally, sensation & reflection, to which we may add abstraction.

19 Q. What are the means by which objects are perceived by the mind?

A. They are called ideas or images of the things perceived.

20 Q. What is an idea?

A. That which is immediately perceived by the mind when any thing is presented to it.

21. Q. Is an image of the object presented to the mind in every simple perception

A. No, except in perceiving objects of sight, but when the mind comprehends or perceives any object it is said to have an idea of it metaphorically, & for want of a proper term

22. Q. What do we mean therefore when we speak of our ideas of invisible objects?

A. Only that impression which they make on our mind whereby we perceive the existence, nature and properties of the objects, which may be called a mental or spiritual image of them.

22 Q. Are the ideas or images of the objects,5 only presented to the mind when the objects are present?

A. The ideas of sensible objects are received by recollection, when the objects are absent, but intellectual objects are at all times equally present to the mind.

23 Q. How are ideas divided with regard to their objects?

A. Into substances, modes, & relations.

24 Q. What is a substance?

A. That which exists of itself without dependence on any other being.

25. Q. What is a mode?

A. An attribute property, or manner of existing supposed to inhere in another being, & incapable of existing itself, without it.

26. Q. What is a relation?

A. That which expresses the situation of one being with regard to another.

27 Q. How are ideas divided with regard to their nature?

A. Into simple & compound.

28 Q. What is a simple idea?

A. That in which the mind can perceive no plurality or possibility of division.

29 Q. What is a compound idea?

A. That which consists of several simple6 ideas, comprehended in one term.

30 Q. How are ideas divided with regard to the manner in which they are perceived?

A. Into clear & obscure.

31 Q. What is a clear idea?

A. That which is distinctly perceived.

32 Q. What is an obscure idea.

A. That which is not distinctly perceived.

33 Q. How are ideas divided in respect to the relation they have to their objects?

A. Into adequate & inadequate.

34 Q. What is an adequate idea?

A. That which perfectly represents its object.

35 Q. What is an inadequate idea?

A. That which represents only part of its object.

36 Q. Can we receive an idea of any object without pronouncing some judgment upon it?

A. No.

37 Q. What is the first judgment we pronounce concerning any object, when we receive an idea of it?

A. That it exists.

38 Q. Can we form an idea of any object without attributing some property to it.

A. No.

39 Q. What judgment do we necessarily form when any property is perceived by us?7

A. That the object & property exist together.

40 Q. As ideas are the images of objects, do they not form the ground work of our knowledge?

A. Yes, we know the object by means of our ideas.

41 Q Does our knowledge of ideas therefore exclude all acquaintance with their objects?

A. As ideas are true objects images, we therefore become acquainted with their objects, an idea being a relative term, supposes the existence of its object.

42 Q. As ideas are the only objects of knowledge, must they not be supposed to exist themselves?

A. The ideas are produced by the objects, so the existence of the Effect, involves the existence of the cause.

43 Q. How are ideas divided?

A. Variously,

Into substances modes & relations.

Into the ten Catagories.

Into substances, & accidents.8

44 Q How are modes divided?

A. Into essential & accidental, absolute & relative.

45 Q. What is an essential mode?

A. That which belongs to the nature and essence of its subject.

46 Q. What is an accidental mode?

A. That which is not necessary to the being of a thing.

47 Q. How are essential modes divided?

A. Into primary & secondary.

48 Q. What is a primary essential mode?

A. The chief thing which constitutes a thing in its particular essence, & which distinguishes it from all others.

49 Q. What is a secondary essential mode.

A. That property of a thing which is not of primary consideration, but which is the natural effect of a primary essential mode.

50 Q. Are not primary essential modes sometimes denominated properties?

A. Yes, but in common Speech they are used to signify 4 different kinds of properties.

51 Q. What is a property of the first kind?

A. That which belongs to every subject of9 a certain kind, but not to that kind only.

52 Q. What is a property of the second kind?

A. That which belongs only to one kind, but not to every subject of that kind.

53 Q. What is a property of the third kind?

A. That which belongs to all subjects of one kind, & to them alone, but not always.

54 Q. What is a property of the fourth kind?

A. That which belongs to every subject of a certain kind & to that kind only & always.

55 Q. How are these several kinds of properties distinguished by the schoolmen?

A. 1. Quod competit omni sed non soli.1

2. Soli sed non omni.2

3. Omni et soli, sed non semper.3

4. Omni Soli et Semper.4

56 Q. What is an absolute mode?

A. That which belongs to its subject without respect to any being whatever.

57 Q. What is a relative mode?

A. That which expresses any property of a being with respect to another.

58 Q. What are the ten Catagories or predicaments?10

A. Substance, quantity, quality, relation, action passion, place, time, Situation & habit, which are contained in this Technical distich5

Arbor sex servos, ardore refrigerat ustos,

Rure eras stabo nec tunicatus ero.6

59 Q. Can not being be the subject of our knowledge?

A. Yes.

60 Q. What are those ideas called, which signify not being

A. Negative ideas.

61 Q. How many kinds of not being are there.

A. Two negation & privation.

62 Q. What is negation?

A. The absence of any thing which does not naturally belong to any being.

63 Q. What is privation?

A. The absence of any thing which belongs to the nature of a being.

64 Q. What is the power of abstraction?

A. That by which we form general ideas, or consider properties apart from one another, & apart from the subject to which they belong.

65 Q. What is the use of abstraction?

A. To class or arrange our ideas under11 genera & species, according to the common properties which belong to them.

66 Q. How are relations discerned?

A. By comparing different things together.

67 Q. How is that idea called which is conceived to be related?

A. The subject.

68 Q. How is that idea called to which another thing is conceived to be related?

A. The term.

69. Q. What is the common name of the two?

A. Correlata

70 Q. Are all the relations equally obvious?

A. No.

71 Q. Wherein do they differ from one another?

A. Some are supposed, on the mere supposition of the subject & term; others imply some foundation of the relation.

72 Q. Give me an example of each?

A. An egg is supposed to be related to12 another, on the supposition of the existence of any two, but a father & a son, & a master & a slave, are not conceived to be related without supposing a foundation of their relation.

73 Q. How are relations divided?

A. Into Synonymous & Heterogeneous.

74. Q. What are Synonymous relations.

A. Those in which the subject & term are expressed by the same name, as, Friend, Rival.

75 Q. What are Heterogenous relations?

A. Those in which the subject & term are expressed by different names as Father, Son.

76 Q. What are the marks of relation?

A. They are five,

Things related admit of a contrary.

Of a majus & minus, or greater & less, that is, whose foundation is mutible.

That things related correspond reciprocally with one another, tho' the reciprocity cannot be expressed always.

Related objects are at the same time in nature.

They are also conceived at the same time.13

77 Q. Do actions and passions imply a relation?

A. Yes.

78 Q. How is it called?

A. Cause & effect.

79 Q. How are causes divided?

A. Into original & subordinate, total & partial, material, formal, efficient, instrumental & final.

80. Q. How is the agent commonly called?

A. Terminus a quo.7

81 Q. How is the patient commonly called?

A. Terminus ad quam.8

82 Q. Can the agent & patient ever be the same?

A. Yes, in case of spiritual beings

83 Q. How are these acts called when the agent & patient are the same?

A. Immanent acts, because the effect remains in the agent.

84 Q. How are those acts called when the agent & patient are different?

A. Transient acts.

85. Q. Why are they so called?

A. Because the effect is conceived to pass from the agent to the patient.

86 Q. Can there be any thing in the effect14 which was not in the cause first?

A. No. Nihil est in effectu quad non suit prius in causa.9

87. Q. How is the action termed, when it passes from the agent to the patient, in schools?

A. The flux of the effect from the agent to the patient.

88 Q. Can there be any thing in the cause which is not in the effect?

A. Yes in the cases of rational & voluntary causes.

89 Q. Does a necessary cause exhaust its power of causation?

A. Yes.

90 Q. Is this the case with voluntary causes?

A. No.

91 Q. Can a charge of powder drive a ball any farther, than in proportion to its expansive power?

A. No.

92 Q. But may not a voluntary agent do much less, than it is in his power to do?

A. Yes.

93 Q. How many kinds of quantities are there.

A. Two.

1st Quantitas discreta, which comprehends number, in this the15 parts are distinct from each other.

2. Quantitas continua, comprehending time & space, the parts whereof are not distinct from each other.

94 Q. What is situation?

A. The order of the parts of the body with respect to each other.

95 Q What is habit?

A. The external adjunct of cloaths, armor, or other marks of distinction.

96 Q. What is the use of catagorical division?

A. It is subservient to accurate definition & distinct expression.

97 Q. How are objects at first known?

A. As individuals.

98 Q. Whence arise generalization & classification?

A. From reflection, & observation of common properties.

99 Q. Does not this observation suggest names of classes & properties?

A. Yes.

100 Q. How are objects known?

A. By their ideas & impressions.

Q. Can we know any thing of objects except what is conveyed by their ideas?

A. No.16

Q. Is not the idea then in our conception, identified with the objects?

A. Yes, as we cannot seperate them nor conceive of the one but by means of the other.

Q. Can we conceive of objects existing independent of their properties?

A. No.

Q. Must not we transfer to the objects all that we discover concerning their ideas?

A. Yes, as we know of substances no other way.

Q. What are the universals or predicables?

A. These five, Viz. Genus, Species, differentia, accidens, proprium.

Q. Why are these called predicables?

A. Because they may be predicated or affirmed concerning all our ideas.

Q. What is Genus?

A. A large class or division of beings.

Q. May not one of these comprehend several subordinate ones?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the highest Genus?

A. A. A. being, which is also called Genus generalissimum.17

Q. What is species?

A. A less division of beings arranged according to certain properties.

Q. May not one of these also comprehend several under it?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the lowest species?

A. That which comprehends only individuals, otherwise called species specialissima.

Q. What is difference?

A. That which distinguishes genus, species & individuals from each other.

Q. How is that difference called which seperates species from each other?

A. Differentia Specifica.

Q. What is property?

A. A distinguishing attribute arising from difference.

Q. May not the fourth mode of property distinguish classes as well as the differentia Specifica?

A. Yes.

Q. What are accidents?

A. Qualities changeable in their nature & without which things may exist.18

Q. What are the objects of the universals?

A. To make a complete enumeration & accurate division of all things that can be predicated concerning any class of beings.

Q. How are ideas expressed?

A. By words & terms.

Q. Are all words perspicuous?

A. No.

Q. What are the causes of obscurity in language?

A. There is,

1st Its poverty.

2nd The necessity of using the same words in different senses.

3rd The necessity of expressing ideas by single words.

Q. Does any language afford a different term for every idea?

A. No.

Q. Have words any connection with the ideas they stand for?

A. No.

Q. How is the sense of ambiguous words to be ascertained?

A. By the connection in which they stand.

Q. What are the remedies for obscurity19 & ambiguity in Language?

A.

1. accurate Definition.

2. attention to Etimology.

3. Connection.

Q. Can all terms be defined?

A. No.

Q. Are not the clearest terms least capable of definition?

A. Yes.

Q. What are the most certain truths?

A. Intuitive ones or first principles.

Q. Can these be capable of demonstration?

A. No.

Q. Why so?

A. because nothing can be perceived clearer than themselves.

Q. Are these less certain because they cannot be demonstrated?

A. They are more certain, being the foundation of the demonstration of other truths.

Q. Is it proper to doubt of every thing in order to find the foundation certainly?

A. No.

Q. What are we to think of the famous Effatum or conclusion of Des Cartes cogito ergo sum?

A. That it is a mere delusion or petitio principii10, because the first term includes20 the last, & yet it is brought in to prove it; the opperation of thinking necessarily implies the existence of a thinking being.

Q. May not the foundation of any truth be discovered without doubting of it?

A. Certainly, we need only to suppose some person to have doubted of it.

Q. How is language divided?

A. Into literal & metaphorical.

Q. What is Literal language?

A. That wherein one term only signifies one idea.

Q. What are negative terms?

A. Those which deny some quality.

Q. What are positive terms?

A. Those which affirm some quality.

Q. Does not the first of these include the last?

A. Always, as every substance must have some certain or positive properties.

Q. Does not one word sometimes stand for more ideas than one, when no metaphor occurs?

A. Yes, when a relative is used instead of an absolute one which is called circumlocution

Q. What is Metaphorical Language?

A. That wherein one term signifies more than one idea.21

Q. Do not terms generally suggest more ideas than they express?

A. Yes, an additional as well as an original idea.

Q. Is not such an association natural?

A. Yes.

Q. But is it always accurate?

A. No, it is a great cause of error.

Q. Does not the secondary idea occur to the mind as often as the original one is mentioned?

A. Yes, by habit we cannot help it.

Q. Does not wrong association lead to wrong conclusion?

A. Yes.

Q. How are names divided?

A. Into proper & appellative.

Q. May not the exchange of these cause error?

A. Yes.

Q. What are univocal words?

A. Such as signify one idea only.

Q. What are equivocal words?

A. Such as signify more than one idea.

Q. Is the sense of the same terms always equally extensive?22

A. No they are sometimes used in a larger, sometimes in a stricter sense.

Q. What is the use of Metaphors?

A. To explain & illustrate objects already known.

Q. Can they be useful for informing us of what we do not know?

A. No.

Q. Can we understand the metaphorical use of a term, without understanding its proper signification?

A. No.

Q. What is definition?

A. A distinct & determinate declaration of what a thing is.

Q. How are definitions divided?

A. Into those of names & things.

Q. What is a perfect definition?

A. That which assigns the genus & differentia specifica of any object.

Q. What is true definition?

A. That which may be substituted in the place of the word, or thing defined without occasioning error.

Q. What sort of terms are proper in definition.

A. Only such as are distinct & perspicuous.

Q. Is not the definition of a term & of a thing, sometimes the same?23

A. Yes, when the term is a proper one.

Q. Can simple ideas be defined?

A. No.

Q. What are the rules of definition?

A.

1. That it be universal.

2. That it be proper to the thing defined & to that alone.

3. That it be clear.

4. That it be short.

5. That no synonymous words be included in it.

Q. What is division?

A. The resolution of the whole into its component parts.

Q. How many kinds of wholes are there?

A. Four viz.

1. Universal or Logical.

2. Formal or Metaphysical.

3. Essential or Physical.

4. Integral or mathematical.

Q. What is the Metaphysical whole?

A. That which is made up of genus & differentia specifica.

Q. What is the physical or essential whole?

A. That which is made up of matter & form.

Q. What is the Logical whole?

A. The genus with respect to species, &24 the species with respect to individuals.

Q. What is the mathematical whole?

A. It is that whereof the several parts may exist distinctly & separately from each other.

Q. What are the rules of division?

A.

1. That each part taken singly must contain less than the whole, & all the parts taken together must contain neither more nor less than the whole.

2. In all divisions we should first consider, the larger, & more immediate parts of the subject, & not divide it all at once into the more remote & minute parts.

3. the several parts ought to be distinct so that one may not contain another.

4. Subdivisions ought not to be numerous without necessity.

5. Every subject ought to be divided according to the design in view.

6. The nature of things ought to be chiefly attended to.

Q. What are original causes?

A. Such as are not the effects of others.25

Q. How are subordinate causes divided?

A. Into essentially & accidentally subordinate.

Q. What is a cause, essentially subordinate?

A. Such as is dependent on others for its power of causation.

Q. What is an accidentally subordinate cause?

A. Such as is dependent on others, but not for its power of causation.

Q. Can there be more than one total cause for one effect?

A. No.

Q. Can there be a series of subordinate causes ad infinitum?

A. No.

Q. What causes are called external?

A. The efficient or final which belong to the agent.

Q. What are the internal causes?

A. The material or formal which belong to the effect.

Q. May not matter & form be applied to immaterial things?

A. Yes.

Q. What is matter?

A. That of which a thing consists, and which exists in it.26

Q. How is matter divided?

A. Into, materia in qua, materia ex qua et materia circum quam.

Q. What is materia ex qua?

A. That of which a thing is made.

Q. What is materia in qua?

A. The subject or matter considered with regard to some quality.

Q. What is materia circum quam?

A. The object or matter considered with relation to action upon it.

Q. What are the properties of matter?

A. to receive form, & constitute a compound along with it.

Q. Can matter & form exist seperately?

A. No.

Q. What are we to think of the first matter of the schoolmen, which was conceived to be without matter & form & indifferent to each.

A. That it is inconceivable.

Q. What is form?

A. That which declares what a thing is, or the manner of its essence.

Q. What are the properties of form?

A. To form matter & make a compound with it.

Q. How is form divided?

A. Into material & immaterial.

Q. What is material form?27

A. That which is dependent on matter.

Q. What is immaterial form?

A. That which has no relation to matter.

Q. How are efficient causes divided?

A. Into active & emanative.

Q. What is an active efficient cause?

A. That which produces its effect by the medium of action.

Q. What is an emanative efficient cause?

A. That in which the effect proceeds from the cause without any action.

Q. What is a principal efficient cause?

A. That which produces its effect by its own power.

Q. What is a less principal efficient cause?

A. That which is subservient to the principal in producing an effect.

Q. In what respect is the effect said to be in the cause?

A. When it is of the same nature, it is said to be in it formally; when it is of a different nature, it is said to be in it casually or emanently.

Q. How are less principal causes divided?

A. Into Procataretick Procatarctic , Præguminæ & Instruments.

Q. What is a Procataretick cause?

A. That which extrinsically excites the principal cause to action.28

Q. What is the cause Præguminæ?

A. That which from within excites the principal cause to action.

Q. What is the Instrument?

A. That which is subservient to the principal cause in producing an effect.

Q. How are final causes divided?

A.

1.st Into finis cujus & finis cui.

2. Into principal & secondary.

3. Into subordinate & ultimate.

Q. What is the finis cujus?

A. That which the efficient desires.

Q. What is the finis cui?

A. The person in whose favour the effect is desired.

Q. What is a principal final cause?

A. That which the agent intends in the first place.

Q. What is the secondary final cause?

A. That which intended along with the principal cause, either as a consequent, or a substitute to it.

Q. What is a subordinate final cause?

A. That which has a relation to something farther.

Q. What is an ultimate final cause?

A. That to which all subordinate ends are referred, but has no relation to any29 thing farther, thus the final or ultimate end of man is the Ευπρaξιa11 or summum bonum12 of his nature

Q. What is a subject?

A. That to which something is joined besides its essence.

Q. How are subjects divided?

A. Into subjects of inhesion & subjects of predication or denomination.

Q. What are subjects of inhesion?

A. Such as are susceptible of inherent adjuncts.

Q. What are subjects of predication?

A. Those of which some property is affirmed or predicated.

Q. How are adjuncts divided?

A.

1. Into proper & common, which are the same with essential & accidental modes.

2. Into absolute & limited; the absolute being such as agree with the subject at all times, & the last, such as agree with it secundum quid, or in a particular respect or occasion only.

3. Into external & internal, the first including such as adhere to the subject from30 without, & the latter such as are inherent in the subject.

Q. How are external adjuncts divided?

A. Into objects signs & circumstances.

Q. What is an object?

A. The materia circum quam, or that about which any thing is employed in the way of casuality or working.

Q. What is a sign?

A. Something presented to our senses, which presents another thing to our understanding.

Q. How are signs divided?

A. Into natural & arbitrary.

Q. What are natural signs?

A. Those which signify by themselves and are either the causes, effects or concomitants, of thing signified.

Q. What is an arbitrary sign?

A. That which signifies by compact or custom as words & letters.

Q. What are material signs?

A. Such as do not represent the thing signified.

Q. What are formal signs?

A. Such as represent the thing signified.

Q. What are the conjunct qualities of beings?

A. Agreement, opposition, identity & diversity.

Q. How many of these belong to Logic?31

A. Two agreement & opposition.

Q. What is agreement?

A. That in which more things than one, or what is conceived to be more than one, are united together.

Q What is real agreement?

A. That of a thing with itself.

Q. What is that agreement which is found by an act of the mind?

A. The union of more than one thing under one notion.

Q. What is simple agreement?

A. That of two things with the same third.

Q. What is an analogical agreement?

A. That of two or more things in the same relation or proportion.

Q. What is equality?

A. agreement in quantity.

Q. What is likeness?

A. Agreement in quality.

Q. What is opposition?

A. The pugna rerum or incompatability & inconsistency of things, one of which being supposed, excludes the other necessarily.32

Q. What things may be said properly to be opposite to each other?

A. Such as cannot be affirmed of either of each other or of the same kind.

Q. What are the properties of opposites?

A. That they exist at the same time in nature, that they are perceived at the same time by the mind, that they mutually excite the idea of each other, & that each renders the other more clear. contraria juxta se posita clarius eluciscunt.13

Q. How many kinds of opposites are there?

A. Five disparata, contraries, relative opposites, privative opposites and contradictories.

Q. What are disparata?

A. Things different in kind as well as contrary in quality.

Q. What are contraries?

A. Things at the greatest distance from each other, under the same genus.

Q. What are the properties of contraries?

A. That they mutually destroy & exclude each other, that the one is taken away by the admission of the other, & that they cannot be in the same subject, at the same time.33

Q. How are contraries divided?

A. Into mediate & immediate.

Q. What are immediate contraries?

A. Where there is nothing in the middle partaking of both.

Q. What are mediate contraries?

A. Those that admit of a middle point.

Q. What are relative opposites?

A. Such as include a relation

Q. What are privative opposites?

A. Any habit & its privation. – a privatione ad habitum non datur regressus.14

Q. What is a proposition?

A. A sentence, in which something is affirmed of another either truly or falsely.

Q. How are propositions divided?

A. Into simple & compound, pure & modified.

Q. What is a simple proposition?

A. That which cannot be resolved into more propositions.

Q. What is a compound proposition?

A. That which consists of several propositions joined together.

Q. What are the parts of a proposition?

A. The subject, the predicate & the copula.

Q. What is the subject?

A. The person or thing spoken of.34

Q. What is the predicate?

A. The thing spoken of it, or affirmed concerning it.

Q. What is the copula?

A. The affirmation or verb by which the predicate is connected with the subject.

Q. Are predicates & subjects always to be discovered by their situation.

A. No, but by the sense & connection.

Q. How many kinds of proposition are there?

A. Five, copulative, conditional, disjunctive, adversative & relative.

Q. Why are they called by these names?

A. Because their parts are joined by conjunctions of these several kinds.

Q. What is a pure proposition?

A. One that does not express in what manner the terms are connected.

Q. What is a modified or modal proposition?

A. One in which the manner of the connection of the terms is expressed.

Q. How many modes of affirmation are there?

A. Four, viz. necesse est, impossibile, possibile, continget.35

Q. How may modified propositions, be resolved?

A. Into affirmation & the manner, the first of which may be reckoned the subject & the last the predicate.

Q. What are the distinguishing qualities of propositions?

A. Quantity & Quality.

Q. What is the quantity of a proposition?

A. The extent of the affirmation, in respect of which a proposition is either particular or universal.

Q. What is an universal proposition?

A. One in which the subject is taken universally, or the words all or every may be used.

Q. What is the quality of a proposition?

A. That which expresses the nature of the connection of the terms whether affirmative or negative.

Q. What is an affirmative proposition?

A. One that joins the terms.

Q. What is a negative proposition?

A. One that disjoins the terms.

Q. What is an indefinite proposition?

A. One that has no note of quantity36 prefixed to the subject.

Q. How many kinds of universality are there?

A. Three, Mathematical, Physical and Moral.

Q. What is Mathematical universality?

A. The most perfect of all, as when the predicate is contained in the subject, which cannot exist without it – all mathematical axioms & definitions have their universality.

Q. What is Physical universality?

A. That which has a respect to the nature of things, tho it admits of accidental exceptions.

Q. What is moral universality?

A. That which respects the greatest part of the subject, or the general event of things, such as are found in proverbs & moral aphorisms –

Q. How are the quantities & qualities of propositions artificially expressed?

A. By the four first vowels,

A. Denoting universal affirmation.

E. Universal negation.

I. Particular affirmation.

O. Particular negation.

Q. What are opposite propositions?

A. Those in which what is denied in one is affirmed in another.37

Q. How are opposite propositions divided?

A. Into contrary, subcontrary, and contradictory.

Q. What are contrary propositions?

A. Such as agree in quantity, but differ in quality, but are both universal.

Q. What are subcontrary propositions?

A. When they are both particular.

Q. What are contradictory propositions?

A. Those that differ both in quality & quantity.

Q. Can two contradictory propositions be both true?

A. No.

Q. But may not they be both false?

A. Yes.

Q. What is a true proposition?

A. One that joins those things, that are joined in nature.

Q. What is a false proposition?

A. One that joins what nature has disjoined.

Q. How are true propositions divided?

A. Into necessary & contingent.

Q. What is a necessary true proposition?

A. That which cannot be false.38

Q. What is a contingent true proposition?

A. One that may be false.

Q. Can any proposition be true & false both at the same time.

A. No; but the same proposition may be true & false at different times.

Q. What is truth?

A. The agreement of our ideas with each other.

Q. What is the Criterion or distinguishing mark of truth?

A. Evidence, quicquid est verum clare et distincte percepimus.15

Q. How is the truth of necessary true propositions ordinarily called?

A. Certainty.

Q. How many kinds of it are there?

A. Two, mathematical & moral.

Q. What is mathematical certainty?

A. That which excludes all doubt.

Q. What is moral certainty?

A. That which is the most that the nature of the subject can afford, which demands belief, tho it does not remove all possibility of doubt.

Q. Can Mathematical certainty be attained in all our enquiries?

A. No, in nothing except mathematics.

Q. May not truth admit of degrees?

A. Yes according to the degrees of evidence on which it rests.

Q. May not moral certainty extort39 our assent as well as Mathematical.

A. Yes.

Q. How is the truth of contingent propositions ordinarily called?

A Probability; and such propositions are called opinions –

Q. May not every proposition be either true or false by nature?

A. Yes.

Q. How are uncertain propositions divided?

A. Into probable & improbable.

Q. What are probable propositions?

A. Those which bear a greater evidence of their being true, than of their being false.

Q. What are improbable propositions?

A. Where there is more evidence against them than in their favour.

Q. Whence does evidence arise?

A. From our senses internal & external, when in a sound state.

Q. What is that evidence called which results from our internal senses?

A. Consciousness.

Q. Do not all human affairs & particularly matters of fact, depend on probality & moral evidence?

A. Yes.40

Q. Are all men equally qualified to perceive truth?

A. No they differ both in capacity & disposition.

Q. What hinders men from perceiving the truth?

A. Ignorance & prejudice.

Q. May not ignorance be removed by a clear display of the agreement & connections of things?

A. Yes.

Q. What is prejudice?

A. A judgment formed concerning any person or thing without sufficient evidence or examination.

Q. May not prejudice be conceived either in favour of truth or falshood?

A. Yes.

Q. What are the chief circumstances which serve to strengthen prejudices?

A. Custom, antiquity, the example of others, Variety, Interest, attachment to our country.

Q. How many kinds of prejudices are there?

A. It is impossible to enumerate them all, Lord Bacon reckons five kinds16,

1. Idola patris, comprehending those prejudices which we receive from our parents or Countrymen.

2. Such as arise from ignorance or a41 retired life, which he calls Idola specus.

3. Idola scholæ including the prejudices which we receive from our masters & instructors.

4. Idola fori fori or those that arise from the customs of our countrymen.

5. Idola Theatris including such prejudices as we receive from the customs & opinions of the world in general.

Q. What are the most general sources of prejudices?

A. Prejudices may arise from words or things, ourselves or others.

Q. In what manner may prejudices arise from things themselves?

A.

1. On account of their obscurity and the speciousness of the contrary errors.

2. From the appearance of things in disguise.

3. From the mixture of different qualities in the same thing.

4. From the different lights in which the same object may be placed.

5. From the casual association of our ideas.

Q. How do prejudices arise from words?

A.

1. When they are insignificant.42

2nd When they are equivocal.

3rd When two or three are synonimous

4th From the vice of the manner of speaking.

5th From Eloquence.

Q. How do prejudices arise from ourselves?

A.

1. From the weakness of our reason.

2. From our senses.

3. From imagination.

4. From the passions or affections of the mind.

5. From the kindness we have for ourselves.

6. From our humours & tempers.

Q. How do prejudices arise from other persons?

A.

1. From those who have the charge of our education.

2. From the customs & fashions of those among whom we live.

3. From the authority of men.

4. From the manner in which a doctrine is delivered.

Q. How many kinds of evidence are there?

A.

1. Intuitive or self-evidence.

2. Demonstrative evidence.

3. Moral evidence.

Q. What is self evidence?43

A. That which belongs to intuitive propositions.

Q. What is Demonstrative evidence?

A. That which belongs to mathematical truths, or to those whose connection with first principles can be demonstrated.

Q. What is Moral evidence?

A. That which is the highest that the nature of the thing admits of, such as tradition & testimony for proving matters of fact.

Q. What things are principally to be attended to, in the examination of testimony?

A.

1. The Moral character of the witnesses.

2. Their opportunity of being rightly informed & their capacity.

3. Their impartiality.

4. The manner in which the testimony is transmitted.

5. The concurrence of men of different parties & prejudices.

Q. Can the Silence of one or more authors militate against the truth of a fact that is attested by others?

A. No – qui tacet assentire videtur.1744

Q. What is internal moral evidence.

A. That which arises from the nature of the fact itself, which shews it to be credible, possible & agreeable to the nature of things.

Q. Can any thing be proved by external, without being attended with internal evidence?

A. No.

Q. Must not internal evidence first be found competent to a fact or Doctrine before it can be proved by testimony?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the third opperation of the mind?

A. Argumentation, natural or artificial.

Q. What is reasoning or argumentation?

A. That opperation of the mind by which it infers the truth of one proposition, from one or two others already known.

Q. What is artificial reasoning?

A. The adjustment or ordering of three propositions, in which one is already inferred from the other.

Q. Who was the inventor of Sylogisms?

A. Aristotle is commonly reckoned the inventor of it, tho' Sylogisms are to45 be found in Plato an earlier writer.

Q. What are the parts of a Sylogism?

A.

1. The proposition which is to be maintained which is called the question.

2. The major proposition.

3. The minor, these last are commonly called by the name of the premises, because in the order of artificial reasoning they are placed before the question or proposition to be maintained, & it is called the conclusion because it is placed last, & is conceived of as flowing from the premises.

Q. What is that which is called the minor term?

A. The subject of the question or conclusion.

Q. What is the major term?

A. The predicate of the conclusion.

Q. Can there be more than three terms in one Syllogism?

A. No, as it consists in comparing two ideas with the same third.

Q. How is this third called?

A. The middle term.

Q. What is the sum of a Syllogism?

A. The regular & apt disposition of three propositions, by which it may appear that the last is necessarily connected with the two first.46

Q. What is the figure of a Syllogism?

A. The artificial arrangement of the middle term with the several parts of the question.

Q. What are the moods of a Syllogism?

A. The regular determinations of the propositions according to quantity & quality.

Q. How many kinds of moods of Syllogisms are there?

A. Two viz. Direct & inverse.

Q. What are the direct moods?

A. Those in which the greater extreme or predicate of the question is concluded concerning the lesser.

Q. What are the inverse moods?

A. Those in which the lesser extreme or subject of the question is concluded concerning the greater.

Q. What are the universal moods?

A. Those in which one or both of the premises are universal.

Q. What are the particular moods?

A. Those in which one or both of the premises are particular –

Q. How many figures of Syllogisms are there?

A. Three.

1st in which the middle term is the subject of the major,47 and the predicate of the minor proposition.

2nd In which the middle term is the predicate of both of the premises.

3rd In which the middle term is the subject of both premises.

Q. How many universal & directly concluding moods are there?

A. Fourteen, four in the first figure, four in the second, & six in the third.

Q. What is the use of the technical verses in which the moods of Syllogisms are wont to be expressed?

A. The vowels of these words, being prefixed one to each proposition, indicate their quantity & quality, according to the rules concerning propositions.

Q. What is the foundation of affirmative conclusions?

A. That things agreeing with the same third, agree also with one another

Q. What is the foundation of negative conclusions?

A. When one, of two ideas, disagrees with the same third, and the other agrees with it, they must disagree with each other.

Q. How are Syllogisms divided with respect to the conclusion?48

Into universal affirmative

Universal Negative

Particular affirmative

Particular negative.

Q. How are Syllogisms divided with regard to the composition of them?

A. Into Single & compound.

Q. What is a single Syllogism?

A. That which consists only of three propositions.

Q. What is a compound Syllogism?

A. One that consists of more than three propositions.

Q. How are single Syllogisms divided?

A. Into simple, complex, & conjunctive.

Q. What is a simple Syllogism?

A. One that consists of three simple propositions.

Q. What are the axioms commonly laid down concerning Simple Syllogisms?

A.

1. Particular propositions are contained in universals and may be inferred from them, but universals are not contained in particulars.

2. In universal propositions, the subject is universal.

3. In all affirmative propositions the Predicate has no greater extent than the subject.

4. The predicate of an universal proposition49 is always taken universally, for in its whole extent it is denied of the subject.

Q. What are the rules of regular symple Syllogisms?

A.

1. In every Syllogism there cannot be more nor less than three terms.

2. These ought to be no more nor less in the conclusion than in the premises.

3. The middle term ought not to enter the conclusion.

4. The extremes are to be placed in the same order in the conclusion, as in the premises, that is, whatever was the predicate in the premises, ought to be the predicate in the conclusion & vice versa, or if both the extremes are the subjects of the middle term, or both predicates of it, that ought to be predicated in the conclusion, which is joined with the middle term in the major proposition, & that ought to be the subject which is joined with the middle term in the minor proposition.

5. The middle term must not be taken twice particularly, but once at least universally.

6. A negative conclusion cannot be proved by affirmative premises.50

7. The conclusion follows the weaker part that is, if one of the premises be particular, the conclusion must be particular, & if one of the premises be negative, the conclusion must be negative.

8. From two negative or two particular propositions nothing can be concluded.

Q. What are complex Syllogisms?

A. Those that have one term complex, or in which the middle term is not connected with the whole subject, or the whole predicate, in two distinct propositions, but intermingled compared with them by parts, & in a confused manner.

Q. How are complex Syllogisms divided?

A. Into as many kinds as there are complex propositions.

Q. What is a conjunctive Syllogism?

A. One that has a conjunctive major.

Q. What is a conditional Syllogism?

A. One whose major or minor or perhaps both are conditional propositions.

Q. How many kinds of argumentation do conditional Syllogisms admit of?

A. Two.

1st When the antecedent is asserted51 in the minor, that the consequent may be asserted in the conclusion.

2nd When the consequent is contradicted in the minor that the antecedent may be contradicted in the conclusion.

Q. How are these two kinds of reasoning denominated?

A. The first is called arguing from the position of the antecedent to the position of the consequent; & the second is called arguing from the contradiction of the consequent, to the contradiction of the antecedent.

Q. In what cases do these several modes of argumentation take place.

A. The first takes place when the antecedent of the major is a true proposition, and the second when it is a false one, The consequents in both cases being supposed to be just & natural.

Q. Can we reason from contradicting the antecedent to the removing of the consequent, or from the position of the consequent to the position of the antecedent?

A. No.52

Q. How may conditional Syllogisms be faulty?

A. Either in matter or form; in matter when the consequent of the major is false, & in form when the antecedent is derived from the consequent, or when the denial of the consequent is gathered from the denial of the antecedent.

Q. What is a disjunctive Syllogism?

A. One whose major is a disjunctive proposition.

Q. How many kinds are there of these?

A. Two, either one part is to be taken away that the other may be reserved, or where one member is to be retained, that the other may be taken away.

Q. In what sense are these Syllogisms false?

A. When there is any medium between the opposite parts of the major, so that the parts do not mutually exclude each other.

Q. If the disjunction of the major have more parts than two, what is the consequence?

A. Those parts which are not taken away by the minor are concluded.

Q. What is an Inductive Syllogism?

A. It is one whose major consists of a number of parts, two or all of which53 being removed by contradiction in the minor, the whole is removed.

Q. How are such Syllogisms faulty?

A. When the parts of a whole are imperfectly enumerated in the major, so that a denial of all the enumerated parts does not amount to a denial of the whole.

Q. How may conditional Syllogisms be changed into catagorical ones?

A. When the subject of the antecedent & consequent are the same, this may be may be done by omitting the condition & substituting an universal for the common subject of the antecedent & consequent.

Q. How may a conditional Syllogism be changed into a catagorical one, when the predicate and not the subject of the antecedent & consequent are the same?

A. In that case the conditional major may be converted into a relative one, but if neither the subject nor predicate of the antecedent & consequent are the same, the conditional Syllogism cannot be changed into a catagorical one.

Q. What is the use of Syllogism or artificial reasoning?54

A. It has this advantage, that an argument thus stated, may be examined by the Rules of art, & shewn to be conformed to them.

Q. Can artificial reasoning be used with success in discovering truth?

A. No, but solely in proving those truths which have been discovered already, as the conclusion must be known befor the construction of the premises.

Q. What is an enthymem?

A. A Syllogism wanting one proposition the first part of which is called the antecedent, & the last the consequent.

Q. Which of the premises is supposed in an enthymem?

A. If the subject of the consequent is placed in the antecedent, the major will be suppressed, – if the predicate, the minor.

Q. How may an enthymem be reduced to a catagorical Syllogism?

A. By adding the proposition omitted.

Q. What is an epichirema

A. A sort of double enthymem, in which the proof of both premises precedes the conclusion.

Q. What is a dilemma?55

A. A dilemma or argumentum cornutum is a compound argument, in which after a whole is divided into two parts & something proved concerning both, the same is affirmed or denied of the whole.

Q. How does a Dilemma become vicious?

A. Either when the parts of the disjunctive major are not properly opposed to each other, or when the conclusion inferred from either or both is not necessary, or when the dilemma can be retorted with equal justice on the opposer.

Q. In what case is the dilemma capable of being retorted?

A. When any one of the parts of the disjunctive major is contained in the other.

Q. What is a sorites?

A. An argument consisting of a series or string of propositions, so placed that the predicate of the preceding proposition, becomes the subject of the following, & the last predicate is concluded of the first subject, by the intervention56 of a number of middle terms, equal to that of the numbers of which the sorites consists.

Q. What is a prosyllogism?

A. An argument containing two syllogisms, in five terms, so that the conclusion of the first becomes the minor of the following.

Q. How are Syllogisms divided in regard to their matter?

A. Into Dialectic, apodistic, & sophistic

Q. What is a Dialectic Syllogism?

A. One that begets opinion, or from probable premises infers probable conclusions.

Q. What is an apodictic Syllogism?

A. One that begets science; or whose certain conclusions are necessarily inforced from certain premises.

Q. What is a Sophistic Syllogism?

A. An argument, in which a false conclusion is inferred from true premises, by transgressing the rules of art.

Q. What sort of questions do Dialectic Syllogisms admit of?

A. True or false probable or improbable, Necessary or contingent.57

Q. How many kinds of apodictic Syllogisms are there?

A. Two.

1st οτι or quad sit which proves the existence of a thing.

2. δι ότι or cur sit which proves the reason of its existence.

Q. What sort of middle terms are employed in the demonstration οτι?

A. The argument is brought either from the effect, or cause.

Q. What are demonstrations a priori?

A. Those which argue from cause to effect.

Q. What are demonstrations a posteriori?

A. Those in which we argue from effect to cause.

Q. What is an indirect demonstration, or abdictio ad absurdum?18

A. A species of demonstration δι ότι whereby it is proved that a thing cannot be otherwise than it is.

Q. What are the chief species of sophisms or sophistic syllogisms.

A.

1. Ignoratio Elenchi, in which a different thing from the question is proved & resolved by distinction.

2. Petitio principii, or beginning the question when the very thing in question is assumed without being proved.58

3. Non causa pro causa wherein that is assigned for a cause, which has no power of causation.

4. Fallacia accidentis, when a consequence is supposed necessary which is only accidental.

5. Concluding a dicto secundum ad dictum simpliciter, when one argues from what is true in a particular case, as if it were true on all occasions.

6. The sophism of composition & division, when things are taken jointly that ought to be divided, or when things are divided that ought to be taken jointly. This also includes the mistake of singula generum for genera singulorum.

Q. What is method?

A. The arrangement of things in due order according to the nature of the subject or intention.

Q. How is order defined?

A. That according which any thing is prior or posterior to another, or at the same time with it.

Q. How many ways may a thing be prior or posterior to another?

A. In five ways, that is, in time, nature, disposition, dignity, & knowledge.

Q. What is prior in order of time?

A. That which exists before another.59

Q. What is prior in nature?

A. A thing may be said to be prior to another in nature two ways, either by its consequence of existence, or causality. That is said to be prior in its consequence of existence, which being supposed, another thing is supposed, but which not being supposed, the other thing is not supposed. That is prior in causality which is the cause of the existence of another.

Q. What is prior in disposition?

A. That which is nearest the beginning.

Q. What is prior in Dignity?

A. That which is most excellent.

Q. What is prior in knowledge?

A. That which is most obvious & first perceived by the mind.

Q. In how many respects may things be said to be at the same times?

A. In as many as they can be said to be prior or posterior to each other.

Q. Is the same order to be observed in all subjects?

A. No, the order ought to be suited to the subject in hand.60

Q. What must be the best method for the communication of truth?

A. That which displays it in the most natural & convenient order, to the understanding & tends most to fix it in the memory.

Q. Is that method best which is chiefly calculated for the ease of memory?

A. No if perspicuity is lessened by it.

Q. How many kinds of method are there?

A. Three, Analytic, Synthetic & arbitrary or occasional.

Q. What is analytic method?

A. That in which we proceed from a particular truth already known, to others that concern a particular thing.

Q. What is a synthetic method?

A. That in which we proceed from general to particular.

Q. Do not both these methods conclude in the same end?

A. Yes, & they only differ from each other as the different method of stating Genealogies; wherein we either begin at the last person & ascend to the first, or when we begin at the first & descend to the last.

Q. What rules are common to both methods?

A.

1. That no proposition be admitted, to61 which we can deny our assent.

2. In every degree of progression the connection ought to be evident.

3. We ought only to reason of things of which we have clear ideas.

Q. What are the particular rules of synthetic method?

A.

1. That general principles be first laid down, & then the consectaries19 flow from them.

2. To use no words that are not defined or perfectly understood.

3. All consequences drawn ought to be necessary.

4. No propositions to be assumed except axioms.

Q. What is arbitrary method?

A. That which depends, on the intention of the person who uses it, as writers of Dictionaries observe the order of the Alphabet, Historians the order of time, & Poets & Orators, that which they think will be best to persuade or please others. —

The end of Logic.62

Autograph Document

Dickinson College Archives & Special Collections, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Roger Brooke Taney notebook on "Logic & Metaphysics"

This manuscript is the first half of one of the three hand-sewn volumes containing the notes Taney took while attending Dickinson College. The first several pages consist of Taney signatures in various styles, and have not been included in the transcription. The title page reads: Questions &. Answers. / on / Logic, Metaphysicks / and / Moral Philosophy / by the / Revd Charles Nisbet D.D. / Carlisle.

That which applies to all but not only

Only but not all

All and only but not always

All Only and Always

A distich is a pair of lines, or couplet, in poetry

A mnemonic device used to illustrate the ten categories. William Fleming, The Vocabulary of Philosophy (London and Glasgow: Richard Griffin and Company, 1857), 72 - 73.

End from which or starting point

The terminus ad quem is the end to which, or aim

There is nothing in the effect that was not first in the cause

A petitio principii (an assumption from the beginning) refers to the logical fallacy in which a premise is assumed to be true without justification

Good conduct

The highest or ultimate good

Contraria juxta se posita clarius elucescunt, or Opposites placed next to each other shine more clearly

From privation to habit there is no return

A variation of seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza’s proposition that Quicquid clare et distincte percipimus, verum est: Whatever we perceive clearly and distinctly is true. Spinoza, Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, Pars I. Propositio XIV.

"There are four kinds of idols besetting human minds. To help in my teaching, I have given them names. I call the first, Idols of the Tribe; the second, Idols of the Cave; the third, Idols of the Market-place; and the fourth, Idols of the Theatre. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Book I, Aphorism 39.

He who is silent appears to agree

Likely a misspelling of reductio ad absurdum, a form of argument in which one attempts to establish a claim by proving that the opposite claim leads to an absurdity

Deductions from premises, or things which follow by consequence

A A