John Quincy Adams’s (JQA) diary, which was inspired by his father John Adams (JA) and started as a travel journal, initiated a lifelong writing obsession. In 1779, twelve-year-old JQA made his second trip abroad to accompany his father’s diplomatic mission. While in Europe, he attended various schools and traveled to St. Petersburg as an interpreter during Francis Dana’s mission to Russia. He subsequently served as JA’s secretary at Paris during the final months before the Anglo-American Definitive Peace Treaty was signed in September 1783. Two years later, JQA returned to the US. After graduating from Harvard College in 1787, he moved to Newburyport to read law under Theophilus Parsons and in 1790 he established a legal practice in Boston. JQA’s skill as a writer brought him public acclaim, and in 1794 President George Washington nominated him as US minister resident to the Netherlands.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) entered diplomatic service in September 1794 as US minister resident to the Netherlands. He married Louisa Catherine Johnson (LCA) in July 1797 after a fourteen-month engagement, and their three sons were born in this period. During his father John Adams’s (JA) presidency they moved to Berlin where, as US minister plenipotentiary, JQA signed a new Prussian-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce. JQA returned to the US in 1801 and entered politics, elected first to the Massachusetts senate in 1802 and then to the US Senate in 1803. His contentious relationship with fellow Federalist members over his support of some Democratic-Republican policies led to his removal from office. In May 1808 the Federalist-controlled Massachusetts legislature voted to replace him at the end of his term, prompting JQA’s resignation in June. Between 1806 and 1809 he also served as the first Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) returned to diplomatic service in August 1809 as the US’s first minister plenipotentiary to Russia. In St. Petersburg JQA was well-liked by Emperor Alexander I and closely followed the battles of the Napoleonic Wars then raging across Europe. When the US declared war on Great Britain in 1812, Adams watched from afar as the conflict dragged on for two years. In April 1814, he traveled to Ghent, Belgium, as part of the US delegation to negotiate an end to the war with England; the Treaty of Ghent was signed on Christmas Eve. Subsequently appointed US minister to the Court of St. James’s in May 1815, JQA served in London for the next two years.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) served as the US secretary of state during James Monroe’s presidency. Adams’s duties included organizing and responding to all State Department correspondence and negotiating agreements beneficial to the US. His achievements as secretary of state include the Anglo-American Convention of 1818, which established the US border with Canada along the 49th parallel, and the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 (Transcontinental Treaty), which resulted in the US acquisition of Florida. JQA also formulated the policy that became known as the Monroe Doctrine, in which the US called for European non-intervention in the western hemisphere, specifically in the affairs of newly independent Latin American nations. As Monroe’s presidency came to an end, JQA was among the top candidates in the 1824 presidential election. When no candidate earned the necessary majority, the House of Representatives decided the election in JQA’s favor in February 1825.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) was inaugurated as the sixth president of the US on 4 March 1825 and began his administration with an ambitious agenda of improvements for American society. His presidency was embattled. Supporters of Andrew Jackson, who believed their candidate had unfairly lost the 1824 election, worked ceaselessly to foil JQA’s plans. Domestically, JQA refused to replace civil servants with partisan supporters, and his administration became involved in disputes between the Creek Nation and the state of Georgia. JQA’s foreign policy also suffered, as partisan bickering in Congress failed to provide timely funding for US delegates to attend the 1826 Congress of Panama. Political mudslinging in advance of the 1828 presidential election was particularly fierce, and by mid-1827 JQA knew he would not be reelected.
In 1831 John Quincy Adams (JQA) became the only former president to subsequently serve in the US House of Representatives. As the chairman of the House Committee on Manufactures, he helped compose the compromise tariff bill of 1832. He traveled to Philadelphia as part of a committee that investigated the Bank of the United States, drafting a minority report in support of rechartering the bank after disagreeing with the committee’s majority report. JQA regularly presented the antislavery petitions he received from across the country, and he vehemently opposed the passage of the Gag Rule in 1836 that prevented House discussion of petitions related to slavery. He opposed the annexation of Texas, and in 1838 he delivered a marathon speech condemning the evils of slavery. JQA also chaired the committee that oversaw the bequest of James Smithson, which was used to establish the Smithsonian Institution.
During his final years of service in the US House of Representatives, John Quincy Adams (JQA) continued to oppose the Gag Rule that prevented House discussion of petitions related to slavery. In 1839 he joined the defense team for the Africans who revolted aboard the Spanish slave ship Amistad. The Supreme Court declared the Amistad Africans free on 9 March 1841 after JQA delivered oral arguments in their favor. In 1842 JQA faced a censure hearing and ably defended himself against charges from southern congressmen. He introduced a successful resolution that finally led to the repeal of the Gag Rule in 1844. JQA voted against both the annexation of Texas in 1845 and the US declaration of war with Mexico in 1846. He collapsed on the floor of the House on 21 February 1848 and died two days later.
r Poletica, the Russian
Minister to call there before Noon— He came, and I told him that I had
asked to see him by the President’s direction. It was his intention, in the
Message to Congress, when speaking of the refusal of Spain to ratify the
Florida Treaty, to state that France and Great Britain had both
manifested wishes favourable to the ratification— He wished to say the
same of the Russian Government, if Poletica thought that it might be
positively stated. He said it certainly might— He had written altogether
in that Spirit to Tatischeff, and was confident it would be entirely approved
by his government— I said we knew that Count Lieven and Pozzo
di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador’s at London and Paris,
had expressed such sentiments; but we had received intimations that
Tatischeff’s conduct had not been equally friendly— He said he was not
surprized at that— He had been suspicious it would be so. But he knew
Tatischeff perfectly well; and if he had taken that part, it was to be
in opposition to everything done by the British Ambassador; and to
strengthen his own influence by shewing zeal for those to whom he was
accredited— I went to the President’s at Noon, where there was a Cabinet
Meeting— Crawford,
Thompson and Wirt were present. The President read
the draft of his Message, which is nearly prepared— It is less pleasing,
and will I think be more criticised, than either of his former Messages,
at the Commencement of the Sessions of Congress— It presents a situation
of public affairs less auspicious, and a variety of topics, upon which
there will probably be vehement debates. The question with Spain is
drawn out more into detail, and yet is not shewn in so clear a light as
I could have wished it might be. The recommendation is however as I had
suggested that Congress should pass an act authorising the Executive to
carry the Treaty into effect as if it had been ratified by Spain; but
the authority to be contingent, and to be used at the discretion of the
Executive, in case there should be no satisfactory result to the
Negotiation, during the Session of Congress. The paragraphs respecting
the South Americans, which the President told me he had drawn with
modifications of the first draft were still so strongly expressed and so
partial in their favour, that I was strongly apprehensive that they
would produce effects not only in Spain, but throughout Europe— As I was
aware that the only way to obtain any mitigation of the passage, was to
make at once an objection to the whole, I asked after it had been read,
whether it would not be advisable to omit the whole; in this, as I had
expected I was opposed from all quarters; particularly from Mr Thompson, the Secretary of the Navy. He
said if the Message should not express favourable sentiments of the
South-Americans, the administration would be charged with having become
hostile to them, and with insincerity towards them— I observed that this
charge had already been made, and urged with all the ability and all the
animation that the enemies of the administration could bring to it— That
they had been harping upon it two years without intermission, and I
thought there never was a topic upon which the strings of popular
feeling had been touched with less success— A disposition sufficiently
favourable to the South-Americans had been manifested in the Messages of
the two preceding years. It was useless to repeat now what had been said
before—it was not yet proposed to recognize their independence; and as
we knew this to be the precise point upon which the obstacle to the
ratification of the Treaty turned, I thought it highly inexpedient that
anything should be said in the Message, upon which 221Spain could fasten, as a departure from neutrality, and which France
and Russia might consider as at least tending to justify Spain in
persisting to withhold ratification— Mr Wirt
asked if the expression of opinions and wishes could be considered as a
departure from neutrality— I said that in a Message from the chief
magistrate to the Legislature, if not a positive breach of neutrality it
was a very near approximation to it; and asked him how it would be
viewed, if sentiments and wishes equally strong were expressed against
the Colonies, and in favour of Spain— The President said we had made to
Great-Britain and France, the proposal for a joint acknowledgment of
Buenos-Ayres; which neither of them had accepted. But Britain had
immediately made it known to Spain, and to all the rest of Europe, while
it was not known to our own People. He thought it would be proper to
avow it in the face of the world, and to assign reasons in justification
of it, which could only drawn from exhibiting the Colonies, as having
just claims to be recognised as independent— At the same time he wished
by shewing to the People of this Country what had been done for the
South-Americans, to take away from the enemies of the administration the
pretence that it was not friendly to the Independent cause. Crawford
said that all the rest of the world knew we had made this proposal to
the French and English Governments; our own People did not know it. He
thought it would be proper to inform them of it— I did not press the
total omission of the paragraph; but then objected successively to its
details, urging the general objection, to each part of a sentence, and
making special question upon the principal statements contained in it—
The President consented to strike out several of the strongest
expressions, and softened down the whole as much as the other members
would approve, and when it was brought to the point which they all
thought acceptable, the President asked me again what I thought of it— I
said in a tone of good humour which produced a general laugh—[“]Sir, to
be quite candid with you, I have brought my mind to the conclusion, that
the less there is said in this Message, upon
South-America, the better it will be— Whatever therefore you will
consent to strike out will in my judgment be an improvement; and
whatever you conclude to retain, I must put up with, and make the best
of it that I can— I have no ill will to the cause of the
South-Americans— I have no doubt they will ultimately maintain their
Independence; and that at a proper time it ought to be acknowledged— But
at this moment I think we should avoid any thing, of which Spain might
make a handle, and which would dispose France and Russia against us”—
The paragraph was in fact expurgated, until I hope it will be harmless;
unless the President should restore the obnoxious passages, or at least
some of them, as I apprehend he may— I had as he desired drawn a short
sentence, stating that France, Great-Britain and Russia were favourable
to the Ratification of the Treaty— He had been promised by Mr Wirt a draft of a paragraph recommending a
revision of the Laws against Piracy; but it was not produced— He adopted
mine with some alteration— The statements respecting the Survey and
Fortifications the Yellow-Stone expedition, the condition of the Navy,
and the Finances drew forth few observations— On the pecuniary
embarrassments of the Country, the distressed and decayed state of the
manufactures, and the aspect of the Treasury Department, little was
said, and I think the Message will be found meagre, by the Public— There
was an introductory paragraph speaking of the reassembling of Congress
at the Capitol, as an Event more important than it deserves. Crawford
advised to let it down to a very brief and unassuming notice, or even to
strike it out altogether— In the allusion to the State of the Treasury,
the sums were announced in Millions of Dollars and so many Cents— Crawford proposed to strike out the Cents,
and the dollars under hundreds of thousands; justly observing that round
numbers, and general expressions were more suitable to an Executive
Message; and that units and fractions of dollars might be left to the
Report from the Treasury Department— When the rest of the Message, a
very long one, was gone through, the President said, that was all,
except one subject, which as this was a new subject Congress he thought it his duty to recommend to their
consideration— He then produced a manuscript long enough itself for two
moderate Messages, recommending the proposal by Congress of an Amendment
to the Constitution, authorizing them to make internal improvements by
Roads and Canals; with an elaborate argument to prove that the authority
has not been given by the 222Constitution— It is a
paper which he drew up last winter, and was then anxious to communicate
in some way to Congress— He then read it at a Cabinet Meeting—but
finally postponed producing it to the public at that time. After he had
now read it through, a general silence ensued, until I remarked that
when the Message at the commencement of the first Session of the last
Congress was prepared I had taken the Liberty of suggesting some
considerations upon which it appeared to me desirable that the whole
paragraph should be omitted— I now retained the same opinion, and the
course pursued by Congress on that subject since the former Message, had
in my mind added new motives for the omission of it at present— The
debates in the House of Representatives on that part of the former
message had been full of imitation and not altogether respectful to the
Executive— It had been asserted that the expression of his opinion had
not been given the proper time, a large portion, perhaps a majority of
the House of Representatives had voted for Resolutions in opposition to
that opinion— There is a moral certainty that if the President now
recommends the proposal of an amendment to the Constitution, it will be
without effect— The argument will be encountered by argument, and a
conflict between the Executive and the Legislative, always to be
deprecated in the administration of this Government will not only be
established, but appear to have been invited and provoked by the
President, and under circumstances in which no useful purpose could be
effected by it— I was however on this as on the former occasion without
support from any other member of the Administration— The President
admitted as usual that there was great weight in my suggestions, but
said as this was a new Congress whose opinions might be supposed not
pre-occupied on the question he thought it his duty to give them
explicitly his opinions on the subject— Crawford was more wary than
candid in his remarks— He balanced the reasons pro and con; admitted
that it was an affair of great delicacy, and that this part of the
message would be sharply criticised; but still flattered the President
with the hope that there might be a majority of Congress agreeing in
opinion with him, sufficient to carry an Amendment to the Constitution,
which a competent number of the State Legislatures would ratify—
Crawford knows better— But dans les malheurs de nos meilleurs amis nous
trouvons toujours quelque chose qu’ne nous déplait pas— Crawford is not
unwilling to see this disagreement between the President and Congress,
fester and inflame— It will all turn to his account— Wirt hinged much
upon the right of the President to recommend an
amendment to the Constitution; and said Clay last winter had denied it— Crawford said Clay was
heated— But that he was very likely to start such an objection— I
observed that I had no doubt of the right; though as by the
Constitution, Amendments are the only acts of the Legislature in which
the President has no participation there may be some colour for the
question; but it was upon the expediency of the recommendation that my
doubts were founded. However, the President had determined, I have no
doubt upon long determination, to send it; and he has probably motives
for this measure which he has not disclosed— It is to all apparent
purposes so injudicious, that the President who is a man of strong
judgment, and great discretion would certainly not produce it, without
objects to answer, adequate to balance the ill effects which he cannot
but see it will be attended with in Congress— He has been brought into
mortifying dilemma’s, by his declaration of faith on the internal
improvement question; for Congress have passed acts to all appearance in
the face of his opinions, which acts, he has with great reluctance
approved— This has given the appearance of inconsistency between his
doctrine and his conduct which he has severely felt, and he draws nice
distinctions to reconcile them together, which will be sharply sifted in
Congress and by the public— The Cabinet Meeting broke up between four
and five O’Clock— Poletica called at my house this Evening, and shewed
me three Letters which he had received since he had been with me in the
Morning— One was from Count
Nesselrode, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs; dated
at St. Petersburg in September; it is in
answer to Poletica’s first despatches after he arrived here, and
expresses great satisfaction at the frankness and confidence of my
communications with him; and a hope that they would be continued in the
same Spirit— The second was from Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador
at Paris, and expresses great concern at the refusal of Spain to ratify
the Treaty; and great apprehensions that we shall resort to force to
take possession of Florida; by which it says we shall lose the good will
of the European Powers which is now with us— The third was from
Tatischeff—Russian Ambassador in Spain, but written at Paris; where he
was on his way to St. Petersburg, on a leave
of absence nine months— It was in answer to a Letter from Poletica to
him, which was sent by the Hornet, and in which he 223urged him to use his influence with the Spanish Government in favour
of the ratification of the Treaty, and recommends Forsyth to him— Tatischeff answer that
he should have taken great satisfaction in promoting the ratification,
but that Forsyth’s character was said to be unsocial (peu liant) and as
he spoke none of the languages of the Continent of Europe, they could
not converse together— Poletica said that he had brought those Letters
to shew them to me; immediately after receiving them, to confirm, what
he had told me this Morning.
