12 May 1816
adams-john10 Neal Millikan Barbary Wars Slave Trade Court Life and Society, European
443

12. VI:15. Finished the Note to Lord Castlereagh concerning the sales of Slaves; upon which I have been so long employed— My wife is making a copy of it; and I took the Press copy with me, for Smith to make out the original Note to be sent. I went to London in the Curricle, after an early Breakfast alone, and at eleven O’Clock was at Lord Castlereagh’s door— I was shewn into the anti-room, and within five minutes, Lord Melville, the first Lord of the Admiralty came in. He told me that they had not yet received any despatches from Mr Bagot— Not even of his arrival at Washington.— But they had Letters from the Captain of the Niger; from Bermuda; to which Island she proceeded after having landed Mr Bagot and his family at Annapolis— I said to Lord Melville in the tone between jest and earnest that I heard Lord Exmouth had been making Peace for Naples and Sardinia, and a quarrel for us, with the Dey of Algiers— He said that was the subject upon which Lord Castlereagh had requested to see me this Morning. They had no intention to make a quarrel between us and Algiers; and hoped no such consequence would follow— I replied that if it should, the quarrel would I hope be rather useful to us than otherwise; and My Lord, said I, if we had only for three years, one third of your naval force, I assure you, that the Christian world should never more hear of tribute, ransom or Slavery to the African Barbarians— Just then the servant came, and ushered us in to Lord Castlereagh’s cabinet. He began immediately upon the subject, and told me that he had asked this interview for the purpose of communicating to me confidentially their Instructions to Lord Exmouth and his proceedings under them, with a view to satisfy the Government of the United States that the conduct of the British Government in these transactions had been fair and honourable; and that although there was one Article of the Treaty between the United States and Algiers, which Great-Britain considered as objectionable it had not been at-all noticed or referred to in Lord Exmouth’s Negotiation— He then read to me two papers and gave me to peruse three others, serving to elucidate all the proceedings of this Government in this affair. They were 1. A Letter from himself to Earle Bathurst, directing by an order of the Cabinet Council, that Instructions from the Lords of the Admiralty should be sent to Lord Exmouth to go and notify to the Barbary Powers, the dispositions by which the allied European Sovereigns have placed the Ionian Islands under the protection of Great Britain; to obtain the acknowledgment of these dispositions; and at the same time to negotiate a Peace between the Barbary Powers and the kingdoms of the two Sicilies and of Sardinia. The motives alledged for this measure are, the obligations of Great-Britain to extend to the Ionian Islands since they have been made a part of the British dominions, the same privileges enjoyed in the Mediterranean seas, by other British subjects—the general indignation arising throughout Europe, against the mode of warfare practised by the Barbary States against Christians; and the urgent applications of the king’s two intimate allies the kings of Naples and Sardinia; more particularly a very recent one from the latter of these Sovereigns, through his Minister at this Court, for the interposition of Great-Britain to effect this Peace in respect to his dominions— It is observed that by the annexation of Genoa to the Sardinian Dominions the importance to them of a Peace with the Barbary States had increased. That the object of that annexation having been to strengthen the barrier on the side of Italy against France, it would be more consonant with that policy that all the resources of Sardinia should be applied to its military power by Land, than that any part of them should be diverted to the purpose of making it a naval power— That while the Island of Malta had been possessed by the knights of that order, they had been at perpetual war with the Barbary Powers, and had thereby afforded considerable protection to the Commerce of the Mediterranean States against their Cruizers. And as Great-Britain now possessed Malta, although she was not obliged to take upon her the duty of protecting all the Christian flags, the revenues of the Order, not having been transferred to her, yet it was proper she should exercise her influence of protection to a certain extent. 24 [symbols] Lord Exmouth was therefore to be instructed to go to Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli; and to perswade their Governments to make a Peace with Naples and Sardinia, upon the footing of that with Portugal. He was to agree that the same rate of ransom as had heretofore been paid for prisoners, Subjects of those Powers, should be paid for those he should find there in captivity. And that the usual presents in money should hereafter be paid for them. He was to resist & reject all demands for contributions of naval or military Stores, and to require the release without ransom, of all prisoners, natives of the Ionian Islands. But although he was to refuse any stipulated compensation for their deliverance, he was authorized 444to give it to be understood that a suitable present would be made for them. He was also to admonish the Regencies of the rising indignation of Europe against their mode of warfare; and to advise them to abandon it, and to resort to more creditable resources for the support of their Governments. At the same time he was to assure them of the friendly disposition of Great-Britain towards them, and that she would not support any Christian State in any unjust claim or pretension against them— He was in the first instance to urge all this in an amicable manner; but was explicitly authorised to use force if necessary— 2. A second Letter from Lord Castlereagh to Earle Bathurst dated 13. March. stating that the Treaty between the United States of America and Algiers, concluded on the 30th. of June 1815. and ratified at Washington, on the 26th. of December last, had engaged the attention of His Majesty’s Government That the 18th. Article in particular, would in the case of a future War between Great-Britain, and the United-States, be incompatible with the 9th. and 10th: Articles of the Treaty of 1698. between Great-Britain and Algiers, which had been recognized and renewed in all the subsequent Treaties between them. That it might not for this reason be necessary to require the abrogation of the Treaty, between the United States and Algiers, but that Lord Exmouth should be instructed formally to protest against the Application of that Article of the Treaty, to Great-Britain in the case of any future hostilities between this Country and the United States. 3. A Report from Lord Exmouth, dated 17. April at Tunis, to the Lords of the Admiralty, of his Execution of the first Instructions at Algiers and at Tunis. He states that he had not received the second Instructions (those relative to the Treaty between the United States and Algiers) until after he had left Algiers, and that he should therefore execute them upon his return. 4. A Summary Statement of the Terms upon which the Peace was concluded, both at Algiers, and at Tunis, for Sardinia and for Naples. The Ransom for the Sardinian Prisoners was 500 dollars for each man, and for the Neapolitans 1000. The Consular and other Presents in future to be as usual heretofore, but only in money. The Ionian Islanders to be restored without ransom. 5. A Declaration by Mahmoud Bashaw, Bey of Tunis, addressed to Lord Exmouth, and promising, in Consideration of the anxious desire manifested by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of England, to put an end to the Slavery of Christians, and to prove his esteem for the European Powers, and his pacific disposition, that in case of War with any of the said Powers, the prisoners shall not be reduced to Slavery; but treated as Prisoners of War, and at the end of the War exchanged and sent home— After thanking Lord Castlereagh for the communication of these Documents, the purport of which I assured him I should immediately report to the Government of the United States, I told him that as the Instructions to Lord Exmouth had positively forbidden him to stipulate for any future contributions to the Barbarians in naval or military Stores, I hoped that in the next arrangement, which Great-Britain should make with them for her friends she would proceed one step further and prohibit the payment to them of money, which was equivalent to, and would procure them all. And as the Prince Regent’s anxiety to put an end to Christian Slavery had obtained a Declaration from the Bay of Tunis, that he would no longer reduce Christian Prisoners to Slavery, the same influence would here after be exerted, effectually to abolish that practice on the part of all the Barbary Powers, and especially Algiers. That it was worthy of Great-Britain, to take the lead in the abolition of this species of Slavery, as she had done with regard to that of the Africans. That she was perfectly able to accomplish it alone, and in that case would enjoy all the credit and glory of having effected it. But if she preferred to have the co-operation of others, I was confident she might rely upon that of the United States, to the full proportion of their Power, and that I thought her having succeeded to the possession of the Island of Malta really did impose upon her the obligation of affording to the Christian Commerce, at least all the protection that it could derive from the perpetual War between that order and the Infidels. Lord Castlereagh declared that it was the earnest wish of the British Government, that all the Barbary Powers should abandon altogether this mode of warfare; but he thought that mild and moderate measures, and persuasion would be better calculated to produce this effect than force. He seemed even to consider that this payment of money to them would have the tendency of relaxing them into good humour, and incline them to compliance with the wish that they would make no more Slaves to be ransomed. He said that although Great-Britain possessed the Island of Malta, she had none of the Revenues, which had been assigned by all the principal States of Europe to the Order. That Great-Britain with all her exertions had not been able to obtain the abolition of the African Slave-trade by Spain and Portugal, and as she would not have felt justified in resorting to War, to compel them to it, so she could not make War upon the Barbary States to force them to renounce the practice of making Slaves of Christians, so long as they never applied it to her Subjects, or had given her any cause of offence. It was for other Powers to vindicate and maintain the Liberties of their own People; and besides the Northern Maritime States France, Spain and all those who had possessions on the Mediterranean had as strong an obligation to put down the scandal of Christian Slavery, as Great-Britain. She had for herself no complaint against the Barbary States to make— She had often found them useful friends; and especially during the late War in the Peninsula, which it would have been impossible for her to have carried through successfully without the supplies 445which her troops had received from the coast of Barbary—from which they had almost all their fresh provisions. Great-Britain however had no interest or desire to countenance or encourage the Wars of the Barbary States against the other navigating European Powers. She had no unworthy policy of securing by such means an exclusive privilege to her own flag, of securely navigating in the Mediterranean Seas— But she did not think that the obligation of putting an end to the depredations of the Barbary States was incumbent upon her alone; and if it was to be effected, she thought the best mode of accomplishing it would be by convincing them that it would be better for their own interest to resort to other, and more honest sources of Prosperity.— I observed that as to the manner of accomplishing the object, if Great-Britain would undertake it, that must be at her own option. There could not be supposed any necessity for her resorting to the use of force.— The intimation of her will, and the exhibition of her means of enforcement, would infallibly be as efficacious upon the Dey of Algiers, as the Prince Regent’s wish had been upon the Bey of Tunis. As to the assistance which had been derived from supplies of Provisions to the British Troops in Spain, the interest of the Seller was doubtless the motive for that, and it could lay no claim to the merit of an obligation. If however, Great-Britain should not incline to assume the task of putting an end to Barbary Piracy, if she would leave them in our hands, I believed we should be able to give a good account of them. The experience of the last year had proved that they were not very formidable antagonists upon the Ocean, and if we had to deal with them alone; I had no doubt that our navy would be competent to the protection of our Commerce against them. I was not informed what the precise point of difference between Algiers and us now was; but as to the conflicting Articles of the two Treaties there could be no difficulty in an arrangement between the two Governments concerning it— He replied that we might depend upon meeting no molestation, in our operations, against Algiers, on the part of Great-Britain— He thought that the place itself could not be attacked with any prospect of success— There had been of late years a change in the system of Algerine warfare, which had been to their own disadvantage. Formerly they had been accustomed to send out small gallies, and xebecs, and gunboats for shallow waters, which cost nothing, and against which it was scarcely possible to protect commercial vessels, especially during certain Seasons of the year. Of late they had undertaken to maintain a sort of Navy— Large, expensive frigates, with which they had effected their descents on the Coasts of Italy and Sardinia, and carried off whole villages. But such vessels were not so well adapted to the annoyance of Commerce as those which they had formerly employed— The large ships could be out only part of the year, and then they could neither fight, nor navigate them well.— Defence against them would not be difficult; but it was Lord Exmouth’s opinion, that if they should resort again to their old system, there could be no effectual protection for merchant vessels against them through all Seasons— This was the substance of the Conversation, in which Lord Melville took none, or scarcely any part—appearing merely to assent to the observations of Lord Castlereagh.— Before leaving them I mentioned to Lord Castlereagh, the not that I addressed to him the first of this month, concerning, the American vessel refused entry at Liverpool, because the Collector at Richmond certified that the master had been qualified, instead, of saying sworn, to manifest of tobacco: I told him that in some parts of the United States, I knew the term qualified was used, and received as equivalent to sworn— Lord Melville said that sometimes it was so used in this Country— Lord Castlereagh had not seen, or had forgotten, my Note; but he promised to enquire after it. I also told Lord Castlereagh that I had received Instructions to ask for a permission to export Rollers, for the use of the Mint of the United States— He said there could be no difficulty in that; but Lord Melville remarked that the prohibition was by Act of Parliament. Lord Castlereagh asked me to write him a note about it— I had ordered the Coachman to come with the Curricle for me to Craven Street at five O’Clock— I walked from Lord Castlereagh’s to my Office, and there found Mr M. C. Paterson with Mr Smith. I also received there a Letter from Coll: Aspinwall, enclosing those to him from Mr Shaler, Commodore Shaw, and Mr M’Call, the navy Agent, and Consul at Barcelona, relating to our new troubles with Algiers. Coll: Aspinwall has doubts as to the expediency of publishing the information they contain and asks my opinion of it— He sends me likewise a Letter from Mr: G. W. Erving at Havre dated the 5th: of this month— Bound to Paris, and as Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to Spain. He sailed from New-York the 10th. of April, and gives me the recent news from America— At half past three O’Clock, I left the Office, and walked home in two hours and twenty Minutes, the shortest time I have ever taken for it and walking the whole way at the rate of four miles an hour— My usual rate of walking is 3 1/2 miles an hour— I was twice overtaken with heavy showers of hail, Sleet, and Snow—the first in Hyde Park, and the second at Turnham Green.— The last soaked me through and through, so that on reaching home I was obliged to change my clothing— I had also blistered one of my feet— George went this Evening to Church at Brentford.— I also received at the Office, a printed notification from the Lord Chamberlain’s Office, of a Court Mourning of three 446weeks, for the late Empress of Austria—to commence this day— Full Mourning a fortnight— Half Mourning, a week— And a written Notice from the same office, that there will be a Levee at Carleton House next Tuesday, and a Drawing Room at the Queen’s Palace, next Thursday, both at two O’Clock.

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Citation

John Quincy Adams, , , The John Quincy Adams Digital Diary, published in the Primary Source Cooperative at the Massachusetts Historical Society: