John Quincy Adams Digital Diary

27. V:45. Rain Storm— Received a Note from the President, calling the Meeting of the Members of the Administration, at One O’Clock. At the Office I found a despatch from R. Rush, with the information that on the 12th. of August, the Marquis of Londonderry, the British Secretary of State for foreign Affairs, committed suicide by cutting his throat with a small penknife— “With a bare Bodkin.” His mind was like the cable that drew up the frigate at the Navy-Yard, upon the inclined plane—stretched till it snapped— Attended at the President’s at one O’Clock— Mr Calhoun only was there, Mr Wirt being unwell, and not able to attend— The proposition of Mr Sanchez, as disclosed in Mr. Duponceau’s Letter to General Mason was discussed— There was also a second Letter, explanatory of the first and more strictly confidential. The question was discussed what was to be done. Mr Calhoun has a most ardent desire that the Island of Cuba should become a part of the United States, and says that Mr Jefferson has the same— There are two dangers, to be averted by that event. One that the Island should fall into the hands of Great-Britain; the other that it should be revolutionized by the Negroes— Calhoun says Mr Jefferson told him two years ago, that we ought at the first possible opportunity to take Cuba, though at the cost of a War with England; but as we are not now prepared for this, and as our great object must be to gain time, he thought we should answer this overture, by dissuading them from their present purpose, and urging them to adhere at present to their connection with Spain— I thought it advisable to take a different course— To give them no advice whatever— To say that the Executive of the United States is not competent to promise them admission as a State into the Union; and that if it were, the proposal is of a nature which our relations of amity with Spain would not permit us to countenance— Mr Calhoun suggested, that it would be proper for the President to make it a subject of a confidential communication to Congress, at their next Session; and he objected that if much stress should be laid upon our relations with Spain as forbidding our acceptance of the proposal, it might be considered as indirect instigation to the declaration of Independence, inasmuch as that would release us from the obligation of considering it as involving any of the rights of Spain— I replied that there would be no possibility of proceeding in the business by confidential Communication to Congress— First because there has not been one Message, with closed doors, during the present Administration; nor I believe since the Peace— The very notice of a secret Session would rouse an insatiate curiosity throughout the Nation to know, what could be its object— And secondly the proposal was of a nature which would not admit of secresy; the power of Congress itself to act upon it was questionable— It involved external War and internal revolution, in its essential and inevitable consequences— It would neither be possible nor proper that such business should be transacted by secret Sessions of Congress— The whole affair would be divulged in a week—perhaps in a day. All Europe, as well as America would have notice of it, and the very communication of the proposal to Congress as a subject for their deliberations by the President, might be taken by Spain as hostility to her, and give warning to Great-Britain, to take an immediate and determined stand against it. As to taking Cuba at the cost of a War 382with Great-Britain, it would be well to enquire before undertaking such a War, how it would be likely to terminate; and for the present, and for a long time to come, I hold it for certain that a War with Great-Britain for Cuba, would result in her possession of that Island, and not ours. In the present relative situation of our maritime forces, we could not maintain a War against Great Britain for Cuba. Nor did I think that a plain distinct answer that our relations with Spain forbid our encouragement of a proposal to annex one of her Colonies to our own Union could be construed into an instigation to revolt. It was a reference to a plain principle of moral duty expressly applicable to the case; suitable to be acted upon as a motive, and honourable to the good faith of the Nation. I would give them at the same time to understand that the Government of the United States entertain the most friendly sentiments towards the inhabitants of Cuba; and are fully aware of the common interests which point to a most intimate connection between them and the United States— But to advise them to cling to their connection with Spain, would expose them to be transferred to Great-Britain by Spain, of which there is double danger, first by the present revolutionary Government of Spain to purchase support against the holy Alliance; and secondly by Ferdinand, to purchase the aid of Great-Britain to consummate a counter-revolution in his favour. Now by advising the People of Cuba to adhere to Spain, we expose them to both these dangers; and if the transfer should be made; they would charge the result upon us, and a heavy responsibility for the consequence would be upon us, for such ill-judged interposition— Mr Calhoun said he inclined to think there would be no immediate danger of a transfer of the Island to Great-Britain. The President directed an adjourned meeting for tomorrow— General Mason was at the President’s house, but not present at the Meeting— Johnson Hellen was confined to his bed with a severe fever.