The Papers of Roger Brooke Taney

Septr. 14. 1849

I have always intended to write an account of the part I took in opposition to the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States. But infirm health & the fatigue of official duties have heretofore compelled me to postpone it; and I have found it necessary to pass the short vacations which are allowed me during some of the summer months, in recreation & exercise in order to recover strength for the renewal of my judicial labors. Yet I have always felt that justice to myself & to Genl. Jackson, and to the truth of history required of me the work I now commence. I know not whether I shall be able to complete it But being at this time in the Country with my family, at a quiet place, and without any engagements of business for a few weeks it will give me pleasant occupation to pass a few hours every day in recalling to memory & narrating the incidents of that memorable struggle made by the Bank to overthrow the administration of Gen l . Jackson, because he was opposed to the renewal of its charter compel the government to renew its charter.2

As I Now look back to that trying period, after the lapse of sixteen years, & remember the scene of distress and ruin & alarm which pervaded the Union & the constancy & courage which with which the administration was supported by a majority of the people of the U. States, my confidence in the intelligence & public spirit of the American people gathers new strength, and my hopes become firmer that our free institutions may will be perpetuated. It was a fearful time scene scene of dismay & ruin for some months after the decisive measure was adopted of removing the deposits of the public money from the Bank. It then put forth its whole strength, & its power was every where felt. The currency of the country consisted at the altogether of paper. There was no gold in circulation, & very little in the country either hoarded or in the vaults of the Banks. Silver The little specie in circulation consisted of silver. But silver is too heavy Silver to to become the principal general currency of a commercial community, and is hardly ever used as such, except for very small transactions or the purposes of change. Of course there was little of it in circulation. And when the paper currency was suddely & violently contracted there was nothing to take its place. This sudden contraction took place was made by the Bank soon after the deposits were removed; and the distress and ruin which followed is without example in the history of the U. States.3

It produced more real suffering in the country than than the last war with Great Britain, with when her fleets and armies took possession of our waters & on our shores had been able to inflict in the her armies were landed on our shores. It was not confined to particular places places but was felt in every State. Property became unsaleable – the price of produce & labor was reduced to the lowest point – & thousands of indigent were thrown out of employment commerce was embarrassed and confused, thousands and ten of thousands of industrious laborers thrown out of employment, and a multitude of most estimable & respectable citizens who persons who had supposed themselves to be in affluent circumstances & in truth were so, were sunddely suddenly reduced to poverty and want. A small debt would often ruined the possessor of a large property, – Nobody prospered but those who had the means & were willing to could speculate upon the distress of others, or upon profited by the confusion in the value of the paper of the state Banks, which grew out of this general want of confidence.

The power of the Bank of the U. States was not then nor is it I believe now fully understood and appreciated by the mass of the community. And there are I doubt not many intelligent persons who at this time cannot comprehend how a mere Bank was capable of producing such a wide spread scene of ruin extending as it did from one end of the Union to the other. And as it followed immediately after the removal4 of the deposites that it must have unavoidably occasioned by that measure: many yet suppose that the removal produced it: And and that the evils which the country endured were produced occasioned by a derangement of the currency which this necessarily arising altogether from this act of the administration. It was the policy of the Bank to create this impression – & it was vehemently insisted on during the contest, by the newspapers & others under the influence of the Bank; & was reechoed day after day by the politicians in & out of the public councils who were opposed to Genl. Jackson & striving to overthrow his administration. The removal of the public was deposites was called tampering with the currency! And it is one of the remarkable events of that period & shews how far party spirit & disappointed ambition will carry men, when heated in the contest, that many who were avowedly opposed to the recharter of the Bank & deemed it not only inexpedient but unconstitutional, united with it in this war upon the administration, and encouraged & upheld it in all of its measures . demanded the restoration of the deposites, as the only cure for the public distress. Yet it was obvious that if the administration was overthrown on this ground the recharter of the Bank was inevitable5

The Yet the removal of the deposites did not of itself produce ne c essarily the slightest commercial embarrassment or the least derangement of the currency. They were intended to be gradually withdrawn, according to the wants of the government; and if ever that mode of withdrawal had been found more rapid than the Bank could conveniently bear, the public wants could & would have been supplied as far as was proper from the new depositories – The removal of the deposites therefore did not compel the Bank to pursue There was not the least necessity therefore for a sudden & violent contraction by the Bank of its discounts or issues of paper. It was moreover the duty of the Bank to keep itself ready at all times to pay over the whole amount of the money it held on deposit for the government upon reasonable notice. And not only to pay it over, but to do so without deranging disordering in any degree the monetary concerns of the country. For in addition to the regular current expences of the government, there was a Subsisting public debt bearing interest which it was the duty of the the administration were bound to pay off as early as practicable; and which would require it to pay all this required the government to use all the public money that could be spared from the oridary ordinary expences: whenever the surplus was large enough to make it important.6 Indeed it was only a short time before, that the government had directed the whole surplus then on deposit to be paid by the Bank in discharge of the 3 percent Stocks. which it was anxious to redeem. How the Bank endeavored to evade that order I need not now say, nor is it important to the matter in hand. I mention this order to pay away the whole surplus to s hew for the purpose of shewing that while any portion of the public debt remained unsatisfied, the Bank had no right to count upon suppose that a large deposit, would be suffered to remain for any length of time: – and that it was its duty therefore as the fiscal agent of the government, to regulate its discounts & issues so as to be ready at all times to pay over upon reasonable notice the whole amount due to the government without subjecting the community to any sensible inconvenience. If it was not in a condition to do this when the deposites were removed, it had failed in its duty to the public & did not deserve a recharter.7

Undoubtedly while the Bank of the U. States continued to be the to be the depository, the collection of the public revenue gave it great advantages and power over the state institutions, & enabled it to discount & to issue its notes as freely to a larger amount than it could safely do after the deposites were removed. And the gradual removal would therefore create the necessity for a gradual curtailment. But the void thus created could have been easily filled up by the new depositories without any Sensible pressure upon the business of the community, or any inconvenient diminution of the circulating medium. And if the charter was not to be renewed the time if it had not come was certainly near at hand when this curtailment should be have been begun. This was admitted by the Bank itself. For in its The Bank indeed had asserted that the time had come nearly a year before. For in its petition for the renewal of its charter, at the Session of 1831. 1832, which was determined on & prepared before Congress met it assigns as the reason for asking a decision at that time, that if the charter was not to be renewed, it was important that they should it was time to prepare for winding up the business affairs of the Bank by beginning at once to curtail their its business. The deposites were removed In removing the deposites the government acted upon the ground that the charter was not to be8 renewed. & It therefore merely required compelled the Bank, to do, what it acknowledged had asserted that it would be its duty and its interest, to do, if the Bank was not to be rechartered. and was and its own determination to do under such circumstances.

It is well known that the bill for the renewal of the charter which passed upon this petition was vetoed by Genl. Jackson and his reasons stated at length. And that in the election for President in the fall of 1832 this veto was made the principal ground of opposition to his reelection. He His opponent Mr. Clay was avowedly in favor of the Bank. Genl. Jackson was however reelected by an overwhelming majority of the electoral votes – and as there was not a possibility that the Bank could obtain at any time a majority of two thirds of both Houses in its favor, the reelection of Genl. Jackson was decisive against against the recharter. He had officially declared that he regarded the institution as unconstitutional as well as inexpedient, & as the existing charter expired a few weeks one year before his second term would end, the question as to the renewal was in fact finally decided and it was the duty of the Bank immediately after his reelection according to its own shewing to begin to wind up its affairs.9

The motive assigned in the petition was however a mere pretext. The Bank had no intention of beginning to wind up, if it was defeated. on that petition. The real object in selecting that time to bring in the question of recharter, was to defeat prevent the reelection of Genl. Jackson. It was a political movement. Mr. Biddle who was then the President of the Bank, had been long enough in office, to feel that it was capable of exercising great influence in the councils of the nation and upon the community generally. He exercised possessed an absolute Control over the Dir a majority of the Board of Directors, and in fact regulated the movements & business of the institution. In point of fact, (as most commonly happens in institutions of that kind), he by means of proxies in his hands or in the hands of others in whom he confided he himself selected the twenty Directors which the stockholders were authorized to elect; while the government could appoint but five. The whole power of the corporation was therefore centered in himself. He was an ambitious man; and full of vanity, and loved power. He believed that by bring the weigt and influence of the Bank into the approaching election he could defeat Genl. Jackson, and that the whole community would he wished political aspirants to see that he had defeated him. – He led the Bank therefore into the political arena determined to shew its strength in political contests. It is true that He over rate d its strength. The event He proved that he overrated it. 10

But he made the struggle a severe one. And although the majority for Genl. Jackson in the electoral colleges was very large, yet the contest in several of the States was a close one, & was considered for a time as by no means free from doubt.

I have said that the The Bank was undoubtedly capable of exercising great influence upon th e community generally . The privileges conferred upon it by its charter gave it great power. and possessed powers with which no corporation can be safely trusted in a republican government.

The pledge of the government to receive its notes

It had before it began this contest already established Branches at the principal places of business throughout the United States. These Branches were all governed by the central power in Philadelphia & could be made to move in concert at any moment. and of course always acted in perfect harmony & concert. And the Bank could make itself felt at the same moment in every part of the U. States.

It issued notes payable at some one of these branches, & for which specie could be demanded nowhere else. Yet as these notes were by the charter of the Bank made receivable every where in payment of public dues, they readily circulated all over the union, no matter how distant from the place at which they were made payable. It was the policy of the central Bank & its Branches to put in circulation in their dis counts and other operations as far as they could notes payable made payable at distant places. And it was enabled by11 this means to keep out a larger circulation and transact a much larger business, than its actual subsisting means of redemption would have justified. Discounts were freely made at the Southern & Western Branches, where it was known that the notes would be disbursed in the importing cities where the revenue was collected. Unless these discounts exceeded all reasonable bounds, there could be little danger of a run upon the mother Bank or any one of its Branches. The pledge of the government to receive them in payment for duties lands and all other public demands was in substance made the U. States in effect responsible in effect for the payment of every note issued. – and gave the notes of the Bank and all its Branches This Guaranty of the U. States sustained the credit of these notes, at the most distant places. – And if by any means a large amount accumulated in the hands of an individual for which he desired to obtain Specie, it was always his interest to submit to a small discount rather than incur the expence & hazard of sending for the Specie to a distant Branch. Upon examining the accounts of the Bank it will be found, that a very large amount of these notes12 were made payable at Fayetteville in North Carolina, & other places to which the course of trade would hardly ever return them. There was a very large amount of them I recollect made payable at the Branch at Fayetteville in North Carolina. And And before the invention of rail roads, very few would have been willing to travel to Fayetteville for specie, from any one of the principal importing Cities – and would have preferred paying a considerable discount – The official These Branch notes and the Guarantee of the government, gave the Bank immense great power over the business concerns of the Country. ; as by which It enabled it to expand its issues suddenly & to an immense amount when it desired to create an abundance in the circulating medium. And it could create a pressure by as suddenly contracting, when a pressure upon the public was a part of its policy. This immense machine was in all its parts moved at the same moment according to the unchecked will of one man.

Another element of its power was that it was made the depository of all the public money collected. Indeed the These privileges which stated before would not have been far less so formidable, if the Bank and its Branches had not been the depositories of the public. This notes privilege daily filled its vaults & those of its Branches with the notes of different state Banks paid in by for duties or for lands: & or other public demands. And as the mother Bank was bound to receive only the notes made and Branches were only not bound to redeem them notes made payable only payable 13 notes only, that wer e made payable then at them respectively, they were not bound to receive their own those the notes of the Bank payable at other Branches payable at another Branch, they were not obliged to receive them in the settlement of their accounts with the state Banks. They might demand the Specie from the state Bank although actually debtor to it to a large amount , provided the notes it offered by the S tate Bank were not made payable at that particular place Branch. This And this power was freely exercised by the Bank, especially towards those the State Banks which it did not choose to patronize.

These privileges combined placed every state Bank in the commercial cities at its mercy. It could shake the credit of any state Bank & cripple its business by refusing its notes in payment of duties upon the ground that it did not regard it as safe. And it could compel any one of them to stop payment by collecting its notes through its various branches & holding up for a time the its notes received for revenue at the various for a time Branches & then suddenly demanding specie & refusing receive its own notes in exchange, if not payable at that place –

The Bank itself was fully aware of this power. In a letter of Mr. Biddle to the Chairman of a committee of the Senate written some time before the question of recharter was brought before Congress he states with great confidence, that it had14 always been in the power of the Bank of the U. States to break any state Bank it pleased: And from the manner in which he made this statement he seemed to be claiming the tone of his letter seemed to imply that he thought himself entitled to credit for his forbearance

This statement of M r. Biddle of the power of the Bank ought in my opinion to have been of itself to have sufficient reason to press for not renewing to prevent the renewal of the charter. It certainly would have been a most dangerous experiment to continue the existence of a Monster admitted to be capable of swallowing up the whole of the State Banks. It made the existence of the State institutions dependent upon the will of a single individual. Even And all the advantages ascribed to it the Bk. of the U. S. if they had been really founded in truth, would not have compensated for the destruction of the hundreds of millions of property vested in stocks of State Banks, & the notes they had issued. As to its forbearance, it had been so crippled by its own misconduct in the early years of its existence that its power over the state Banks for some time was not very formidable. For a time indeed it needed their good will & support. When this statem And after it had recovered and reestablished its stregth strength, its charter had but a few years to run; & it was not a time to bring upon itself the united hostility of the State Banks institutions & the multitude of persons interested in them when it must soon ask for a renewal of its own existence. What would have happened if a recharter for twenty & thirty15 years had been obtained it is impossible now to say. But I believed as Soon as I read Mr. Biddle’s letter & believe now, that it would gradually have compelled every state Bank in the Union to wind up. The letter of M r . Biddle shews His statement shews that the matter had been thought of – and the mode of doing it that the manner in which it could be done was well understood.

The number of individuals too who were immediately within the range of its influence was immense & they were S cattered all over the Union. It had established a Branch in every state of the Union except in I believe with the exception perhaps of two or three which had been but recently admitted. The Directors & officers of these Branches & the privileges & emoluments to which they were entitled were in all of these Branches were appointed by the mother Bank at Philadelphia and were subject to its orders. Their privileges, as well as the & emoluments of the the officers of the Branch were regulated by by the same measure authority. And In every instance one or more of the most eminent laws lawyers in the State was retained as its counsel. And at each of these Branches loans to a large amount were made, bills discounted, & other pecuniary facilies facilities afforded to those whom the mother Bank, or the Directors of the Branch wished to favor.16

It will be readily imagined that all of these persons would be strongly tempted to support favor advocate the renewal of the charter. Many of the debtors would look with some dismay to the loss of their usual accommodations; not and the directors & officers be most unwilling to part with the advantages & emoluments which their positions afforded them. They would with the usual infirmity of man be very apt to think that an institution from which they themselves were deriving so much benefit, could not be very injurious to the community. And being always selected from men of high standing & political influence in society, they were capable of exerting great influence in elections. Upon this great body of men Spreading all over the Union, composed of debtors, – of favored indivals individuals – directors – officers – counsel & Attornies & their various & numerous connections and friends, the Bank naturally supposed it might rely in a the contest for a recharter upon which it determined to enter. With but very few exceptions it was not disappointed in its calculations. One I knew at that time, and it is exception however seems to be sufficiently remarkable to be remembered. John White was the Cashier of the Baltimore Branch. He did his duty so faithfully & ably that they did not venture17 to remove him. Yet he always openly avowed his opinion that the Charter of the Bank as it then stood ought not to be renewed. And although he very properly took no active part in the elections yet he openly voted for Genl. Jackson, & for his friends throughout the contest.

It had increased its power over the currency & over the state Banks by a manifest evasion of its C harter.

The establishing of one of these Branches, while it greatly increased the power of the Bank, and placed the state institutions at its mercy, cost the Bank very little, & required no drain of Specie from the mother Bank, or any Branch previously established. Nothing more was necessary than to select some dozen Directors upon whom it supposed it could rely – select a President cashier & such other officers as it chose to appoint & fix their salaries, and send to it large bundles of notes made payable at the mother Bank or other Branches, & the Bank upon new Branch was at once completely established. Not a dollar of Specie was necessary. The Branch proceeded at once to discount notes & purchase Bills, & to pay out the notes which the Central Bank had forwarded. The guaranty of the government made these notes current – and they could not be returned to the Branch because they were all made payable18 elsewhere. The collection of the revenue would soon bring into their vaults a sufficient amount of the paper of the State Banks, to give them the S pecie they for which specie could be demanded & obtained. And when the coffers of the Branch were by this means sufficiently filled it to meet expected calls, notes were then issued by the mother Bank payable at that Branch, and put in circulation at some distant place, where they would probably be used in payments to the government & be very slowly if even be returned upon the Branch. And these Branches it continued to establish, until when its own charter had but a few years to run.

Besides these advantages it had a strong a multitude of intelligent business men who had not carefully looked into its operations had unlimited confidence in the safety of the Bank, – and supposed it in that respect to contrast very favorably with the state Banks. They saw that its notes were received without hesitation in every part of the union, while the notes of the state institutions, could not be circulated except at a loss out of their immediate neighbourhood. And without looking to the charter of the Bank of the U. States, which made the government ultimately responsible for every note it might issue, they imputed the Superior credit of its notes, to its superior management, and the supervision which it supposed the government had an opportunity of exercising over it. They were regarded the universal credit given to its notes, as19 proofs of prudent & upright management, & the general confidence resulting from its, overlooking the real foundation of this credit, which was the obligation of the United States to redeem them. They could not materially depreciate, unless the world country was so flooded with its issues them, that the whole revenue of the Country could not in a reasonable time absorb them. Yet this mistaken confidence increased added very much the power of the Bank, in a cont es t which was necessarily in controversy which from the nature of our government to be ultimately must necessarily be was ultimately to be decided by public opinion and the votes of the people.

The Bank too had availed itself of this confidence to increase its power over the circulating medium & over the state Banks by a palpable evasion of one of the provisions of its charter. The charter in express terms prohibited the issue it from issuing any note below the denomination of ten dollars authorized it to issue notes at a denomination as low as five dollars signed by the President & countersigned by the cashier. – A great portion of the circulating medium consited consisted of five dollar notes. They are more convenient & more used in the ordinary daily business of the community and I am inclined to think must have amounted nearly to one half of the whole amount of the paper in circulation. – I have no tables before me & cannot therefore speak with certainty. Nor could the exact proportion be ascertained without returns from all the state Banks20

When I speak of the circulating medium, I mean the money notes used in the daily and ordinary concerns of business, and which is are continually passing from hand to hand, and generally remain out for a long time in the hands of the community without being returned upon the Bank for redemption. I think I have not over estimated the proportion of this currency which the five dollar notes formed of this description of currency. They are but little used in remittances to distant places; because in transactions of that kind large notes are generally required. And they are well Suited for a local paper currency circulating in a particular neighborhood. For they are much used by persons not very skilful in detecting forgeries; and the vicinity of the Bank which issues them furnishes the currency contributes very much to protect such persons from imposition. In For in s uch cases counterfeits upon it are most commonly speedily detected and exposed – & attempts to circulate them in the neighborhood of the Bank are on that account very seldom made. This portion of the paper currency was intended to be reserved for the state Banks to protect them from the overshadowing influence of the Bank created by Congress. 21

The Bank of the U. States, could not under its charter avail itself of this circulation, to any great extent, for the labor of signing such a number of notes as would be necessary to make the amount important, was more than the President and Cashier could well undergo in addition to their other duties. Certainly Mr. Biddle with his aspiring views & gigantic plans was not a man to sit at his desk month after Month to sign five dollar notes in number sufficient to supply the wants of the whole Union for that description of paper. It was had had therefore been supplied for some years by the local Banks. But it was necessary for the interest of the Bank to supply engross if it could this circulation. It enabled For it would enable it to support keep in circulation a much larger amount of paper, and thus increase its business and its profits. And what was still more important to it his with its views to power & influence of obtaining power power over the business of the country it would give it more effectually the control of the currency, & make its power more sensibly & universally felt when it thought proper to increase or diminish the circulating medium. Its superior credit in distant places would give its five dollar notes great advantages over the issues of the local Banks. It therefore continued, in place of the five dollars notes authorized by its charter to issue what it called22

But notwithstanding the prohibition in its charter the Bank in the usual spirit of monopolies sought to extend its privileges beyond their power over the currency beyond its chartered limits; and to share in the circulation The prohibition was so direct & imperative, that it would dared not venture to issue five dollar notes in the usual form, as that might have endangered endangered the existence of the charter. But it continued in their place what it called branch drafts: – that is one of its Branches drew a bill on another Branch for five dollars, payable to some person or Bearer – or perhaps in some instances payable to one of its own officers or to his order & indorsed by him in his official character. I am not sure as to the exact form of these Branch drafts, as it is some years since I have seen them one. But they were in the one or the other of the two forms above mentioned. They were printed on paper & in type so as to look like Bank notes. And without being even accepted by the Branch on which they were drawn, they were paid out and put in circulation as money, like their other notes. These drafts made by the Branches upon each other did not upon the face of them bind the Bank to pay them at any place, for as I have said they were not generally, if ever, accepted by the Branch on which they were drawn. And there23 might be have been some difficulty in maintaing a suit for them the Branch which is on them against the branch that issued them or any one else. For they were passed from hand to hand for years without being demanded presented to the Branch on which they were drawn; & the one that drew them could not be sued; – for it was not a corporation. And The Bank itself that is to say the corporation was not a party to them; – and neither drew, nor accepted nor promised to pay them. Yet it had influence enough to obtain an order from the Treasury Department directing them to be received in all cases as money in payment for government dues. And when this was done, they readily passed current in the individual transactions; like and shared in the general confidence reposed every where in the notes of the Bank; for which the government was by law responsible. Indeed the community generally hardly understood the difference between these Branch drafts, and the notes of the Bank, & received them with the same faith as if they had readiness & regarded them as equally safe. At the time of which I am speaking these drafts had been put in circulation to an immense amount, and constituted an important portion of the currency of the country. And it is no small proof of the power which the Bank had acquired over public opinion, that it was able to circulate as money, these issues, obviously in fraud of the law to which it owed its existence24 and for the payment of which it was difficult to say who was responsible, or when the holder had a right to reply. apply. It was however one of the usual fruits of a currency entirely of paper. For when that is the case, men in their ordinary business generally take any thing they find circulating in the form of paper money – without inquiring whether whether it will be paid or not – and indeed often without the means of ascertaining the fact if they were disposed to inquire. – The party takes it, not because he supposes it will be paid on demand; for he does not intend to demand payment: but because he supposes he can pass it away as money when he proposes to use it. This ingenious contrivance of the Bank This is one of the many evils of a paper currency. Paper Notes of no real value is are confounded with the good notes & with it ones & the unwary & ignorant cheated.

This ingenious contrivance of the Bank, increased its emoluments by giving it a wider field of circulation, and at the same time increased its control over the currency, & over the state Banks, & enabled it to expand or contract the circulating medium at its pleasure. enabled it to palm upon the public, notes for which the government were certainly not responsible – and which the Bank itself might refuse to pay without incurring the penalty from of stopping specie payments. These Branch notes were of course never received from a state Bank unless in p in the settlement of balances, even by the Branch that issued them; except only when it was deemed to as a matter of favor to the state institution or when the from motives of policy, it was encouraging25 the State Banks to expand.

But its most dangerous influence & formidable power when it entered the political arena, was the corrupt and corrupting influence it exercised it had acquired, over the press. In every state where a Branch was established some one or more of the leading News papers were devoted to its interests. – Even without any direct bribery, every paper would naturally desire the favor of the institution, on account the facilities it could afford him in his business, & the advantages he would derive from the patronage of the Directors & other officers. And if the newspapers already in existence were not sufficiently submissive faithful to the interests of the Bank, the influence of the directors & officers was always great enough to secure the establishment of another on which it could rely. – In other instances the Bribery purchase was more direct. – In the case of The National Intelligencer at Washington was in fact owned by the Bank. For under the name of a loan, the editors had received more than the establishment was worth – and the mortgage they made was in substance a sale, and the editors nothing more than the agents of the Bank. The case of the New York Courier & Inquirer was still more26 flagrant. The editors of that paper had been were warm friends of Genl. Jackson at his first election and had afterwards taken ground openly and strongly against the Bank. To the amazement of those who were not in the secret they suddenly changed Sides – and became the ardent supporters advocates for the renewal of its charter. The whole secret however afterwards came out & it appeared that they had received from the Bank fifty secretly from Mr. Biddle as president of the Bank fifty thousand dollars. It is needless to detail this disreputable transaction here because it has been fully stated in the official report of the examining Committee. How many other cases there were of like transactions we shall never know. But one thing is certain: that before the Bank entered upon into the contest, it had secured had secured the support of the great majority of the news papers in the country. The Bank It was continually praised the subject of praise. – Its every measure eulogized. Nobody Scarcely any news paper found fault with it – for never And if Mr. Biddle believed all that was said of him & the Bank he had every reason to suppose that Genl. Jackson would be overwhelmed as Soon as he took the field against him.27

the State Banks too exposed

With all these elements of power in the Bank combined together & wielded as they were by Mr. Biddle alone, it is not a matter of surprise, that he should have supposed himself able to control the election of president – and to the administration which had dared to express any opposition oppose the renewal of its charter

It was a bold measure however on his part to create a pressure in the money market throughout this country by unnecessarily contracting the currency – and charging the administration with the evils which he had himself occasioned. For the merchants & traders were the class of persons who would first feel the stringency of the money market, & would most seriously suffer from it most seriously. They were almost to man The great mass of them were in his favor in this contest, & I did not supp I confess when this subject was under consideration, I did not suppose that he would for any purpose consent to ruin his own friends; in order to secure the renewal and if he attempted to do so, that I did not believe they would submit to it – much less that they would cooperate in producing it. For they are undoubtedly in this country a highly intelligent class of men, & not easily deceived when their own interests are concerned. And I believed therefore, that if any unnecessary contraction took place, they would readily understand who was28 responsible for it – and that Mr. Biddle would now be compelled to relax his grasp or lose their support. He evidently had some doubts himself upon this subject, & felt his way with some caution. The pressure, severe as it was, while the re-election of Genl. Jackson was pending, was nothing compared to what it became, in the final struggle after the removal of the deposites. He had by that time discovered that he had either effectually succeeded in deceiving the mercantile community as to the true source of the evil – or that they had determined felt that they were in his power & compelled to support him at all hazards. For they not only held meetings every where denouncing the removal of the deposites – and sent committees & deputations without number to Washington to encourage the friends of the Bank, & intimidate its opponents; but they passed resolutions, in effect declaring in effect that unless the deposits were restored the commerce of the country was ruined, and general bankruptcy must follow. When the merchants said so of themselves, the rest of the community very naturally believed them. And when Credit was destroyed. A nd what With all Mr. Biddles power over the currency would have he could have made produced nothing more than a severe & trying pressure; In if left to his own resources; but by the aid of the merchants and politicians pushed us to a panic converted into he created a fearful panic: deepening in intensity29 every day for some months and overwhelming with ruin many of the friends of the Bank as well as its opponents. It required no little Stoicism to say the least of it, to press matters to this extent. He could by a word have changed the whole aspect of affairs in a single week. Yet in the midst of the cries of distress which were a rising rose up daily from some quarter or another, M r . Frelinghuysen one of his denoted friends, took occasion to say in the Senate every quarter of the country, Mr. Biddle sat unmoved in the marble palace of the Bank calm as a summer morning. So at least one of his friends (Mr. Frelinghuysen) took occasion to say in the Senate of the United States in the pronouncing a speech made in the midst of this deplorable ruin which Mr. Biddle had himself produced and which Mr. Frelinghuysen was then speaking to aggravate. Nero is said to have fiddled while Rome was burning. – But I have not learned from history that even his Courtiers praised him for it doing so. It is true Mr. Frelinghuysen charged the ruin around him upon the administration, – He may have believed it. But Mr. Biddle knew better. And I am satisfied that no impartial intelligent man who lived at that time saw & witnessed what was passing, & desired to form opinion in Washington could doubt, but that ruin he every day witnessed was wilfully produced by the Bank, & & the panic designedly created by its supporters; & was not the necessary consequence of the acts30 of the administration: and that Every member of the senate I doubt not knew and believed this as firmly as I did: and that the Senator above mentioned and every other Senator who professed to deplore the public distress calamity, and who daily declaimed against the administration for producing it, were seeking by their those very Speeches to deepen enhance the panic evil and to render the general suffering & distress by that means more intense; in the hope of casting the odium upon the President & his friends, & driving them from power. My experience and observation of the events of that period have convinced me that there are more ambitious politicians who act upon the principle of rule or ruin than are willing to acknowledge it to themselves. – Undoubtedly there were thousands & tens of thousands of honest men who were led by party prejudices to believe in these Speeches – and who still believe in them. But Senators & representatives in Congress had better means of information & could not have been deceived. Certainly they knew that to enhance & aggravate the panic was not the way to relieve the public distress.31 I proceed to the narrative. As my object is to do justice to myself as well as Gen l . Jackson, I necessarily speak about it As the plan upon which the deposites were removed to the State Banks was matured & executed by me must I must necessarily speak almost continually of myself and I therefore use the first person in this narrative: and I shall speak in the first person because it is the shortest and most direct mode: and It would be mere affection to do otherwise.

Genl. Jackson offered me the office of Attorney General of the United States in June 1831; – I accepted it, and soon after entered upon the duties of the office. I can say most truly that I did not desire the office; & accepted it with reluctance. – When I was of received this appointment, I was the attorney General of Maryland. This was the only office I ever coveted; although I certainly never asked for it & never made the slightest effort to obtain it. Nor did I desire it for the purpose of emolument. For the duties were performed & the fees received by my deputies in all of the courts of the state except except in the court of appeals to which very few cases were removed; & when the fees allowed by law were too small that they were not hardly worth the trouble of collecting to make the office an object of ambition desirable as a matter of profit to any Lawyer: even to one of the most moderate standing. But the office it had been most commonly filled by highly gifted and eminent men; & my family on both the Father & mothers side have been for so many32 generations Maryland people, that I have always felt strong Maryland attachments; and having as I never have had any ambition desire no desire for political distinction or power, my highest ambition was to receive the highest Bar honor in my native State; and to be thought worthy of Succeeding the distinguished Lawyers who had held the office before me. – I left it with reluctance. – For I had had no particular connection with the public affairs of the United States and had very little acquaintance with any of the leading men of the general government out of Maryland. But when he General Jackson offered me this office appoin appointment his first Cabinet had been just dissolved He was at that time vehemently assailed, not only by his old enemies but by new ones who had before been his friends. – I had scarcely any personal acquaintance with Gen l . except from him; and knew him only from his public acts & the history of his life. But yet my feelings towards him were warmer than mere political confidence. For I felt towards him happiness Pains had been taken to wound not only his fame, but his feelings & affections. – His wife had been most wantonly & cruelly defamed introduced into the electioneering contest. – she had been defamed & traduced in the most ferocious & truculent spirit.33 The ungenerous & unmanly attacks upon her character had not been confined to the low and the base, but were put forward and upon again & again by every newspaper which supported the rival candidate; from the highest to the lowest; – And and if not instigated and encouraged they were yet undoubtedly countenanced & encouraged by all the political leaders opposed to him – I felt that I should have grieved to see a high and noble spirit beaten down by those who had thus wantonly trampled upon hi m endeavoured to have tortured him, & broken the heart of the excellent woman to wh wife to whom he was so devotedly attached.1 It seemed to me that every man who by his support of him in 1824 had made him so prominent in the canvass of 1828 & by that means brought on him these this vindictive rivalry, was bound to do more than give him a mere cold political support: was bound to make personal sacrifices if they were necessary to support his administration while he continued to deserve his confidence & continued to be unjustly assailed. Such sacrifices They seemed to me to be necessary when new enemies were to combining with the old ones – and to wage the war against him in the same fierce spirit of personal hostility. And understanding that he had Some difficulty for as to the office of Attorney General I accepted it, as I have said with reluctance34 but without hesitation. – I certainly did not count upon being any thing more than the law officer of the government; and never dreamed that I should become a prominent figure actor in the most prominent event of the day his administration. In a country like ours where exciting political subjects follow each other in rapid Succession, some of the influences under which we have at times acted pass away from our own minds and cannot easily be understood or appreciated by those who come subsequently upon the stage & did not mingle in the conflict. But the motives which led me to accept feelings which I entertained towards General Jackson, & which strongly influenced my decision to accept the place of Attorney General of the United States were I am quite sure at that period common to ten thousands of those who had supported Gen l . Jackson him in the warm & exciting contests which had ended in began in 1824 – and ended in his election in 1828. We gathered around as his personal friends who felt & resented the cruel destruction of his domestic happiness. – In a pecuniary point of view the office was a losing one to a Lawyer in full practice in a large commercial City: and at the same time the most laborious in the government, with the exception of that of the President himself.2

It is proper here to state as the subject was because it was frequently made the subject of remark during the Panic War, that I was one of the old Federal party. – I certainly belonged to that party35 from the time I was old enough to exercise the right of suffrage, and would not have accepted the office General Jackson offered me, if its my acceptance had implied any change of my political principles or any abandonment of the party to which I had been attached. This General Jackson knew as well as I did – and his previous Cabinet as well as the one of which I was a member was formed without reference to par former party divisions. The main point in the dispute between the old parties was was concerned our foreign relations. And upon those questions the interest taken on both was so intense, that other questions were regarded as of Secondary consideration. For many years before the last war with England we appeared every day to be upon the cusp of a War with France or England or both. But the Federalists And when that war was over the Federal party as it existed before the last war with England was dissolved by the events of that the war. For the greater portion of the prominent men of that party in Maryland This is not the place to vindicate it, or to shew why it was dissolved. But it may not be improper to say so far as maryland is concerned that during the war the deepest dissatisfaction was felt by the greater number of the prominent Federalists of this sort of the State with the conduct of the Eastern Eastern Federalists of the Eastern States, at the conduct pursued by them For while the enemy was in the midst of us assailing our cities – & burning our houses & plundering our36 property, and the citizens of the state without distinction of party were putting forth their whole strength to defend themselves & bleeding in its defence – those with whom the Maryland federalists had been associated as political friends in the Eastern states and whom they had regarded & treated as the leaders of the Federal party generally were holding the Harford Convention3 – talking about disunion: – conferring with one another in secret conclave: demanding from us as one of the Southern States, the a surrender of a portion of the political weight secured to us by the constitution: and making this demand too in the hour of our distress when the enemy was upon us: – And They were moreover using every means exertion in their power to cripple in the power and to destroy the credit and cripple the means of the General government, feeble as then was: & leaving us to defend ourselves as well as we could by our own resources. It will readily be imagined that after this, the federalists of maryland would hardly desire to continue the party association, when and continue the lead in hands so indifferent to the interests who appeared to be not only indifferent to the the sufferings of our citizens but ready to take advantage of the peril in which the state was placed to extort from it the surrender of a portion of its legitimate power. – We thought it time that the party connection should be dissolved.

There was no general concert of action between the members of the old Federal party in relation to the general government after the close of the war. Mr. Monroe was elected without opposition – nor was there any37 organized opposition to him during his administration. – Indeed Some of the Federalists of the Eastern States who had been most prominent and active in the reprehensible proceedings which I have just mentioned seemed anxious to enrol themselves under his banner, and to be recognized as his political friends

At the election of 1824 when Genl. Jackson was first brought forward, Mr. Crawford was the regularly nominated candidate of the old democratic party4; & universally supported, general and with but very few exceptions, the leading men of that party were every where opposed to Genl. Jackson and denouncing him as wholly unfit for the office. In the Eastern states the great body of the federalists united with the Democrats in supporting Mr. Adams, who up to that time had been particularly obnoxious to the old Federal party on account of the time manner and circumstances under which he deserted it & went over to their opponents – In But in Maryland the far greater number of the Federalists who had taken a leading part in politics supported Genl. Jackson, whom they preferred to either Mr. Crawford or Mr. Adams; and at their head was Charles Carroll of Carrollton: – which the prominent men of the old democratic party, with very rare exceptions opposed5 38 became one party when these principles and measures were opposed by an organized opposition. It But it was a new party formed of persons who had belonged to both of them the old ones – and the Federalists and Democrats of former times who composed it, both found themselves in direct opposition to old party associates. There was nothing in the principles or measures of the administration of General Jackson, in any degree inconsistent with the doctrines of the old Federal party with which I had acted – And it is due to truth to say that a purer, more patriotic, or more enlightened body of men never in my opin so far as the Federalists of Maryland are concerned, that it was composed of pure, patriotic & enlightened men & so sincerely devoted to the cause of Liberty and to free institutions; and I have never seen any cause to regret my association with it – nor to change any political opinion that I then held in common with them my party friends. I speak only of the Federalists of maryland because I knew personally & intimately almost every prominent man, of the party of them of the party in the State; and had very little acquaintance out of it. And what I now say I have never concealed but have always up to this day Said made it a point to say it openly39 whenever the occasion seemed to make it proper for to speak upon the subject. Undoubtedly both of the old parties committed errors; and perhaps the greatest error of the Federal party (& it was one that led to others) was in electing Mr. Adams as the successor of General Washington. Certainly nobody would at this day think of proposing an Alien or Sedition law. Neither would any one think of dismantling our ships of the line & Frigates & going back to Mr. Jeffersons Gun Boats – nor of relying upon an embargo, or non intercourse to repel the insults or injuries of a foreign nation General Jackson certainly did not follow in the footsteps of either party in these respects. And although some time after his election those of his friends who had belonged to the old democratic party, were anxious for the purposes of political influence to take again that name – and although it is now claimed that his administration election was a victory of the old Democratic party – and the party who supported him the legitimate representative of that party as contradistinguished from the old Federal party yet it was not the name recognized at his election nor for some years afterwards. Nor could he have been elected if brought forward out under it. Nor had the questions The questions upon parties were afterwards formed while he was at the6 40

I proceed to the narrative.

The first discussion which took place in relation to the Bank was at a Cabinet Council, which was held in the Presidents office a few days before the commencement of the Session of Congress of December 1831.7 The meeting was called to hear read the annual message which had been prepared under the Presidents direction, and which he proposed to Send in.

It will be remembered that the first cabinet had been dissolved after the close of the preceding Session of Congress: and Mr. Barry the Post master General was the only one retained in the new arrangement. Mr. Livingston had succeeded Mr. Van Buren as Secretary of State: Mr. Mc.Lane was Secretary of the Treasury in place of Mr. Ingham: General Cass in the War Department in place of Genl. Eaton: and Mr. Woodbury in that of the navy instead of Mr. Branch. – I had succeeded Mr. Berrien as Attorney General41

The former messages in which of the President in which he had taken ground strongly against the renewal of the charter, and stated his conviction that it was unconstitutional as well as inexpedient & dangerous to the liberties of the Country; were. But they had been prepared with his former cabinet about him. What Their opinions were, upon the subject was were not generally known, but they were supposed to be un favorable to The opinions of all the members of the new Cabinet adverse to the Bank.

In the new Cabinet it was well understood that Mr. Mc.Lane was in favor of a renewal of the charter: and that his had no opinion was known to the President before he appointed him to the Treasury Department. The Bank was defended charter had been granted upon the ground that it was the a necessary fiscal agent of for the government and as such the question so far in collecting & disbursing the revenue: and the question of recharter therefore so far far as concerned its expediency or necessity more properly belonged to the consideration of the Secretary of the Treasury, than to that of any other member of the Cabinet. It was therefore on that account very naturally believed that his opinions in relation to the Bank, would be likely to have more weight with the President than those of any42 of the counsellors about him other member of the new cabinet. and his appointment to the Treasury Department with a previous knowledge of his opinions, created some doubt whether the Presidents own views had not changed to some extent undergone a change.

It was certainly not a judicious movement to bring into that Department, a Secretary who was openly and decidedly opposed to him, if he was still determined to carry out the opinions he had expressed. The His opposition to the recharter of the Bank & his plan for the reform of the currency: was the great which was connected with & intended to follow the defeat of the Bank were the great leading measures of his administration. The public mind was already much excited and divided upon them; subjects and would evidently become more so. And the appointment of a Secretary of the Treasury who differed with him seriously embarrassed must seriously embarrass his own Course, as well as that of the his the friends who agreed with him in opinion: while it gave countenance and confidence to his adversaries. – and It added the whole political influence of that Department to their Strength, which was already sufficiently formidable8 43 President were placed by him in the hands of some one together with directions from the President containing his as to his own views, for the purpose of being arranged in the form of a message. This was usually done by Mr. Livingston while he was Secretary of State in whom the President had great confidence. And most commonly where the President had so concurred in the views of the head of the Department, the very language of the latter was followed in the part of the message appropriated to the business of that Department. When the message was thus prepared it was read in full cabinet, and any part of it deemed objectionable by any member was fully & freely discussed in the presence of the President – who of course finally decided for himself how it should stand – and whether any alteration in the language used or opinions expressed should or should not be made. – The Attorney General having no Department had not no statement to make previous to the preparation of the Message – and generally knew nothing of44 what it was contain until it was read in Cabinet. This was my situation as to the Message of Decr. 1831 – And knowing the opinions of M r . Livingston who had made the draft draught of the message, and of Mr. Mc. Lane to whose Department the question as to the Bank more immediately belonged, I look listened with a good deal of interest & anxiety when Mr. Donelson who was reading it came to that part of the message. which related to the Bank.

I was startled when I heard it read – and the impression it made upon me was that it implied that although the President still entertaind the opinions expressed in his former messages yet in deference to the judgment that he had performed his whole duty in stating them; and that he would now defer to the representatives of the people & abide by their the decision of congress. – It will be remembered that an election for members of Congress had taken place after the message of 1830, in which he had stated strongly his objections, and discussed the subject at some length. that this was a new congress elected since he had make known in his messages his objections to the Bank & stated fully the grounds upon which he was opposed to a recharter. And it might be read I thought it might be implied from the message language now used, that having stated brought the subject to the attention of the people of the U states 45 message s , he was prepared to acquiesce in their decision of the people – and would regard the decision action of the new Congress whatever it should be as an expression of their will.

The sentence of the message as it then stood, to which I objected was different from the one finally adopted by the President – The M essage as sent to Congress paragraph in this message which relates to the Bank, after stating that he still entertained the contained opinions set forth in his former Messages and had felt it his duty to lay them before Congress & to bring them to the public attention concludes with the following sentence:

"Having conscienciously discharged a constitutional obligation duty I deem it proper on this occasion without a more particular reference to the views of the subject then expressessed to leave it for the present to the investigation of an enlightened people & their representatives."

The sentence as it was originally stood was I think as follows.

"Having conscientious conscienciously discharged a constitutional duty it is proper on this occasion I deem it proper without a more particular reference to the Subject to leave it to the investigation of an enlightened people & their representatives"46

I may not give the precise words of the original draught – for I have no copy of it – and & it is many years since the event took place of which I am speaking. But I believe I give the very words. For it was the first message after I became attorney Genl. – I was new in Cabinet discussions and in the concerns of the General government – & was hardly yet & was comparatively a stranger to Genl. Jackson,: for all of the other members of the Cabinet his Council had been in public life with him before he became President, & had been personally & familiarly known to him for many years. It was my first conflict in the cabinet; & I stood alone in it; and in opposition to Mr. Livingston & Mr. Mc. Lane who were experienced politicians, & in both of whom I knew that the President at that time reposed the highest confidence. The strongly The duty of making this objection I felt to be an unpleasant one: & the whole scence scene is yet strongly impressed on my memory47 9

. . . I thought otherwise; and that it would be inferred from this message, that the President merely meant to justify himself for what he had before said in his messages – that he considered himself as having discharged his whole constitutional duty in bringing this the subject before the p congress & presenting his views of it to the public: and that he was now prepared to submit his judgment to the decision of Congress, regarding that decision as speaking the will of the people. That as the President had That I did not suppose the President meant this. But he had called a new Cabinet about him, & every word in this message his upon this subject in his message would be carefully & anxiously weighed scanned. – It For it would naturally be supposed that the opinions & arguments of the councillors counsellors with which advisers with whom he had now surrounded himself, would might in some degree influence his op inion course; & might produce some change in his measures. And if it was supposed that what he had already done was he considered what he had already done as all that his duty required of him & that he would sign an act for the renewal, if Congress should pass one, many of those who were then prepared to go with him in opposition to the Bank, would be discouraged & fall off; while its friends & advocates would gather new strength; & put forward more vigorous efforts. He re I policy 48

In the cabinet meeting of which I am speaking Mr. Livingston, favored supported the message as proposed it stood & did not think the inferences I suggested would be drawn from it. He however said did not take a very earnest or leading part in the discussion. He was had paid very had in truth paid but little attention to the financial concerns operations of the government illegible or to questions of political economy or the currency. He was fond of literary pursuits & philosophical studies – and loved to mingle in society with persons of similar tastes. He had no ambition for high office and did not aspire to the Presidency. – The place of Secretary of state was I am sure the only one he would have accepted in the Cabinet. It engaged him in historical researches, & in the study & application of the laws of nations and of the principles on which they were based. He was truly a philanthropist: – a scholar – an amiable & accomplished gentleman; with whom it was and a delightful companion in the social circle. And when he came into office I have no doubt he looked forward to the embassy to France49 which he afterwards received. It suited his tastes and cast of mind far better than the intrigues and angry conflicts of political life. He had been aid de camp to Genl. Jackson during the campaign at New Orleans – and was one of his principal advisers in the measures so energetically (and as I have always thought lawfully) taken to repress & punish treason within his lines. He was warmly attached to Genl. Jackson, & had the highest respect for his judgment in any matter, to which he had given where he believed that the General had bestowed his attention upon it. The attachment was mutual. His The principal object what he said at the I speak of of Mr. Livingston seemed to be to avoid any decided movement against the in relation to the Bank until after the next election under the impression of President. He thought I have no doubt that if there was no strong popular excitement upon the subject, Genl. Jackson would certainly be reelected: and that in that event a charter for a bank of the U. S might be framed so as to that would avoid the Presidents objections to the existing one: without impairing its usefulness to the government. and at the same time an d be useful & and beneficial to the public. And50 not having turned his attention particularly to the subject, he had without examination imbibed the opinion which at that time of the extensively prevailed before the election of Genl. Jackson that a Bank of the U. States in some form or other was desirable, if not absolutely necessary, for the convenient collection of the revenue & the financial operations of the government.

The discussion as I have already said, in support of the paragraph as it originally stood, was conducted Chiefly by Mr. Mc. Lane. He objected strongly to any alteration. Mr. Mc. Lane was an ambitious man: loved power, & aspired to the Presi which dency which he confidently expected to reach He had been many years in Congress; and was for some time chairman of the Committee of Ways & Means10, which had made him familiar with the financial concerns of the country; & the manner of collecting & disbursing the revenue. This circumstance gave his opinions more weight in the Cabinet and he was Sensible of it.51

He had always been in favor of a Bank of the U. States, & his close intimacy with Mr . Biddle and with the Barings in England11 made him perhaps more zealous in its support. He was an accomplished Diplomatist12, & exercised as much diplomacy in Washington to carry his measures as he would at a foreign court: and he had a remarkable talent at managing men with whom he came in contact, who were inferior to himself or had less in strength of mind or firmness of purpose. He always knew wh en He had great tact, and always knew whether he should address himself to the patriotism, the magnanimity, the Pride the vanity, the hopes or the fears of the party person on whom he wished to operate. And he thus always gathered had a clique about him whener whenever he was in power over whose opinions he exercised a controlling influence.

His mistake was in underating the intelligence & strength & independence of the Presidents & the lofty independence of mind: his great and the extent of his information. He expected to manage him. Mr. Mc. Lane had belonged to the party which supported Mr. Crawford in 1824, in opposition to both Genl. Jackson & Mr. Adams; and it was52 and it was their policy at that time to represent him as one who possessed as little but little of the sagacity experience or information of a statesman, & who was incompetent on that account on that account to discharge the high duties of a President of the U. States;, and that if elected the measures of his administration would be influenced by the men around him. I have no doubt the leaders of the Crawford party thought so: and when they afterwards supported him Genl. Jackson in 1828 in opposition to Mr. Adams, they expected to govern him. Mr. Van Buren was his first Secretary of State and soon found out that this was a mistake & shaped his course accordingly. But Mr. Mc. Lane had been abroad from the went abroad as Minister to England soon after Genl. Jackson entered upon the duties of his office. He returned with the impressions which he had carried away with him. He supposed Genl. Jackson utterly ignorant in matters of finance and the Currency, and supposed his former messages about the Bank were written under the influence of others. He evidently believed that he would be able to change his opinions, and induce him to assent to a continuance of the charter53 with some slight and unimportant modification, sufficient as a salve to the Presidents consistency. And with his projects of ambition before him he was by no means insensible of the claims he would have upon Mr. Biddle if he could smooth the way to a recharter – nor of the influence which those interested in the continuance of the Bank might exercise in the selection of a successor to Genl. Jackson.

Genl. Cass said very little. He merely stated his approbation of the message as it stood read. – and that he did not think any alteration adviseable. He agreed he said with Mr. Mc. Lane.

Genl. Cass had migrated to the West, when he was a young man, and had always afterwards lived there. He was a lawyer by profession. – Indeed every Member of the Cabinet, & the President himself were lawyers who had been actively & successfully engaged in the profession. Genl. Cass abandoned the law & entered the army in the War of 1812 with Great Britain & served throughout the war with much distinction. He was afterwards Governor of Michigan when it was a territory: – and and they had never been in the coun public counsels at Washington54 until he was invited by the President to take charge of the war Department. He was a scholar and fond of scientific pursuits. But he had turned his attention as a public man altogether to the affairs and interests of the West – and to the character history habits & interests of the aboriginal inhabitants with which he was Surrounded. He knew nothing of the financial Concerns of the country except only as concerned its revenue from lands and had never bestowed a thought I believe upon the operations of the Bank, nor considered whether it was or or was not necessary to the collection of the revenue & the intercourse of Commerce – nor whether its charter was authorized by the Constitution of the U. States; or its powers over the currency so great as to make it dangerous to the government. His disposition was kind an amiable. – He had and that unfortunate And his yielding kindness bordered on that unfortunate weakness in a public man which makes him unwilling to say no to any proposition not morally wrong, when earnestly pressed upon him by one whom he esteemed55 Although he possessed a very high order of intellect This facile dispo this facile temper made him unwilling to come in conflict with any of his associates, upon any measure which was strongly pressed of policy strongly & perseveringly urged: – and His opinions were therefore often influenced by men of stronger will and firmer purposes who were not his superiors in reach of intellect or extent of information. Mr. Mc. Lane perfectly understood his character and exercised over him a controlling great influence while they were in the Cabinet together. Indeed his opinions upon almost every thing that did not immediately concern his Department, seemed to be indistinct and unsteady, & took their color for the time very much from those who took were around him & desired to impress upon him with their own views. – He too looked to the Presidency. Yet I think he had no very anxious desire to attain it: and he certainly never intrigued for it. And The aspiration Seemed to me to be implanted by others who were seeking to use him for other purposes, & not to spring from his own inherent ambition to obtain power or high political station56

Mr. Woodbury expressed no opinion upon the subject. He suggested some changes in words or phrases which he supposed might reconcile the difference between Mr. Mc. Lane and myself and be acceptable to both of us and to the President. But he did not say whether he thought them adviseable or not: nor whether he would or would not prefer any a change in the Message.

Mr. Woodbury was a trained politician. He was perfectly familiar with the operations of the Bank & had no doubt carefully examined the principles on which the charter had been justified – He had been much engaged in the councils of the State nation public life as and was familiar with all the powers and proceedings of the general government. But he was a singularly wary & cautious man; unwilling to commit himself upon any opinion upon which he was not obliged immediately to act. himself ; and never further than that action required. And if he expressed an opinion57 upon a measure, he most commonly added to it so many qualifications & limitations and doubts, that he often sometimes appeared relucant to take it back again. the opinion he had given. He was a man of strong and astute mind: of great industry, who carefully gathered together all the information that could be obtained upon any subject before him; even to the smallest matters of detail. He had I presume his own opinions & views well defined in his own mind – but did not deem it prudent to disclose them too distinctly even to his friends and associates. Nor could I on this occasion understand what he thought either of the constitutionily constitutionality or expediency of the Bank – nor what course under existing circumstances he would recommend the president to take. But whatever his opinions were, they were certainly his own, & never impressed upon him by the influence of others In this respect he was greatly entirely unlike Genl. Cass. It was said however that like him he aspired to58 the Presidency. – I rather think he did. – But if he had any views of that sort he kept them to himself – and determined to work them out in his own way so as not to & in his own time: and in a manner that would not bring him prematurely into rivalship or conflict with the other aspirants.

Mr. Barry the post master General said nothing. He was warmly attached to the President and had the most unlimited confidence in his judgment in every thing. He was a man of warm and general generous feelings – ready to serve a friend to the uttermost extent of his power & at almost any sacrifice on his part. He declaimed eloquently & beautifully & was particularly impressive before a Jury or a public assembly. But he was greatly deficient in practical talent, thought loosely & reasoned loosely and without spirit. Such at least he was at the time of which I am speaking. Unfortunate habits which he contracted afterwards may have changed for the worse the brighter parts of his character. His sad mismanagement of the post office arising altogether from his own want of59 practical talent, and his unbounded confidence in others, brought upon him bitter attacks from political opponents: nor could his friends with all their kind feeling to him always vindicate him his conduct. This soured him & perhaps alienated him in some measure from Genl. Jackson. But at the time of which I speak I am sure he had no desire to alter any thing which the President approved nor to resist an alteration if the President desired it.

Such was the Cabinet with which I was first associated – and such the scenes in the first serious opposition of opinion which I witnessed in it. I had been a member of it but a few months short time , & had no personal acquaintance with any one of them of my colleagues , beyond that of a mere introduction, or a casual meeting until I entered upon the duties of Attorney General. They knew me and I knew them by character only, until we came together as members of General Jacksons Cabinet. 60

The discussion continued for some time, and until I saw that the President was worried & wished it to end. – He had interposed occasionally as it went on – and my objection was evidently new to him & unlooked for. He said finally said that he certainly did not mean in that message to have it understood by that message that he was prepared to sign any bill that Congress might pass for continuing the Bank: – nor did he mean to say think it necessary to say at that time that he would veto it. It would be time enough when he saw the bill act and its provisions, if one should be passed. and presented to him. But he intimated that the clause in question did not seem appear to him to be liable to the objections I had taken – and he did not at that time seem to be disposed to make any alteration; – and I left the Cabinet meeting when it broke up, with the belief that I had failed & that no alteration would be made: and whether with strong doubts also whether under the influence of his new advisers he would not be persuaded to consent to the recharter of the Bank, with some plausible but unsubstantial restrictions on its power. But I did not then know Genl. Jackson as well as I afterwards knew him. If I had, these doubts would never have been entertained.61

If the President had written the paragraph himself there he would have been left no doubt about his its meaning: nor of what he had determined to do. His mind was bold an frank and straight forward. His conclusions were never cloudy or indistinct. He always saw his object clearly, and came up to it openly & directly. And when he had made up an opinion, whether he expressed it orally or in writing nobody could misunderstand what he meant. – But he had never studied the niceties of language – and disliked what he was apt to regard as mere verbal criticisms. And when he read any paper prepared under his direction, he always read it with the strong convictions of his own mind upon the subject, and with an undoubting confidence that his instructions had been fully carried out. For he reposed unlimited confidence in the frankness and fair dealing of those whom he consulted or called respected enough to consult or call about him; and always Seemed to listen unwillingly and listened reluctantly to any criticism upon the language of62 of such a paper a paper prepared under his directions; and seemed to apprehend that the writer might feel mortified, if what he had done was dismissed and declared not to fulfil the the language he had used was determined it was determined that he had imputed to the President him opinions he did not entertain – or failed to carry out to execute the instructions under which it the paper was prepared written. From the earnestness and tenacity with which Mr. Mc. Lane defended this paragraph, it was evident that he himself had prepared it: and that it had been adopted in his own words by Mr. Livingston in arranging the message. The zeal with which he defended it made The president I am sure was the more unwilling to make alterations, as it was evident therefore because he saw that Mr. Mc. Lane would be dissatisfied and perhaps a little hurt if it the paper was materially changed.63

The There was another trait in the character of Genl. Jackson which ought not to be overlooked: for although it endeared him the man to his friends as a man, it brought upon him many difficulties as President, & greatly strengthened the hands of the opposition. He It was this; never felt the least dissatisfaction with any one for freely & firmly in of his Cabinet for opposing him or, his most favorite measures, when the opposition was made openly & fairly & conducted with proper decorum. Frank himself, (perhaps almost to a fault perhaps in a public man), he loved t ac t frankness in others; and always regarded the expression of opposition to his opinions, if by one who held office under him, as evidence of firmness as well as honesty of purpose; which rather increased than It did not diminished his confidence & in or friendship for the party when he believed the advice to be given from an honest desire to promote the usefulness & success of his administration. And he carried this feeling so far that he had brought into his then cabinet men whom he knew to differed with him on a this great & favorite exciting measure, of his administration: and afterwards when he had nearly made up his mind to the decisive step of removing the deposites, he brought in Mr. Duane witho as Secretary of the Treasury without first ascertaining what ascertaining what were his opinions. were upon subject; or how far he could rely on his co operation. He had the most abiding confidence64 in the virtue and intelligence of the American people and always believed that if his measures were right, they would support him in carrying their them out, whatever the members of his Cabinet might say or think or say upon the question. In the And when in Cabinet discussions doubts were suggested, whether a movement would be supported or not, or supposed to be of a character that would alienate any of his friends in any particular portion of the Union, his reply often was most commonly was – He never fear the people will understand it: and if we do right Providence will take care of us. He was Determined to act upon his own opinions he was yet willing to let the opposing opinions of any member of his Cabinet go before the people & to abide the consequences. Forming But by By forming his Cabinets upon these principles he undoubtedly embarrassed his administration & endangered its success. – He in that way raised up obstacles to the execution of his own measures: and afterwards then found himself compelled to remove them. This was always unpleasant; made new enemies: & weakened his strength. It compelled him to dissolve his first Cabinet, and led to unpleasant conflicts and changes in the one of which I was a member. – Upon all the 65 great leading measures upon which the President has determined, The Cabinet should certainly be composed of men who concur with him the President in his leading measures. He ought to bring in no one, whose opinions are not well known to him and corresponding with his own; although he may call himself his political friend & profess to belong to the same party The Executive Department in its head and members should be an unit. For opposition in a member of the Cabinet is far more formidable than the opposition of the same person out of it: especially if he has happens to have aspirations for the Presidency –The administration and with some prospects of success. The administration of Genl. Jackson is a striking illustration of this. The appointment of the two Secretaries of the Treasury who preceded me, induced many to suppose he would abandon the ground he had taken – and increased & encouraged the hope of a recharter. It made the final contest upon a measure upon which he had so surely taken his stand in his inaugural address, & in which his opinions never afterwards wavered for a moment, a fearful one upon the interests of the Country – a far more severe & doubtful one than it need have been.66

For if he had taken care never to bring into his Cabinet any one whose opinion who differed with him on this subject – and it had always been understood to be the United determination of the President and his whole Cabinet to resist the recharter, the public mind would have looked for that decision more calmly and the Bank would have been far less able to excite a panic, & the public mind & produce the panic & ruin occasioned by its desperate Struggles. There would have been no petition for a recharter at the Session of 1831. & 1832 if the Mr. Biddle had not supposed that the New Cabinet would either induce the President to sign the act: or send in a veto so conciliatory in its terms as would insure a Charter at the next session.67

The day after the meeting of which I have been Speaking some business called me to the Presidents office, and I saw Mr. Donelson in the room near which he occupied as an office. I do not recollect whether he invited me in when he saw me or I went there because I had business with him. He shew ed read to me the paragraph in the message, altered as herein before mentioned & in the form in which it was ultimately sent in: and said the President had directed him to do so shew it to me. It was still far short of what I wished. I certainly did not wish desire the President to say in his message that he would veto the bill if Congress should pass one. This would hardly have been respectful to the Legislative body. But I wished him after stating that he still entertained the opinions Set forth in his former messages, to recommend to Congress to make some provision by law for the safe keeping, disbursement, & of the public money and its transmission from place to place of of the public money to take effect when the charter of the Bank should expire. This would have shewn his fixed opinion that the Bank was not to be continued, & would have been understood to imply, that he would feel himself bound too exercise all his constitutional powers to prevent it.68 While the inference most to be naturally to be drawn as the message originally stood was, that having performed his constitutional duty in Stating his objections he submitted the question to the decision of Congress. – Indeed the whole passage in relation to the Bank appeared to me to be studiedly ambiguous & words introduced into it & put together in such a manner as to make it look as much more like a justification, or an excuse to the friends of the Bank, than a Settled determination to resist it.

The alteration which the President had made in it, although could hardly remove the ambiguity. Yet I preferred it to the first draught. – And I was the more pleased with it, because the fact that any alteration was made to remove avoid the inference to which I objected, shewed indicated as I thought that President did not mean to abandon the ground he had taken: – nor to encourage hopes that he would do so. Yet the message was an unfortunate one & produced mischief 69

Yet this The message was an unfortunate one and produced much mischief. The acquiescence of the President in the its ambiguous & indecisive language & his refusal to take stronger ground encouraged Mr. Mc Lane to believe that with his present advisers in the Cabinet he could induced to after a time to retrace his Steps. – His The annual report of the Secretary of the Treasy to Congress was not Sent in some time afterwards. And although there certainly was nothing which at that time until two or three weeks after the message; and this report shewed what were the hopes of Mr. Mc Lane. For although there was nothing which required an expression of his opinion in that report in relation to the necessity or constitutionality of the Bank, Yet acting it would seem upon the impression above stated he used the opportunity to offer a strong argument in support of it, and insisted on the propriety and necessity of renewing its charter. It was in truth an answer to the Presidents former messages; and if the President intended to adhere to the ground he had taken, this report presented the extraordinary Spectacle of the President & his Secretary of the Treasury standing in hostile attitudes to each other upon a great financial measure, deeply affecting the whole community & upon which the public mind had become excited – and contending with one another against each other for the Support of Congress & the people. I did not suppose that either the President or Mr. Mc. Lane would consent to present such an anomaly in the Executive Department of the Government. And as the support report of the Secretary of70 the Treasury is always read to the President before it is sent in, I supposed when I saw the report of M r . M c . Lane that my first apprehensions when I left the Cabinet meeting as before mentioned were well founded; and that this report was intended to prepare the public mind for the change of ground. The report of the Secretary was never of the Treasury was not usually read in Cabinet: and its contents were therefore unknown to the other members, unless the Secretary thought proper to Shew it to them. I never saw this report until it was printed by order of Congress: and did had not know what it contained. I read it supposed that it would contain a word about the Bank. I read it with the utmost surprise. For if even the Presidents opinion had undergone a change, this did not seem to be the proper mode of indicating it., It should have worn the appearance at least of having arisen from his own reflections & further investigation and experience; and not to have been produced by the His altered views of the subject should at least have worn the appearance of having been produced by his own further experience & reflections; and not the sudden result of the influence which one of his Secretaries had obtained over him. It might have been told by the President The change in his opinions might have been better told by the President himself in his message the next year.71

This report as may be well supposed excited a good deal of attention, and was the subject of much conversation among the politicians at washington. I mixed very little with them at that season. For the Supreme Court was in Session; I was now in the office of Attorney General: and my time was fully occupied in the preparation and argument of the cases in which the government was interested and which Stood for trial at that Term. I attended the Cabinet meetings only occasionally, having requested the President to excuse me on account of my engagements in Court, and do not recall that I had any conversat I never had any conversation with him on the Subject of this mess report and never heard him Say why he permitted it to be sent in – and yet retained Mr. Mc Lane in office. Nor do I recollect that I had ever ever conversed about it with any member of the cabinet. I supposed myself to stand alone there upon this measure & had no inducement therefore to seek a conference with any of them; and indeed very seldom saw any of them except at public places during the winter.; which this 72 But I had occasional conversations with gentlemen in and out of Congress who were warmly attached to Genl. Jackson personally and politically; who had known him intimately for a long time and who and who like myself were opposed to the Bank. They understood the his the character of his mind, much better than I then did; and who like myself were opposed to the Bank. They knew and knowing my opinions and therefore talked to me freely. They strongly disapproved of Mr. Mc.Lanes report – and thought the President had committed a Serious political error in consenting to its being sent in & still retaining him in office. But they did not consider it as evidence that the course of the President in relation to the Bank would had undergone or was undergoing a change would be changed. They said that having brought Mr. Mc Lane into the Treasury Department with a knowledge of his opinions he would never object to his expressing them in any manner or any form Mr. Mc. Lane might desire.: – but that he would act upon his own. And that having made up his opinion as appeared by his former messages he was not likely to change it.73

I listened to all this I confess with some incredulity. It might be so. For I had been struck with his frank & magnanimous bearing: and his willingness upon all occasions to give those opposed to him an open & fair field: and the fixed convictions that his own opinions were right, and that being right he also the firmness with which he made up an opinion, & his confidence that it would be sustained by the people whoever might oppose it. But yet it was obvious that in appealing to public opinion, the arguments of Mr. Mc. Lane as Genl. Jacksons Selected Secretary of the Treasury would have infininitely more influence, than the arguments of Mr. McLane a private individual opposing one of Genl. Jacksons favorite leading measure. He had too much sagacity not to see this; and I could hardly suppose that the high chivalry so much to be admired in private life which offers odds to the adversary in a Conflict could lead him to commit such an error as a s tatesman in statesmanship. I still therefore apprehended that before the time period for recharter came round, that the President would be greatly softened down in his opposition, & that the influence of the new Cabinet on the public mind would secure the recharter by a decisive majority in Congress.74

The fruits of these mistaken measures soon Shewed themselves – but in a way I had not anticipated, and which I am sure was equally unexpected by the members of the Cabinet who had been concerned in them or approved of them. For in a short time after the report of the Secretary of the Treasury had gone in a petition on behalf of the Bank was presented to Congress, praying that a law might pass at that Session renewing the charter. The reason assigned in the petition for presenting it at that time was obviously a pretext and could deceive nobody. It stated that if the charter was not to be continued, it was necessary that the Bank should know it at once, in order that it might have time to wind up it concerns gradually without loss to its elf the stockholders or inconvenience to the community. This petition was presented it will observed in the Winter of 1832 and the charter did not expire until March 3. 1836; and it had under the charter two years afterwards more to wind up its affairs.75

But the truth was that it was evident that the ambiguous tone of the message, & the followed by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury in favor of the Bank had perplexed and mystified the friends of Genl. Jackson: and weakened the opposition to the renewal of the c harter, which up to that time had been daily gathering strength Bank. His His political opponents regarded these measures as proof that he feared the influence of the Bank & its friends in the approaching election of President, and was either retreating from his old ground, or seeking to evade the issue until the election was over. And feeling that they had been greatly strengthened by the Secretarys report & the friends of Genl. Jackson thrown into confusion they determined to force the question at once upon him and compel him to meet it before the election. Those who suspected him of such motives knew but little of him – as future subsequent events abundantly shewed them. But political o p partizans are very seldom just to their opponents: and those who were opposed to Genl. Jackson, always appeared to me to be determined to shut their eyes to his true character.76

Yet with all the advantages which these unfortunate Executive proceedings had given to the Bank, the application appeared to me to be injudicious; was injudicious: and that every motive of policy & interest should have forbidden an applica the petition it at that Session. The question of discussions upon the propriety of renewal up to that time had been confined to polical political leaders & the News papers in the interest of the Bank, and The attention of the people generally had not been drawn to the subject. serious objections which existed against it. And as matters then stood, with Mr. Mc. Lane in the treasury department, and a majority of the Cabinet willing to concur with him, the renewal of the charter was generally regarded by the public as a thing certainly to take place at the proper time; and The utmost that its opponents hoped to accomplish was to engraft on it some new restrictions of power. But if brought by bringing forward the question at that time, the Bank took the hazard of a veto: and if he Genl. Jackson did veto it, the subject must evidently become one of the most exciting questions at topics in the approaching election: And and 77 those friends of Gen l . who were favorable the many of his friends who had theretofore supported it the charter might in the division of parties be compelled to chuse between Genl. Jackson and the Bank; and might in a heated party struggle be converted from friends into enemies. Besides a veto with the election following immediately after it would necessarily bring the objections made to it to the Serious attention of the people, and expose the misconduct of the institution and its dangerous tendencies. It would moreover provoke attacks upon it; The subject would in essence be discussed before the people; Its conduct would be freely investigated, and its hidden abuses and corruptions brought to light; and the public opinion would no longer not be formed from one sided statements or the eulogies of presses under its influence: or from partisan reports or speeches in Congress. The whole subject would necessarily be thoroughly sifted in the Canvas and the public opinion then favorable to the Bank might be changed. Up to that time I think no press in the Union had taken ground against it; or if one or more had expressed an unfavorable opinion it had not be been done in a manner to awaken much attention. Nor do I remember that any Speech was made against it in Congress, of sufficient force to be generally read, by any one78 except Colo. Benton. With all these advantages it was hardly the interest of the Stockholders to hazard a veto – or and run the risk of making the renewal of the charter a party question, – depending upon the popular vote.

And yet a veto in Some form or other Seemed almost inevitable. For if Genl. Jackson had begun to hesitate in his opinion, and had become disposed to leave the question entirely to the decision of Congress when he it should come before them at the proper time, it was impossible for him to change his ground under existing circumstances without subjecting himself to the suspicion of acting from unworthy motives. Every body felt that there was no necessity for a decision at that Session: that the question was unnecessarily forced upon him by the Bank: that it was in truth nothing more nor less than a threat to him to beware of its hostility at the approaching election: and if he had assented to the renewal, it would have afforded strong grounds for suspecting that he had corruptly bargained for its support: or that even his bold spirit quailed before its power: and that he violated his79 own conscience and what he believed his duty to the public rather than face its hostility . These strong grounds of suspicion would not only have degraded him in public estimation. And opposition. If he had signed a bill brought forward at such a time & under such circumstances, it would not only have shaken the confidence of the public in the integrity & purity of his motives; but the example and influence of a one who stood so high in character & in office would might have had the most an injurious effect upon the political and aspiring men morality of the country.; some of whom For many ambitious politicians I fear are too apt to think intrigue & bargain for personal advantages are fair weapons in the struggles for political power. It was seemed to me impossible therefore that Genl. Jackson should not veto the bill if passed at that Session. Public as well as personal considerations would compel him to do so. And when I first heard the petition was presented or about to be presented, I doubted the truth of the report: – and supposed the stockholders we could hardly be guilty of so much folly – and wantonly put in jeopardy the value of their stock. But it turned out that I was mistaken80 They had submitted every thing to the control of Mr. Biddle: and he it would seem had his own views. –

Many of the friends of Genl. Jackson who were warmly supporting his election, and who were also in favor of renewing the charter, remonstrated against bringing on the question at that time – and made efforts to prevent it. And some of them warned Mr. Biddle that although favorable to the recharter, they themselves were opposed to would oppose the passage of the law at that Session. – Their opposition certainly produced Some hesitation on the his part. of M r . Biddle. I do not remember at what period of the Session the petition was filed presented; and have not the journals before me. But the subject was not pressed upon Congress until late in the Session. The Bill did not pass until a few days before the its close, of the Session, and it did not close until the month of June or July 14 th of fourteenth of July.

At one period it was said that the petition would be withdrawn, or at all events not pressed. at that time Session : that M r . Biddle some of the stockholders had become convinced of the impolicy of urging it under existing circumstances and were remonstrating against it. This was for some time the impression of those with whom I conversed, & it was said that Mr. Biddle himself began to doubt whether it would be prudent for him to proceed in the face of so much opposition from persons interested in or friendly to the Bank.81

But after a delay of some months weeks, it became evident that the question would be vigorously pressed pushed forward to an issue. Whether the delay arose from the causes I have above mentioned, or was necessary in order to ascertain whether whether a majority was in both houses of Congress in favor of the charter could certainly be obtained, I do not know. It was understood at the time that Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster informed Mr. Biddle that if the petition was not presented & urged on at that Session, that he must not count on their support at a future time, but must expect to meet their decided opposition; and that this had determined him to proceed. Such a communication was I believe certainly made by these two gentlemen to Mr. Biddle. The information came to me from sources which left no room for doubt. But my own opinion was & still is that Mr. Biddle was himself bent upon going on unless he was presented prevented by the Directors or stockholders. He was offended with the course Genl. Jackson had pursued towards the institution; & persuaded himself that he & was strongly opposed to him; and determined to place him in what he supposed would be a dilemma. He persuaded himself that Genl. Jackson would hardly dare to meet it the bill with an absolute & unqualified veto. – and & that But if he did, that he felt confident that the popularity & influence of of the Bank and the influence it could exercise would defeat his reelection. And if he assented to the Bill, or appeared to temporize & evade the issue presented to him, it would probably be regarded 82 as proof that he feared the Bank, and destroy the high place he then held in the confidence and affections of the people. In either case his resentment would be gratified I can cannot believe that he acted from any apprehension of the hostility from Mr. Clay or Mr. Webster or was influenced by their threats. Both of these gentlemen, were retained Counsel for the Bank & were in the habit of receiving large fees incomes from it, & had a deep personal interests in its continuance. The had publickly & repeatedly expressed their opinions in favor of the Bank – & maintained that it was a necessary agent in the collection of the revenue. – The vast majority of the stockholders as well as of the Directors of the mother Bank, and its numerous Branches & officers were the close political partizans friends of these two gentlemen: and members of the same party. And their leading paper of the (National Intelligencer) was virtually owned by the Bank and under its control. With a full knowledge of all these circumstances Mr. Biddle had obviously nothing to fear apprehend from the threats of these two gentlemen Mr. Clay or Mr Webster, and knew that they could not come out in opposition to a recharter without forfeiting the support of a majority of their party, and surrendering their hopes of political elevation. His own inclination prompted to do what these gentlemen desired But whether he was prompted by his own inclinations or by fears of the hostility of the gentlemen above named, in either case it the application at that time was a political movement levelled at Genl. Jackson; and converted a powerful corporation which had been created as a fiscal against under the control of the govern agent & merely for the fiscal purposes of the government, into a powerful political partizan83 seeking to govern the government by controlling the election of its officers.

As soon as it was understood that the Bank had finally determined to push push for ward have a decision upon their petition at that Session, much excitement was produced at Washington. Many of the supporters of Genl. Jackson who before had been favorable to the Bank, now openly opposed it. They saw that it was a political movement & became satisfied that the existence of a corporation of such immense powers, capable of exercising such corrupting influences, & so ready to enter into political contests was dangerous to our liberties, and ought not to be longer continued. Other friends of Genl. Jackson whose constituents were known to be favorable to a recharter were much embarrassed in their course. This was particularly the case, with the Senators & representatives from Pennsylvania, where the Legislature had been induced to pass resolutions recommending the renewal, without being at all aware I presume of the purposes for which the application was to be used. And Some of the decided friends of Genl. Jackson I doubt not supported the bill under the impression that their duty to their constituents required it, :- and perhaps supposed they were not bound to impute to the Bank any other motives than those which it had assigned in its petition. when the re and found afterwards that their constituents as Soon as the subject was understood, wished them to support the President. 84 There was never any doubt of the passage of the Bill in the Senate. But in the House of Representatives, a large majority had been elected of what was then called the Jackson party, and it was at one time considered as uncertain whether the Bill would pass that House. Many Some Many opposed it as out of time, & merely intended to influence the approaching election, who would have voted for it if brought forward after the election. – But the Bank watch The debate upon it was long and animated. But the Bank watched the proceedings & knew how to secure friends when a close division was apprehended. I must mention an anecdote upon subject. – It was known that I was opposed to the Bank. While the debate was going on in the House I happened one rainy day in goining going to the Supreme Court in a Hack to find myself in company with a member from North Carolina (M r . Carson) of the House. He was my only companion in the carriage, and I had frequently before met him at the Presidents at the informal evening assemblages, where he was always spoken of and treated as one of the Presidents warmest friends. I We had become well acquainted with each other, and our way to the Capitol he said he wished to make85 a speech against the Bank; but as from want to exact information upon the subject, he might fall into mistakes; he and would be much obliged to me if I would state in writing what I considered as the grounds of opposition my objections, & send them to him. I endeavored to excuse myself – telling him (as was truly the case,) that I was very much engaged with my official duties in the Supreme court; & besides that as a member of the Presidents Cabinet I did not like to interfere with the proceedings in the House. He however urged me a good deal saying that what passed between us need not be known to any one else: – that he meant to publish his speech & was anxious therefore to put it upon grounds that would bear the closest examination: that he had already arranged some of the heads of his argument: but did not like to appear upon them before the public without comparing them with the views of others: that he knew I must have studied the subject carefully & it would give me but little trouble & take but little of my time to put my views in writing & that he did not intend to make his speech for some days. I told him however that that I must according to my then impressions decline for the reasons above mentioned; but I would think further of it, & if I found time & thought upon more reflection that I could with propriety comply with his request I would send him the heads of my opinion86 with a brief statement of the facts on which it was founded. in the course of two or th ree days It so happened that My engagements in court & in official duties filled up my time & put it out of my power to gratify him even if my other objection could have been surmounted – I did not see him afterwards, and In about a week or fortnight after I conversed with went Annapolis to attend the Maryland court of appeals and did not see him again before I left Washington – The question was taken while I was absent. And upon looking over the ayes & noes I saw with the utmost surprize that he had voted in favor of the renewal. Upon my return I mentioned what passed to a friend who mixed very much with public men & was always remarkably well informed upon passing events – and asked him if there was not some mistake in the News paper notice of this vote. He said no: that Carson the member of whom I spoke had obtained a loan of twenty thousand dollars from the Bank, & had changed his opinion.

Now I do not mean to say that Carson he was directly bribed to give this vote. From the character he sustained and from what I know of him I think he would have resented, any thing that he regarded as an attempt to corrupt him. But he wanted the money – & felt grateful for the favor: and perhaps thought that an institution which was so useful to him, & had behaved to him with So much kindness, could not be injurious or87 dangerous to the public, & that it would be as well to continue it. Men when under the influence of interest or passion often delude themselves strangely, and do not always acknowledge even to themselves the motives upon which they really act; and They sometimes persuade themselves that they are acting on some others, which is more a motive consistent with their own self respect & sense of right, & shut their eyes to the one which in fact governs their conduct. It was one of the dangers arising from this great mammoth money power, that its very duties as collecting and disbursing agent bringing brought it constantly in contact with members of Congress & other public men that it could tempt the necessitous , and win them power & functionaries & made it acquainted with their wants: and enabled it to place them under a sense of obligations, & create a feeling of dependency or even gratitude without the direct & offensive offer of a bribe. In cases where it intended to operate it was not very particular about the indorsers – or the sufficiency of the securities offered. Its losses upon these political loans were enormous. How many others received similar pecuniary favors during that Session & during the panic war we shall never know. – I have heard many names mentioned some of them high in influence. – But it would be improper to repeat them as I have no certain knowledge absolute proof upon the subject. Certain it is, that a week before I left Washington all doubt about the passage of the Bill had vanished & it was well understood that there was a dead major majority 88 in the house determined to carry it. Indeed before the close of the debate the tone of some of the speakers in favor of the Bank was very much like a defiance to the President; to veto it; and many a disposition was manifested to make the bill come to him in the attended by Offensive circumstances – so as to make it humiliating to approve it, even if he had changed his opinion. Something was said in the House after or shortly before the bill passed about fixing a day for closing the Session when one of the leaders of the opposition Mr. Mc Duffie took occasion to remark that he hoped the House would not adjourn for ten days after the Bank Bill was sent to the President: evidently intimating by this remark that as Genl. Jackson was not bound by the constitution to act on the Bill unless it was presented to him ten days before the close of the Session, there was reason to suppose, if it was not presented in time, that he would endeavor to avoid the responsibility of either vetoing or approving it until the election of President was over: and would hold it up without any action upon it, until the next Session. – The policians politicians were manifestly obviously pressing it not for the benefit of the Bank, but for the purpose of embarrassing and defying Genl. Jackson, & under the impression if he did veto it, th he would inevitably be overthrown at the coming election. They knew but little of him, if they supposed he felt any embarrassment or hesitation on the subject 89

The passage of the Bill led

Pains were taken also to Shew that the passage of the bill was regarded, not as an a grave measure in which nothing but public duties & feelings were concerned, but rather as a personal contest between Mr. Biddle & the President, in which the former was the victor. He must have been in communication constantly with its friends in the House and have known precisely the day on which it would pass be forced through by the majority. – For he arrived in Washington on the night of its passage & appeared in made his appearance in the House the next day, when the public business was for some time interrupted by the number of members leaving their Seats and crowding about him, & shaking hands with him and congratulating him. It was a public triumph given to him in the Hall of the House. Nor did it end there. They crowded about him again that night at his Lodgings where they were feasted high by him and drank toasts & made speeches until & celebrated the victory – taking pains to make their rejoicing was sufficiently vociferous to be heard in the streets & sufficiently public to make sure that it would reach the ears of the President. And after enjoying his triumph Mr. Biddle left Washington without deigning to pay the President the ordinary visit of etiquette. It was treated as his victory or rather the certain harbinger of Genl. Jacksons overthrow: not a mere law continuing a fiscal agent of the government.90

While the bill was pending in the House, I was constantly beset with letters & calls, urging me to advise the President to sign the Bill when it passed. I was continually told that I was the only member of the Cabinet opposed it – and that the President would hardly veto it, if his Cabinet were unanimous. And it is wonderful how easily intelligent & respectable gentlemen from kindness & or facility of disposition, can be persuaded to give advice on such occasions, & repeat trite arguments, without stopping to consider whether your capacity for judging may not be equal to their own; and your opportunities of information far greater.

And yet during all this struggle and vehement debate out of doors, it may seem strange, that the President never Spoke to me on the subject nor I to him. Nor had I any other other reason for believing he would veto the bill except his public declarations in his inaugural address & his annual messages: – and my knowledge of the immoveable firmness of his character & purity & patriotism of his motives. I was quite sure that he would lose his election ten times over rather than do any thing which he believed to be contrary to his duty & or the public interest. But I never spoke If he knew But I did not know whether the arguments of Mr. Livingston & more very especially of Mr. Mc.Lane might not have wrought some change in his opinions.91

M y opinion spoke him on the subject nor he to me I do did not know that he knew my opinions until I officially presented them as secretary If he did, he must have learned them from others & not from me – was acquainted with my opinions on the subject. If he was He knew my opinions on the subject, & it seemed strange that he never mentioned it the subject to me, throughout the long discussion in the House.

The animated opposition to the recharter procrastinated the final decision of the House , so long, that I was thought it probable that I should be was obliged to leave Washington, for the Maryland court of appeals before the Bill passed the House would be passed was pr ese nted to the President. Finding from the course of the debate that this would probably certainly be the case, I determined to state in writing to the President my advice that he should veto the bill meet the bill with an open & direct veto, precluding all hopes of his assent at any time to the continuance of the Bank. Being a matter of so much importance, and one that had attracted so much public attention I thought it not unlikely, that he would call on the members of his Cabinet for their written opinions. But whether he did or not, it seemed to be my duty to lay before him my opinion together with the reasons on which it was founded. I knew that the majority of the Cabinet were directly those whom I considered as the leading members of the Cabinet were in favor of the renewal of the charter; and although they might advise the President not to sign the bill at that time when it was so unnecessarily of him pressed upon him, & pressed too in the most offensive manner, yet their opinions advice, as to the character and grounds of the veto of the veto, and the grounds proper to be taken in it, would naturally be influenced by their opinions92 in favor of the ultimate renewal. Indeed I did not know that any one of the Cabinet except myself was opposed to the renewal it if brought forward at the proper time. & with some modifications For although I had conversed with all of them upon the subject, they had not all expressed decided opinions. My own opinion was decidedly that the Bank was unconstitutional, & inexpedient,: and that it had abused its powers,: was dangerous to the liberties of the Country; and that the menacing and offensive manner in which the renewal was demanded, made it the more necessary that the President should meet it by a direct & decisive veto, shewing his unalterable determination never to assent to it; In this mode the veto and exhibiting fully the grounds upon which he was opposed to it. And as I did not know that this opinion was entertained by any other member of the Cabinet, or what advice they would respectively give , it Seemed the more necessary that I should bring it before the President & lay before him at the same time the grounds upon which it was my objections were founded. – I still felt & believed he would veto the Bill – but as I have already said I had not conversed with him on the subject; and had no means of judging what reasons would be assigned for refusing his assent. – And It appeared to me that a veto which placed the objection merely upon time, & evaded the direct issue; and would be unworthy of him & would justly result in his overthrow.93

I therefore prepared my opinion: making it as brief as I could for I had very little time to spare. It was finished the night before the day on which I was compelled by my business at Annapolis to leave Washington. In the morning before I left home I went to my office and placed the rough draft draught I had prepared in the hands of my clerk 13 to be copied; and then called to place a with directions to deliver the copy to the President as Soon as it was f i nished the bill passed, & to preserve the original until I returned. It may be proper to remark that the official opinions of the Attorney General are all recorded in a book kept for that purpose in Office. But his opinions as a member of the Cabinet, is never recorded – because it might often happened that it was upon some a subject, upon upon which would it would be improper to at the moment to make public the opinion of the President or a member of his Cabinet –

After giving my opinion to my clerk I repaired to the Presidents to take leave of him & to apprise him of what I had done. I found him alone – Being pressed for time, I merely said to him that the Bank question my impression was that the Bank Bill would certainly pass, & the question was one of such moment, that it seemed to me to be the duty of each member of his Cabinet to present to him his views upon the subject; and that as I should probably not return until after he had acted on the bill, I had prepared mine, & had be absent some weeks the bill it would probably be finally acted upon before my return; that I had therefore prepared my opinion in writing and directed my clerk to make a fair copy & to lay94 it before him; and that when I returned I would sign the copy. He said he was obliged to me and would be glad to see it. I then said that he would find that in my opinion he ought to veto the bill but that I would not at that time trouble him with my reasons, as he would see them briefly stated in the written opinion;: Nothing more passed between us and then I took my leave And having said this I took my leave and in a few minutes afterwards Set out for Annapolis. This was all the conversation that passed between us, and he did not even then say what he intended to do. I supposed at the time & still suppose I take for granted that he was Satisfied thought I knew him well enough to be satisfied, that he had deliberately made up his mind against the Bank before he had on the former occasions officially expressed it, in such decid ed terms; and that having made up his opinion he upon full consideration he would not be likely to change it & would act upon it at all hazards. He no doubt believed that I was If I had remained longer with him I have no doubt that he would with his usual frankness, have told me without reserve what he thought upon the subject and what he proposed to do.95

The bill as I anticipated passed the House of Representatives & was presented to the President while I was yet at Annapolis.14 I think I had been there about a week when I saw by the News papers that it had passed – about Two days after its passage I received a letter from my friend Andrew Stevenson, then Speaker of the House, urging me to return without delay. He was my intimate friend, and we had communicated freely with one another throughout this proceeding, & concurred entirely in our opinions. He had the most remarkable tact in knowing the sense of the House, upon any important question, before the vote was taken no matter how close was the division. He seemed to me to know what every man was thinking about while the debate was going on; and it was from him I had learned very early in the business that the bill would certainly pass. In his letter to me he said the President is firm in his opposition, & we all know his he cannot be moved from what he thinks right. But with his cabinet against him I ought But opposed as he is upon this question by the members of the Cabinet about him, he is entitled ought to have the support & assistance of the friends who think with him. This was the situ

I did not however upon this letter think myself bound to leave the Court in which I was much96 engaged. I had performed my duty to the President & the country in putting before him my opinions & advice; and did not like to wear the appearance seeking to make myself conspicuous in the Struggle. I knew believed that if the President wished for my presence or my services he would say so; and if I hastened back without his request, it would seem to imply that I thought my presence necessary to support him in his measures or to influence his course. I had determined therefore to remain where I was.

But on the next day I received a note from the President, couched in his usual kind terms & saying merely saying, that if my business in court could be so arranged that I could leave it without in convenience he would be very glad to see me, in Washin as I would have seen by the News papers that the Bank bill was before him. As Soon as I received this note, I proceeded to make such a disposition of my business as would enable me to leave the court without injury to my clients; and on the next day returned to Washington.

I arrived there at night too late to see the President on business – as he was usually at that hour in his parlor receiving the social visits of friends. I called on him the next morning immediately after breakfast. He expressed much pleasure at seeing me, & said he hoped he had97 not put me to any inconvenience: but he had been placed in an embarrassing situation. That he had read my opinion, and that it concurred entirely with his own: that after the bill passed he had conferred with the other members of the cabinet, & listened to their arguments, but they had not changed his opinion, and that he had stated to them his determination to veto the bill, & the grounds upon which he meant to place it, & requested their assistance in preparing the veto. They all he said concurred in opinion that he ought not to sign the bill, but wished him to place the veto upon grounds that would leave it open to him to sign a bill for a recharter at a future Session. and were much opposed to his taking ground which should shut the door against any a renewal at a future time, as far as depended on him; and they offered to assist him in the preparation of the veto, if he would consent to put it upon grounds which they suggested & approved. This he said positively refused to do, saying that he would not sign a veto upon placing it upon any other grounds than those upon which he acted; and that they had thereupon declined taking any part or to render him any assistance whatever in preparing it. that under these circumstances, as I was absent98 he had placed his opinion decision & his reasons for it in the hands of Mr. Kendall whose opinions coincided with his own: that he regretted the necessity of calling for the aid of any person out of his cabinet on such an occasion: but that Mr. Kendall had done it very well, although he thought it required some alterations & might be abbreviated; and that Mr. Donelson (his private Secretary) was then engaged in the room across the passage preparing it under his directions: that I knew the calls upon him were so incessant that he himself could never give more than a few minutes at a time to it: and said that if my other engagements would permit he would thank me to join Mr. Donelson & suggest examine the whole document very carefully, & suggest such alterations as I should think adviseable in the either in the argument or the style: adding that he would be glad to have it done as early as practicable, as he wished to send it in without delay. I told him I would lay aside other business until this was done; and immediately went into the room where Mr. Donelson was engaged; and proceeded to examine the draught that had been prepared.

I passed three days in this employment; the President frequently coming in: listening to the reading of different portions of it from time to time as it was up drawn up, & to the observations & suggestions99 of Mr. Donelson & myself, and stating giving his own opinion directions as to what should be inserted or omitted. The first day there was no one in the room but Mr. Donelson & myself, except the President and Mr. Earle – it being It was the room in which Mr. Earle, who lived in the Presidents family, always occupied as his painting room. Mr. Earle however was all the time engaged in painting, taking no part in the preparation of the veto, & I believe not even hearing what was said. His tastes did not lie that way; and from the character of his mind & pursuits although highly respectable as an artist, he would & pure & elevated as a man he was incapable of rendering any assistance in the preparation of Such an instrument. Mr. Donelson told me when I came in that no mem member of the Cabinet had been in the room or offered any aid to him, since Mr. Kendalls draught had been placed in his hands. I saw none of them the first day; and it is possible that none of them knew that I had returned. For I did not go to my office, as I did not wish to be interrupted by other business. Upon the second day Mr. Woodbury came in, & took part in preparing the work, in & continued with us until it was completed. When a fair copy was made, and the whole veto in the shape in which it was transmitted to Congress was which after being examined by the President & approved, & read in the Cabinet was transmitted to the Congress. – This is the history of my concern with the veto. I need not add that I cordially approved of it. The President was fortunate 100 in his private Secretary M r . Donelson. He was frank & manly in his character – amiable in his temper – with excellent judgment, good taste, and a political sagacity & truth t ac t, not often to be found in a man at his time of life, and with his then brief experience in public affairs. He was the nephew of M rs . Jackson, and the President certainly loved & confided in him as if he was his Son – 101

The message produced a great sensation not only in Congress but throughout the Union. It was I believe far bolder & more decisive in its tone, and more argumentative than the Bank and its friends had anticipated. It was sent in on the 11th. of July 1832; and efforts were immediately made to counteract its effect on the public mind, by vehement and angry and abusive Speeches in Congress in reply to it; – predicting the most disastrous consequences to the country from the refusal to continue the charter.

But those who were opposed to the Bank hailed it with acclamation. It brought the Subject before the people in a form that would certainly and strongly attract their attention. For Genl. Jackson possessed in an eminent degree the confidence and affections of the great majority of the American people. Every body read his messages and his opinions exercised a powerful influence on the public judgment. The Veto contained the leading facts and arguments against the Bank; and the question therefore was no longer102 in the hands of Speculators and stockjobbers and corrupt or intriguing politicians, but must now would be investigated, considered and decided by the great body of the people of the U.S. with beyond the reach who could have no other object in view but the desire to promotion of the public good.

It is not my purpose to write the history of that election. It was warmly contested on both sides – I might say bitterly and fiercely by the Bank. When I speak of the Bank I of course mean its multiple multitude of officers agents and presses, who were all, with a very few exceptions, under the influence of Mr. Biddle and Bank governed by his directions. The election was for some time regarded as doubtful by many of the friends of Genl. Jackson – and the friends of Mr. Clay were perfectly confident of success. Mr. Clay had a strong body of friends personally – and the manufacturers, now became a numerous body stronly supported him for the purpose of obtaining a high tariff.103

He had moreover in his favor that portion of the politicians of the old federal & democratic parties who favored a latitudinous construction of the constitution of the U. States. And when to these elements of strength, the influence of the Bank was added, there was indeed much reason to suppose that he must succeed. No man in the U. States but Genl. Jackson could have defeated him. His electoral The Majority in the Electoral College was large : proved to be larger than either party expected: yet Several of the States which voted for him General Jackson were closely contested and pending the election were confidently claimed by the friends of Mr. Clay. Nor was that confidence lessened, nor the apprehensions of the friends of Genl. Jackson relieved, until the returns of the election in Pennsylvania began to come in. There was a period I confess when I myself thought the issue doubtful, though I & always his friends but not so unpromising as to and looked with a good deal of Anxiety for the news from Pennsylvania.

Perhaps if we had known all the preparations which the bank had made for the conflict & the extent of its exertions our The during the canvass the apprehensions of many of us would104 have been stronger. It appeared afterwards that in the year immediately preceding its petition for a renewal of its charter, that is, from the 30th. of Decr. 1830 to the 30. of Decr. 1831, it had increased its loans and discounts from $42,402,304.24/100 up to $63.026.652.93/100: – and while its petition was actually pending before in congress it added before the 1st. of May 1832, $7.401.617.79/100 more to its loans & discounts the sum last mentioned, making the whole amount of its loans & discounts on the day last mentioned $70.428.070 72/100 This was an increase of $28.025.766. 48/100 in the short space of 16 Months, being and an extension of 66 per c.t. on its previous loans. I knew nothing of this when the veto was prepared, and have no reason to suppose it was then known to the President. The As the returns were made by the Bank every two weeks to the Secretary of the Treasury, & it was of course known to Mr. Mc. Lane. and But the circumstance it would Seem did not attract his attention, or he did not think it necessary to communicate it. It did not come It came to my knowledge until when the question of removing the deposites was agitated when whe while Mr. Duane was in the Department & the conduct of the Bank was carefully examined in order to determine what the public interest then demanded.105

How much of this increase was received by public men, or by others for political services we shall probably never know. For if the books of the Bank should ever see the light, they have been kept in a manner to perplex & mislead any inquirer who was not in its secrets. This appears by the reports of the committees of investigation appointed by the President and by Congress. But if the immense amount of money thus suddenly poured out, was not applied directly to corrupt purposes, yet it was sufficiently large to Strengthen greatly the hold of the Bank upon the community generally and to enable Mr. Biddle & his friends to make the pressure and curtailment more extensively felt when pressure and curtailment should become his policy. This large sum was by no means the extent of the expansion of credit , which this operation produced. The Bank of the U.S. was the central and controlling power in the paper currency; and. Its impulses acted immediately upon the state Banks; and they expanded or curtailed according to its lead. And this expansion by the Bank of the U.S. produced its106 usual and necessary effect upon them. It suddenly flooded the country with paper money and paper capital which there was no increase of business and trade to justify; and consequently it engendered a spirit of speculation which made the business trading community exceedingly sensitive to the curtailment which followed the Veto. It & In this state of things the pressure policy was energetically resorted to by the Bank; and and its balances rigidly exacted from the state Banks so as in order to compel them to refused curtailments M r . Biddle Succeeded refuse discounts & curtail their accommodations. And by this means Mr. Biddle succeeded in producing much distress and embarrassment in the Cities, and ruined many enterprising men, who had been encouraged to enlarge their commercial operations by the abundance of money & the facility with which loans were had been obtained while the Bank was so rapidly expanding. – This class of persons are always & inevitably the first & the immediate victims of an unlooked for, reduction of credits, and a pressure upon the money market. But the time between the veto and the election was too short to reach that large portion of the American people who are not accustomed in their business to rely on discounts at Banks. It was not long enough to provide the whole affect affect sensibly the prices of produce or the wages of labor.107 Yet the pressure was severe in the commercial world Cities, and the outcry was great upon in that class of persons who depend upon Bank accomodations to carry on their business. And as the distress followed after the veto it was imputed to the veto; and Genl. Jackson represented as responsible for the evil under which which Mr. Biddle himself was daily producing. Bold and profligate as this scheme was, it succeeded to a considerable extent. The politicians who opposed the reelection of Genl. Jackson, united with the agents of the Bank in making the charge. It had its effect in a greater or less degree in every State of the Union. For from our unfortunate system of Banking, many persons are to be found in every State, who owe money to a Bank which it is not convenient to pay – or expect to borrow from one to meet an engagement. And this Banking operation of Mr. Biddle undoubtedly deprived Genl. Jackson of thousands and tens of thousand votes, which would otherwise been cast for him.108

There was another operation going on during the same period of time of which the President and myself were equally ignorant, but which was not less formidable than the one above stated. It appears by the report of the government directors in the Bank made to the President on the 19th. of August 1833 that the ordinary annual expences of the Bank up to the beginning of the year 1830 amounted to between Seven and eight thousand dollars. But these expences began to increase, after the Presidents fir Genl. Jacksons first message to Congress at Decr. Session 1829, in which he took ground strongly against the renewal of the charter. And In the year 1830 they rose to more than fourteen thousand dollars. – But soon after his second annual Message, which was delivered at December Session 1830, in which he reiterated his former objections, the plans of the Bank to defeat his reelection seem to be have been matured, and their operations commenced in earnest. And in the beginning of 1831 when it began to swell its discounts, its expences under the denomination of Stationary and printing increased with equal rapidity. They amounted in 1831, to upwards of $43.000: and in the year 1832 to $38.678 –109 of which last mentioned sum $26.543.72/100 were expended in the last six months, when the veto had been given and the election was pending. And without doubt the greater part of the $9.093.59 charged as expences for stationary and printing in the first six months of 1833 when the election was over, was in fact to pay for Services rendered in the election Canvass, in the fall of the preceding year.

The report of the government Directors before referred to shews the purposes for which this enormous expenditure was made. – Much of it this money had been applied in such a manner as to baffle the examination of these Directors & to put it out of their power to discover to whom or for what particular purpose it had been paid. But the items mentioned in their report shew the gigantic efforts which had secretly been made to obtain the control of the government by the defeat of Genl. Jackson. Much of it was Large sums were paid for speeches and essays, eulogizing the Bank, & abusing Gen l . Jack and praising Mr Biddle. Many thousand dollars were paid for printing and distributing M r . Websters speech, which although made in his place in the Senate, was obviously th e speech of abov e in its tone temper and partizan character ; the s peech of counsel paid by the Bank, & of one too by no means 110 scrupulous as to in his statements of facts. – I do not know whether M r . Webster received directly a fee from the B ank for this speech in the Senate – and I will not therefore assert that he did. But I do know certainly that in other years while this struggle was going on, he was, under the name of fees for professional services and loans, receiving a princely income from the Bank – and that what was called loan was afterwards settled colorably paid by the transfer of property of trifling value, and bearing no sort of proportion to his debt. This speech upon the face of it was made for distribution & to deceive the uninformed. And the same may be said both as to inducement and object of m a ny of the Speeches made on that occasion and which appear by this report to have been so extensively circulated.

In addition to the essays and speeches, large sums it appears were paid for annonymous publications containing the grossest & coarsest libels upon the President Colo. Benton and other distinguished opponents of the Bank. And heavy sums it appeared were 111 paid by upon the order merely of Mr Biddle, without disclosing the name of the person who received it or the service for which it was rendered: and These payments were authorized, by a resolution of the Board passed early in March 1831 soon after the Bank had determined on its plan of operations by which Mr Biddle was "empowered to cause to be prepared and circulated such documents and papers as may communicate to the people information in regard to the nature and operations of the Bank." This resolution was construed by the Mr. Biddle and the board of directors also, to dispense with any the order of M r . make his order a sufficient voucher, and to dispense with the necessity of stating in the order either the name of the person he paid or the service rendered. This resolution as thus Construed in practice by M r . Biddle and the Board, in effect placed the whole of its capital of the Bank in the his hands, as a secret corruption fund to be used at his discretion. They But they could have afforded to sink their whole Capital it in struggle, if it would have ensured to ensure a renewal. of their charter. They would have made money by it.112

A great proportion of the sums paid for what was called printing and circulation, was paid to emissaries who were hired to travel from place to place & some times from house to house to distribute these various plans publications, in the neighbourhoods to which they were supposed to be more peculiarly adapted. The states which were considered as doubtful & where it was therefore most important for the bank to make exertions were flooded with them. And these emissaries were usually performed the additional function of travelling orators adding their own assertions & statements and inventions to the contents of the documents they were distributing. Yet all of this was cooly charged in the bank accounts as stationary and printing and withheld from the knowledge of the stat government Directors –

I do not now recollect in what form these expences were charged in the accounts rendered to the Treasury Department, and have not the accounts at the time I am writing within my reach. Such an enormous increase in the expences of charge for stationary & printing, amounting in the years 1831 & 1832 to more113 than $80.000. could hardly have escaped But this undoubedly escaped the attention of Mr. Mc.Lane who would hardly examine the himself; the items of the Bk accts . And it certainly was his duty if he For had he observed it to he would without doubt have called for an explanation, and to have reported it to the President. For independently of the circumstances that this large expence account, could not fail to awaken suspicions that the Bank was actively interfering in this election, the U. States owned one fifth of the Capital, & therefore paid one fifth of these expences. – And the expenditure of more than fif sixteen thousand dollars of the public money by the Bank, in abusing the first magistrate of the Nation, could hardly be tolerated at the Treasury Department. The account may mystified returned may have changed this expenditure in such a way as not to attract the attention of the Secretary Clerk in the Department whose duty it was to examine it.15 – Certain however it is that Nothing was known of it while he remained in the Treasury. – and it it did not come to the knowledge of the President until the report of the Government directors, of which I am Speaking – and which was not made until August 1833. It was this114 abuse of its chartered privileges that decided the President to remove Mr. Duane if he would not remove the deposites. And he made his decision as Soon as these facts came to his knowledge, as will appear in a future part of hereafter in this narrative, if I live to complete it.115

The election over and Genl. Jackson elected for another term of four years commencing on the 4 of March 1833, the question occurred whether any & if any what further step should be taken by the Executive in relation to the Bank. The issue had been made before the people by the Bank itself, & the people had decided against it. For they had not only re elected Genl. Jackson, but a very large majority of the New House of Representatives were elected on this same ground and pledged to vote against a renewal of the charter.16

Another circumstance came to light soon after the election, Th shewing still more strongly how little the Bank was to be relied on as a public agent. And it is proper to state it here, as it is noticed in the Presidents message of Decr. 1832 and formed one of the grounds on which the removal of the deposites was justified116

In the spring of 1832 the government found itself in funds to pay off one half of the three prct stocks which were the remnant of the debt created by the Revolutionary war of the Revolution. – As the public money was in the Bank, and it was bound by its charter to perform the duties of the of loan offices in relation to the public debt, the intention of the government was of course communicated to the Bank in order that it might make the proper arrangements. The notice to the President of the Bank was given in March, & he was informed that the usual advertisement would be made on the first of April and the payment made on the first of July. – Upon receiving this information he came on to Washington, and represented that the payment of so large a Sum, (between 6 and 7 – Millions) at h one half of which was due to foreign creditors, would increase the demand for remittance, & necessarily abridge the facilities which the Bank was accustom afford to the importing117 merchants, and that means might endanger the punctual payment of the revenue Bonds. Upon these grounds he suggested the propriety of postponing the time of payment, the Bank agreeing to pay the interest on this Stock, so that the public revenue Treasury would sustain no loss from the delay. These propositions were finally embodied in a letter dated Bank of the U.S. but in fact written in Washington – and upon these representations the President agreed that the payment should be delayed until the 1st. of Octr. the Bank paying the interest

In the July following this arrangement with Mr. Biddle the Secretary of the Treasury supposed he could pay two thirds of the three percents on the first 5th of Octr. and the remainder on the first 5th of January. Notice of this intention was given to Mr. Biddle on the 19th of July and the advertisement appeared on the 20th.118 Before this letter was written, Mr. Biddle knowing that the Government would pay off at least the half of these Stocks on about the first of October, dispatched Genl. Cadwallader to England to make an arrangement with the Barings, by which five Millions of this Stock was to be held back until the 1st. of October 1832, the Bank paying such interest as might be agreed on, from the time fixed for payment by the government.17 Genl. Cadwallader was one of the Directors of the Bank and the family connection & intimate friend of Mr. Biddle. The mission was intended to be a confidential one – And the plan of preventing the Certificates from being presented for payment was kept secret from the officers of the government. But the Editor of the New York Evening Post 18 obtained possession of a copy of the Circular of the Barings making this proposition to the holders of the stock in behalf of the Bank and published it in his paper of the 11th. of October. When Mr. Biddle found that the affair had become public, & concealment no longer practicable, he wrote to the Secretary of119 the Treasury on the 15 of the month proposing to give a summary of what had been done and stating that the Bank had disavowed a part of Genl. Cadwalladers arrangement, as not having been authorized by his instructions. The portion disavowed was that which authorized the Barings to purchase the stock for the Bank, and retain the Certificates as his security. This purchase was undoubtedly a direct violation of the charter; of the Bank – and if authorized by the Bank would certainly have subjected its chartered charter to forfeiture. It hastened therefore to disavow it as Soon as the circular of the Barings was made public;. a s For it was then evident that the whole transaction must now be investigated by the government. But it appeared afterwards very clearly that the Bank had been in possession of the contract made by Genl. Cadwallader some weeks before the publication in the Evening Post, and yet did not disavow any part of that contract to the Barings nor make any communication to the Treasury until concealment was no longer possible.120

It is not my purpose in this narrative to go into a detailed statement of all the circumstances of this transaction; nor of the sort of indirect hostility hostilities which were for some waged it occasioned for a time between Mr. Mc. Lane & Mr. Biddle. I shall have hereafter to admit to these again hereafter. All of the circumstances material facts are embodied and most ably examined in an article published in the Globe on the 1st. of January 1833, and which I propose to annex as an appendix to this narrative.19

When this transaction came to the knowledge of the President he was exceedingly indignant. – For even admitting that the disavowal of any any authority to purchase the stock for the use of the Bank was made in good faith, and not wrung from the Bank by the publicity given to the affair by the publication of Barings circular, yet enough was admitted by the Bank to shew a gross violation of its duty to the public. For the object of this arrangement was to prevent the government from paying five Millions of its debt; and to enable121 the Bank to keep so much of the public money for an entire year, for its own purposes, and against the express orders of the Government. And to accomplish this object was secretly using the credit of the government for its own benefit not only without its consent but in violation of its positive directions. For while these certificates were thus held back the government U. States continued liable to the holder for the principal amount due, & it was upon the faith of this liability that the Bank kept the public money for its own use & kept the U. States still liable to the Stockholder. Taking this view of the subject the President brought it before his Cabinet as Soon as the explanation was received from the Bank after the result of the election was ascertained, and requested our opinions whether a sci. fa.20 ought not to be issued to forfeit the charter, or the public deposites be immediately removed. – He was confidently of opinion that the Bank would prove insolvent & that the public money was not safe in its vaults.122

Mr. Mc. Lane was in favor of directing a sci. fa. to be issued to forfeit the charter. He was of opinion that the conduct of the Bank in relation to the 3 prcts, as well as its purchase of paper under the name of loans, & its interference in the recent election, were abuses & misuses of power that subjected its charter to forfeiture. That this proceeding would put an end to all further efforts to renew the charter, which would otherwise be continued & embarrass the government until the charter expired by its own limitations. That as to the safety of the deposites while the sci. fa. was pending, it would be proper to appoint an agent to examine into its condition, & that the President could better decide after his report whether the deposites ought or ought not to be removed.

I was opposed to issuing a sci. fa. and thought better to do nothing than adopt a measure of that kind. – I said there were many things which we certainly knew in relation to the conduct of the Bank, and upon which the Executive might properly act, but which it would be difficult if not123 impossible to establish by legal proof in a court of Justice – and especially against an adversary so adroit and unscrupulous as the Bank had shewn itself to be. That Besides the case must be tried in Philadelphia, before a Jury of that C ity Philadelphia Jury with all the leading counsel in of that city retained as counsel for the Bank, & it would obviously be impossible to obtain a verdict against the Bank in a case where the trial from its very nature must last Some weeks, and the Jury during all that time Subject to the exposed to the influences which the immense & powerful interests Bank would not scruple to exercise: and that such an excitement would be got up, through the local press & otherwise in its favor of the Bank that even honest & incorruptible men on the panel most probably would not have the firmness to withstand it. – Moreover the Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court was known to be zealously warmly in favor of the renewal of the charter, and had held earnest & repeated conversations with me at my office, endeavoring to persuade me to advise the President not to veto the Bill: that although he was a very learned Judge and an upright & honest one, yet it was well known that he was a man of warm feelings124 and subject to painful & unfortunate excitement: and that in several some instances where his mind had been closely occupied for some days time, upon matters subjects in which he felt to be matters of great interest, this excitement had become practical actual insanity and that he had been compelled to absent himself from for an entire Term from the Supreme Court on that account21: and that I should not be surprised if in a case of this sort, with his own preconceived opinions & pe r his feelings in relation to it , upon this subject he should in his charge to the Jury reply to the Presidents veto, and lecture him freely for his conduct in directing the Sci. fa. But apart from all these considerations there were many abuses of corporate privileges which would not in law amount to a forfeiture of the charter. And however faithless the government was Bank had been in the instances mentioned & however unfit on that account to be trusted or Continued as a fiscal agent, it did not follow that it had forfeited its charter: And the proofs the President acted on the that the proofs that could be adduced against the Bank, and the legal consequences of its acts ought to be very carefully considered before a Sci. fa. was issued. 125

I further stated that in my opinion the deposites ought to be removed: that the conduct of the Bank in relation to the 3prcents shewed it to be in a State of much embarrassment, and might justify the removal upon doubts as to its ultimate solvency which the transaction certainly authorized: But but that I did not put my advice upon this ground: that whether solvent or not, it had attempted by a Secret arrangement to keep possession of the public money for an entire year without the consent for its own purposes against the orders of the government – and that after such an act of infidelity it was no longer trustworthy; as the agent of the government and ought not to be continued as such: that its interference in the politics & the elections, and the corrupt means to which it was obviously resorting to obtain the renewal of its charter, made it still was even still more objectionable: and as the possession of the public deposites increased its the power for mischief withdrawn they ought to it exercised for such improper & corrupt purposes, they ought to be withdrawn: that although the Bank was evidently much embarrassed, yet it would with its foreign126 connections would be able to keep itself afloat if the public deposites were continued, until the the next election of President was over; and it would continue to disturb the country by its struggle for a renewal, while the hope of obtaining it remained: that if the deposites were removed, another mode of collecting and disbursing the revenue must necessarily be adopted & the Bank would then be convinced that its Charter would not be continued the Banks and would proceed in good faith to wind up its concerns: that the petitition for the recharter admitted that if the charter was not to be renewed it was time to begin to close its affairs: that the recent elections had decided against its Continuance & it was time according to the statement of the bank itself to begin the work of winding up the concerns: that in my opinion the Bank would not proceed to close its affairs, unless coerced by the government but would expand again & prepare for another until another contest at the next election of President if some other fiscal agent was not appointed thereby closing thereby the door against the renewal of the Charter.127

Mr. Mc Lane strongly resisted the removal of the Deposites and pressed the issuing of a Sci. fa. – He said that the present contest congress had passed the bill for the recharter of the Bank and would most probably pass a law directing the deposites to be restored if they were removed by order of the Treasury Department. That he was of course prepared to adopt such measures as the President should determine upon: that he believed the Bank was much embarrassed and that it would might become proper to remove the deposites as a measure of safety. But unless this was shewn proved to be the case this Congress would not sanction it: that no other depository was appointed by law, and as matters now stood if they were removed the executive must take the responsibility of selecting the depository, and if any loss was sustained or difficulties experienced in collecting or disbursing the revenue the Execut President would be held answerable for it: – that public opinion was now and a public clamor might be excited against his administration which would impair its usefulness to the country, & embarrass its operations: that the me 128 public opinion was now decidedly in favor of the President in the controversy with the Bank; but if in the present excitement of the public mind he removed the deposites, it would be represented as being as unnecessary: and as done under the influence of resentment and might perhaps change the current of public feeling: that our difficulties with South Carolina were becoming daily more threatening and it was important to avoid any other conflict which might weaken the strength of the Executive or divide its friends22: that the whole country would approve the issuing of the Sci. fa. It would shew the world that the President in his course to towards the Bank had not as unjustly imputed to him, been actuated by any feelings of personal dislike or hostility – and that he was willing to refer the matter to the Judiciary as Soon as the question assumed a Shape, upon which the Judiciary a judicial tribunal could act. The Executive ought not to be influenced in its course by any suspicion that a Judicial tribunal would not do its duty: – that the evidence of the misconduct of of the Bank could no doubt be obtained, & if129 produced the court and jury must be governed by it: and the decision of the court vacating the charter, would fully vindicate all that he had done, and put an end to all further con- attempts to renew the charter. –

In reply to this I said that to an examination of the Bank to determine whether it was safe or not I set very little value upon it. – It was one of th ose things The books & accounts of a Bank would often shew it to be in a flourishing condition, when it was actually insolvent: and that as to the restoration of the Deposites by congress; I did not think it would be attempted in the face of so gross a violation of duty as that committed by the Bank in the case of the 3 prcts: – But if attempted it could be arrested by a Veto as the charter was: and that in the present state of the public mind in relation to the Bank I had no doubt a veto upon such a proposition would be supported firmly; and would indeed be received with real pleasure by a vast majority of the people of the U. States: – As that as to what I had said about issue of a Sci. fa. in Philadelphia it was no reproach to the judiciary nor to the130 tribunal of which I spoke: – that as concerned the Jury, the possibility & even even probability that a party might may not be able to obtain from in certain cases be able to obtain justice before a Jury of the place where a suit is brought is almost universally admitted by Jurists: and in every country I believed where the common law prevailed provision was made for changing the venue, & sending the case for trial to some other place, beyond the improper influences which might it was supposed would Sway the Jury in the place where it was pending. In Maryland this right of changing the venue upon this ground was secured to the party by the constitution of the state – . But the sci. fa. against the Bank must be tried in Philadelphia, & there was no power of removal under the charter. That as regarded the Judge court, what I said was no impeachment of the Judiciary, nor of the Judge who presided in that Court: that th his unhappy temperament was his misfortune rather than his fault: that delicacy towards him would of course prevent the131 President as well as the members of his cabinet from assigning this as a reason, publickly, for not resorting to a sci. fa. But as we all knew it, it would hardly be the part of wisdom to shut our eyes to so material a fact, and to proceed as if we thought the fact to be otherwise.

The President after hearing what we had to say observed that it was an important subject: that he wished us all to think of it; and would call our attention to it again at a future time.

Autograph Document

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Roger Brooke Taney Papers, MMC 2191; Folder 10

1

Rachel Jackson, long of poor health, died on 22 December 1828. An unforgiving Andrew Jackson blamed his opponents’ campaign attacks for her demise.

2

Manicule inserted here followed by (in second hand): Dont copy any further turn to p67

3

The Hartford Convention (15 December 1814 – 5 January 1815) was a series of secret meetings of prominent New England Federalists in Hartford, Connecticut. The delegates were frustrated with President James Madison’s conduct of the war and resentful of the South’s disproportionate political power. While some of the attendees raised the possibility of secession, the moderate elements won out, and a final report proposed several constitutional amendments that addressed the delegates’ grievances. Yet shortly after the close of the convention, news of Andrew Jackson’s victory in the Battle of New Orleans swept the country. The delegates were disgraced, and the Federalist Party suffered an immense blow. Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1989), 255-80.

4

William Harris Crawford, who served as Secretary of the Treasury for the entirety of the Monroe administration (1817-1825), was the Democratic-Republican Party caucus candidate for president in 1824.

5

Missing page(s).

6

At this point (the end of page 39) Taney seems to have rearranged and renumbered the pages of his manuscript. Pages 40 to 44 appear to be missing. Pages 45 to 66 have been renumbered as pages 106 to 127. The manuscript resumes with page 67.

7

The Twenty-Second Congress (1831-33).

8

Missing page(s).

9

Missing page(s).

10

Louis McLane of Delaware was a U.S. representative from 1817 to 1827 and a U.S. senator from 1827 to 1829. He chaired the Ways and Means Committee from the Seventeenth through Nineteenth Congresses (1821-27).

11

Baring Brothers & Co., a prominent London-based merchant bank. A former iteration of the firm had brokered the Louisiana Purchase.

12

McLane was U.S. Minister to England from 1829 to 1831. He would serve as Secretary of State (1833-34) and again as Minister to England (1845-46).

13

William Thomas Carroll, a native of Maryland, was clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1827 to 1863. As the 1833 Official Register lists the U.S. attorney general as an employee of the Supreme Court, the editors have concluded that Taney refers to Carroll here.

14

Both houses of Congress passed the Bank of the United States recharter bill on 3 July 1832. The bill reached President Jackson’s desk on the same day. The first session of the 22nd Congress ended on 16 July. Cole, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson, 103.

15

The chief clerk of the Treasury Department at this time was McClintock Young. The Official Register of 1833 lists ten assistant clerks. It is unclear to which clerk Taney refers.

16

The Jacksonians had a more than eighty-seat edge in the House over the National Republicans during the 23rd Congress (1833-1835).

17

For a summary of this incident, see Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Bank War, 120-21.

18

Although William Cullen Bryant was the editor of the New - York Evening-Post, Taney could be referring here to William Leggett (1801-1839), a Post co-editor whose laissez-faire advocacy included criticism of banks.

19

"An Exposition of the Conduct of the Bank of the United States in Relation to the Payment of the Public Debt," Washington Globe, 1 January 1833, 1-3.

20

Scire facias (Latin for "make known") is a judicial writ requiring the party proceeded against to show cause why a matter of record should not be executed, annulled, or vacated. In this case, the Cadwallader-Baring Brothers arrangement motivated the Jackson administration to consider issuing a scire facias that would force the Bank of the United States to defend itself in court against forfeiture of its charter and/or removal of federal deposits.

21

U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Henry Baldwin (1780-1844) presided over the Third Circuit. Andrew Jackson appointed Baldwin in 1830 to fill the seat vacated by the death of Bushrod Washington. Baldwin's eccentric behavior on the bench led to rumors of mental illness. "Baldwin, Henry," in Kermit L. Hall, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 59-60; Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), Volume I: Abbe-Barrymore, 533-34.

22

In November 1832 a South Carolina convention nullified the tariffs of 1828 and 1832, sparking a secession crisis that ended when Congress passed a compromise tariff the following March.