John Quincy Adams Digital Diary

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5. Saturday. The Senate having adjourned over to next week, I employed the principal part of this day, in reading the Correspondence and papers sent by the President to the Senate with the Louisiana Treaty.— These papers are as follows.

1. The instructions to Robert R. Livingston and James Monroe, given by Mr: Madison, Secretary of State, on the appointment of Mr: Monroe, for the Negotiation— They are dated March 2. 1803. and the object is sufficiently developed in the first paragraph which runs thus.

“Gentlemen.

You will herewith receive a Commission and letters of Credence, one of you as Minister Plenipotentiary, the other as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, to treat with the Government of the french Republic on the subject of the Mississippi and the Territories Eastward thereof, and without the limits of the United States. The object in view is to procure by just and satisfactory arrangements a Cession to the United States of New-Orleans, and of West and East-Florida, or as much thereof as the actual proprietor can be prevailed on to part with.”

It would seem from one part of these Instructions, that the idea of this negotiation originally came from the French Government itself.— “It is to be added, that the overtures committed to you, coincide in great measure with the ideas of the person, through whom the letter from the President of April 30th: 1802. was conveyed to Mr: Livingston, and who is presumed to have gained some insight into the present sentiments of the French Cabinet.”

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The instructions are accompanied with the project of a Treaty— The seventh Article of which stands thus.

“To incorporate the Inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the Citizens of the United States on an equal footing, being a provision which cannot now be made, it is to be expected, from the Character and policy of the United States, that such incorporation will take place without unnecessary delay. In the mean time, they shall be secure in their persons and property, and in the free enjoyment of their religion.”

The third Article of this project, contains the stipulations which it was contemplated to acquiesce in, for allowing French vessels free Commerce with the ceded territory, while those of other nations should remain excluded— But it is recommended to the Ministers, to try for a stipulation that each party might without the consent of the other admit whomsoever to navigate the river generally— This attempt is said to be proper not only as a friendly proof of regard to Great Britain, but as “a just attention to the interests of our Western fellow-Citizens, whose commerce will not otherwise be on an equal footing with that of the Atlantic States.”

On the contingency of a partial cession, the Florida’s together are estimated at 1/4 the value of the whole Island of New-Orleans, and East-Florida at 1/2 that of West-Florida. For the whole, the Ministers were authorised to go as far as 50 millions of livres.

2. The second paper is a letter from the Secretary of State to the Ministers, dated 18. April 1803. It is written under the apparent impression that the negotiation will fail, and the strong apprehension of an inevitable War with France— It contains accordingly instructions for negotiating an alliance with England, to make a common Cause in the War— There is a striking difference between the tenor of these Instructions, and those for negotiating with France, which contained powers much more liberal: the alliance with England was, evidently, a measure of extreme reluctance— And in the following extract there appears no small degree of preparation for sacrificing even the right of deposit, rather than go to War.— “If France should avow or evince a determination to deny to the United States the free navigation of the Mississippi, your consultations with Great-Britain may be held on the ground that War is inevitable. Should the navigation not be disputed, and the deposit alone be denied, it will be prudent to adapt your Consultations to the possibility that Congress may distinguish between the two cases, and make a question how far the latter right may call for an instant resort to arms, or how far a procrastination of that remedy may be suggested and justified by the prospect of a more favourable conjuncture.”

The letter contains information of the state of affairs at New-Orleans, as they then stood— The latest information was of 25. February— The second letter from the Spanish Minister to the Intendant, had been without effect— His interposition of 10. March, is mentioned as “meant to be absolutely effectual.” The co-operating measures of the french chargé des Affaires are likewise noticed— The failure of the representations to restore the right of deposit is anticipated in the body of the letter— But in an addition to it, dated 20. April, the letter from the Spanish Minister of that date, announcing the restoration of the right of deposit, is communicated— By a passage in this postscript, the writer seems aware that Spain considered her cession of Louisiana to France as yet unaccomplished. 8The words are—“From the allusion in this Communication from the Spanish Minister, to a future agreement between the two Governments on the subject of an equivalent deposit, it would seem that the Spanish Government regards the cession to France as either no longer in force or not soon to be carried into execution.”

3. With these instructions of 18. April 1803. There is a separate letter to the Ministers, generally authorising them, in case their negotiation with France should fail, “to open a Confidential Communication with Ministers of the British Government, for a closer connection with Great-Britain[”]— This letter was meant to have the operation, without the formality of a Commission— But it seems much more explicit than I conceive was necessary or prudent, under the circumstances.

4. A letter from the Secretary of State to the Ministers, dated 28. May 1803.— Written under the expectation of an immediate War between France and Great-Britain— It urges on the Ministers the necessity of improving this state of things, for the advancement of their Negotiation— The following paragraph, is remarkable. “The solicitude of England with respect to Louisiana is sufficiently evinced, by her controuling the French expedition from Holland to that Country. But her views have been particularly unfolded to Mr: King by Mr: Addington, who frankly told him that in case a war should happen, it would perhaps be one of their first steps to occupy New-Orleans; adding that it would not be to keep it, for that England would not accept the Country, were all agreed to give it to her, but to prevent another power from obtaining it, which in his opinion would be best effected by its belonging to the United States; and concluding with assurances that nothing should be done injurious to their interests. If the Councils of France should be guided by half the wisdom which is here displayed on the part of her rival, your negotiations will be made very easy, and the result of them very satisfactory.”

5. Extract of a letter from the Secretary of State to the Ministers, dated 29. July 1803. Acknowledging the receipt on the 14th: of that month, of the Treaty and Conventions— Declaring the President’s approbation of their purchase of all Louisiana, and apologizing for not having ever thought of giving them powers to make it.

6. A letter from the Ministers to the Secretary of State, dated 13. May 1803— Giving an Account of their Negotiation, and transmitting the Treaties.— The letter is long, and expatiates much on the advantages of the bargain they had made— To guard against an underrated estimate of these, they not only tell the Secretary what was demanded of them; but what the first Consul intended to have demanded, and did not. The purchase of the whole territory; and the price, paid for it, were dictated to them, and no alternative or modification allowed— But the arrangements for the mode and times of payment, and a limitation of the exclusive commercial privileges to France and Spain, to the term of twelve years, all this was obtained by negotiation; and are deemed by the Ministers objects of such moment, that they compliment very much the french Plenipotentiary, and his Government for their candour, and accommodating Spirit in granting so much.

7. A letter from the Ministers to the Secretary of State dated 16. May 1803. inclosing the Account of claims of American Citizens on the French Government, provided for by the Convention. The Consul had then agreed to ratify immediately.

8. A Letter from the Ministers to the Secretary of State dated 7. June 1803: forwarding the Ratification of the first Consul.— It gives an Account of his dissatisfaction with his own bargain; and of sundry expedients by 9by which he manifested a determination to extricate himself from it.— One of these is contained in a letter from the french Plenipotentiary to them, declaring that if any extraordinary delay should take place on the part of the United States, in the payment of the money, the parties will be placed in the same situation as if they had never treated— Their Answer to this letter is wary, but admits the principle— The Consul however seems to have been afterwards ashamed of this step, for the two letters were mutually restored. The Minister for foreign affairs (Talleyrand) probably dissatisfied with the whole of this Negotiation, and the inspirer of the Consuls scruples, had hit upon another idea, worthy of himself— It was, that the Ratification, even after signature, was altogether in the breast of the Consul, who might modify it or make it conditional as he pleased— And his condition would be that on failure of performance in any one point by the United States, the Treaty should be considered as entirely at an end.

These Circumstances induce the Ministers to urge in the strongest terms, more than performance on our part, and they recommend the payment of the money, even before possession of the Posts shall be given.— They mention the contract by which the French Government had sold their stock in advance to the houses of Baring and Hope.

They express it as their undoubting opinion that West Florida is comprized in the cession, and advise the Government to act in all their measures relative to Louisiana, on the ground of this construction.— They give notice that they have appointed the board of Commissioners, for which they were authorized by the Convention.

9. The translation of the letter from the Minister of the Public Treasury (the french Plenipotentiary) above mentioned, dated 20. Floreal 11. Year

10. The Answer of the Ministers, dated 2. June 1803.

11. Extract of a letter from Mr: Monroe, Minister Plenipotentiary—London, to the Secretary of State, dated 15. August 1803.— barely inclosing

12. An Extract of a letter from Mr: Fenwick to Mr: Monroe—dated 5. August 1803.— Intimating that the Spanish Government had made the most serious remonstrances against the cession of Louisiana—and that if the Senate should not disregard federal examples in modifying Treaties; and should introduce any conditional clause of Ratification, France would annul the whole.

13. Extract of a letter from Mr: King, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States in London, to the Secretary of State, dated 28. April 1803.

He had explained to Lord Hawkesbury, the object of Mr: Monroe’s mission to France, with which his Lordship appeared satisfied.

14. From Mr: King, to Messrs: Livingston and Monroe, dated London 7. May. 1803— Speaking of War as inevitable—declaring the intention of the British Government in case of War to occupy New-Orleans— And requesting if the Country had been ceded to us, communication of it, to the British Government; which would prevent their projected expedition.

15. Answer from Messrs: Livingston and Monroe to Mr: King—dated May 1803. Communicating information of the Cession.

16. Mr: King to Lord Hawkesbury 15. May 1803. Communicating the Cession.

17. Lord Hawkesbury’s Answer—19. May 1803— Expressing satisfaction.

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Doc: 18. Extract of a letter from the Secretary of State to Robert R. Livingston, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, at Paris— Dated 6. October 1803.

Giving an Account of the Measures taken by the Spanish Government in opposition to the cession of Louisiana by France to the United States.— Mr: Cevallos in conversation with Mr: Pinckney, denied the right of France to make the cession; “alledging a secret stipulation by France not to alienate— The Spanish Minister presented two notes here against the transaction. The Secretary of State in this letter discusses and refutes their arguments.— These notes had been communicated to Mr: Pichon, the French Chargé des Affaires here, who had sent an answer in Vindication of his own Government.

Doc: 19. Translated extract of a letter from Mr: Cevallos, Minister of State of His Catholic Majesty, to Charles Pinckney Esqr—dated Aranjuez 4. May 1803.

“The System adopted by his Majesty not to dispossess himself of any portion of his States, deprives him of the pleasure of assenting to the cessions, which the United States wish to obtain by purchase, as I have intimated for their information to the Marquis of Casa Yrujo.

“By the retrocession made to France of Louisiana, this power regains the said Province with the limits it had and saving the rights acquired by other powers. The United States can address themselves to the French Government to negotiate the acquisition of Territories which may suit their interest.”

Doc: 20. Translation of the note, from the Marquis de Casa Yrujo to the Secretary of State, dated Philadelphia 4. Septr: 1803.— It communicates the extract of a note presented 22. July 1802. by M. de St: Cyr Ambassador of the French Republic at Madrid to the Spanish Secretary of State— As follows— “His Catholic Majesty has appeared to wish that France should engage not to sell nor alienate in any manner the property and the enjoyment of Louisiana. Its wish in this respect is perfectly conformable with the intentions of the Spanish Government; and its sole motive for entering therein was because it respected a possession which had constituted a part of the French Territory. I am authorized to declare to you in the name of the First Consul, that France will never alienate it.”

On this foundation the Marquis is ordered to deny the right of France to make the cession.

Doc: 21. Translation of the second Note from the Marquis de Casa Yrujo to the Secretary of State; dated Vicinity of Philadelphia 27. Septr: 1803.

In consequence of a renewed command from the king of Spain, he alledges the above-quoted declaration as an positive engagement that France would never alienate Louisiana, and demands that the Government of the United States “should suspend the ratification and effect a treaty which rests on such a basis.”— But this note denies the right of France to make the cession, upon another ground—towit that the cession by Spain to France was on condition that France should procure the king of Tuscany to be acknowledged by “the powers of Europe”—yet never has obtained this acknowledgment either from the Court of London, or that of St: Petersburg.

The conclusion of the Minister’s instructions apparently quoted in his note, is in strong terms—“Under such circumstances it is evident that the Treaty of sale entered into between France and the United States, does not give to the latter any right to acquire and claim Louisiana, and that the principles of Justice as well as 11sound policy ought to recommend it to their Government not to meddle with engagements as contrary in reality to her interest as they would be to good faith, and to their good correspondence with Spain.”

Doc: 22. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Marquis of Casa-Yrujo—dated 4. October 1803. in answer to the two preceding notes.

It refers to the letter from Mr: Cevallos to Mr: Pinckney—(v. above Doc: 19.) as containing an express recognition of the right of France and of the United States, to make this cession— And it promises further explanations and representations, through our Minister at Madrid.

Doc: 23. Reply, from the Marquis de Casa Yrujo to the Secretary of State—dated Baltimore 12. October 1803— An elaborate attempt to explain away the words of Mr: Cevallos’s note; relied upon by the Secretary of State.

Doc: 24. Letter from the Secretary of State to Mr: Pinckney, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Madrid, dated 12. October 1803.— But concluded Octr: 15.

It directs a postponement of the negotiation with Spain for the Florida’s— Expresses much surprize at the opposition and conduct of Spain on this Occasion— Refers to his answer given to the Spanish Ministers notes, for the refutation of Spain’s question as to the right of the United States to buy Louisiana, and urges many ingenious arguments to be suggested to the Spanish Government, to convince them that the cession is conformable to their own interest.

Mr: Pinckney is instructed to convey the justification of our right, to the Spanish Government, “either by a note, or in conversation as he should deem most expedient; and in a form and style best writing the advantage of making that Government sensible of the absolute determination of the United States to maintain their right, with the propriety of avoiding undignified menace and unnecessary irritation.”

In the following paragraph, a suspicion is rather suggested, than avowed, of which there was very little probability— “If her object be to extort Louisiana from France, as well as to prevent its transfer to the United States, it would seem that she must be emboldened by an understanding with some other very powerful quarter of Europe.”

Doc: 25. and last— A Translation of the note from Citizen L. A. Pichòn, Chargé des Affaires, of France, to the Secretary of State, dated 21. Vendemiaire 12. year— 14. Octr: 1803.—replying to the objections stated in the two notes from the Marquis de Casa Yrujo.

In answer to the allegation that France had promised not to alienate Louisiana, he observes that no such stipulation was contained in the Treaty of St: Ildephonso— That a promise made 15 months after, must have been predicated upon a consideration not arising from the Treaty— A consideration which perhaps has failed, and annulled the promise itself, and therefore cannot possibly affect the right of France to cede or of the United States to acquire the Country.

To the second objection, that France had not procured the acknowledgment of the King of Etruria; he says that Spain had long since considered that Article as sufficiently and substantially fulfilled; for that in the Treaty of Amiens 27. March 1802. Great-Britain had not acknowledged the King of Etruria— Yet in October following, the King of Spain had issued a royal Cedula, for the delivery of Louisiana to France, which Cedula, Mr: Pichon had received, exhibited to Mr: Madison, and sent to the Captain General of Louisiana, who sent the Marquis of Casa Calvo to New-Orleans, to superintend its Execution.

In addition to this, he remarks that Spain must have been informed last February of the object 12objectof Mr: Monroe’s mission, and why did she not then object; while it was yet time?— He concludes with remarking that he has received orders to exchange the ratifications, and to “effect the taking of possession of Louisiana by France, and its transfer to the United States.” He hopes Spain will make no opposition but “In any event, as soon as the ratifications are exchanged, he will proceed without delay, in concert with the Commissary appointed for that purpose by the First Consul, to the delivery of the Colony to the persons whom the President of the United States shall appoint to take possession of it.”

Such is the analysis of the papers communicated by the President to the Senate with the Louisiana cession Treaty, and conventions. I have made it at such length, considering the transactions in itself and in its consequences, as the most important which has occurred since the adoption of our National Constitution