John Quincy Adams’s (JQA) diary, which was inspired by his father John Adams (JA) and started as a travel journal, initiated a lifelong writing obsession. In 1779, twelve-year-old JQA made his second trip abroad to accompany his father’s diplomatic mission. While in Europe, he attended various schools and traveled to St. Petersburg as an interpreter during Francis Dana’s mission to Russia. He subsequently served as JA’s secretary at Paris during the final months before the Anglo-American Definitive Peace Treaty was signed in September 1783. Two years later, JQA returned to the US. After graduating from Harvard College in 1787, he moved to Newburyport to read law under Theophilus Parsons and in 1790 he established a legal practice in Boston. JQA’s skill as a writer brought him public acclaim, and in 1794 President George Washington nominated him as US minister resident to the Netherlands.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) entered diplomatic service in September 1794 as US minister resident to the Netherlands. He married Louisa Catherine Johnson (LCA) in July 1797 after a fourteen-month engagement, and their three sons were born in this period. During his father John Adams’s (JA) presidency they moved to Berlin where, as US minister plenipotentiary, JQA signed a new Prussian-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce. JQA returned to the US in 1801 and entered politics, elected first to the Massachusetts senate in 1802 and then to the US Senate in 1803. His contentious relationship with fellow Federalist members over his support of some Democratic-Republican policies led to his removal from office. In May 1808 the Federalist-controlled Massachusetts legislature voted to replace him at the end of his term, prompting JQA’s resignation in June. Between 1806 and 1809 he also served as the first Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) returned to diplomatic service in August 1809 as the US’s first minister plenipotentiary to Russia. In St. Petersburg JQA was well-liked by Emperor Alexander I and closely followed the battles of the Napoleonic Wars then raging across Europe. When the US declared war on Great Britain in 1812, Adams watched from afar as the conflict dragged on for two years. In April 1814, he traveled to Ghent, Belgium, as part of the US delegation to negotiate an end to the war with England; the Treaty of Ghent was signed on Christmas Eve. Subsequently appointed US minister to the Court of St. James’s in May 1815, JQA served in London for the next two years.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) served as the US secretary of state during James Monroe’s presidency. Adams’s duties included organizing and responding to all State Department correspondence and negotiating agreements beneficial to the US. His achievements as secretary of state include the Anglo-American Convention of 1818, which established the US border with Canada along the 49th parallel, and the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 (Transcontinental Treaty), which resulted in the US acquisition of Florida. JQA also formulated the policy that became known as the Monroe Doctrine, in which the US called for European non-intervention in the western hemisphere, specifically in the affairs of newly independent Latin American nations. As Monroe’s presidency came to an end, JQA was among the top candidates in the 1824 presidential election. When no candidate earned the necessary majority, the House of Representatives decided the election in JQA’s favor in February 1825.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) was inaugurated as the sixth president of the US on 4 March 1825 and began his administration with an ambitious agenda of improvements for American society. His presidency was embattled. Supporters of Andrew Jackson, who believed their candidate had unfairly lost the 1824 election, worked ceaselessly to foil JQA’s plans. Domestically, JQA refused to replace civil servants with partisan supporters, and his administration became involved in disputes between the Creek Nation and the state of Georgia. JQA’s foreign policy also suffered, as partisan bickering in Congress failed to provide timely funding for US delegates to attend the 1826 Congress of Panama. Political mudslinging in advance of the 1828 presidential election was particularly fierce, and by mid-1827 JQA knew he would not be reelected.
In 1831 John Quincy Adams (JQA) became the only former president to subsequently serve in the US House of Representatives. As the chairman of the House Committee on Manufactures, he helped compose the compromise tariff bill of 1832. He traveled to Philadelphia as part of a committee that investigated the Bank of the United States, drafting a minority report in support of rechartering the bank after disagreeing with the committee’s majority report. JQA regularly presented the antislavery petitions he received from across the country, and he vehemently opposed the passage of the Gag Rule in 1836 that prevented House discussion of petitions related to slavery. He opposed the annexation of Texas, and in 1838 he delivered a marathon speech condemning the evils of slavery. JQA also chaired the committee that oversaw the bequest of James Smithson, which was used to establish the Smithsonian Institution.
During his final years of service in the US House of Representatives, John Quincy Adams (JQA) continued to oppose the Gag Rule that prevented House discussion of petitions related to slavery. In 1839 he joined the defense team for the Africans who revolted aboard the Spanish slave ship Amistad. The Supreme Court declared the Amistad Africans free on 9 March 1841 after JQA delivered oral arguments in their favor. In 1842 JQA faced a censure hearing and ably defended himself against charges from southern congressmen. He introduced a successful resolution that finally led to the repeal of the Gag Rule in 1844. JQA voted against both the annexation of Texas in 1845 and the US declaration of war with Mexico in 1846. He collapsed on the floor of the House on 21 February 1848 and died two days later.
rs: Adams, but was informed we
were still in the Country.— I enquired if he had any Accounts this
morning from the Prince Regent, who
is laid up at Brighton, with the Gout— He said the Prince was now free
from Pain and recovering— But it had become at last after shifting about
for several days, a regular attack; and as it had left him weak, his
medical attendants had advised that Parliament, which is to sit on the
first of February, should be opened by Commission, and that the Prince
should remain ten days or a fortnight longer at Brighton, before coming
to Town.— He said the Prince had exposed himself to the damp weather in
going round with him, to shew him the place; (the new Pavilion at
Brighton) and afterwards to the Queen, when she came. The Gout had been some days
unsettled; but had finally fixed, and the attack while it lasted had
been sharp— We now entered upon the subjects for which I had requested
the interview, and I shall give the dialogue to the best of my
recollection as it passed; distinguishing the speakers respectively by
the initials of their names— A. I have observed by the Public papers
that your Lordship has received the Ratification by the President of the United States, of the
Commercial Convention concluded in July last— C. Yes—and the
Ratifications may be exchanged in a few days . . . or . . . I believe
they were exchanged there; at Washington. . . A. That was what I wished
to enquire of your Lordship—having myself no advices from my Government,
since the Ratification— C.—Yes—the Ratifications were exchanged there—
A. At the time when that Convention was concluded, the Full-Powers of
the American
Plenipotentiaries were much more extensive than the
objects upon which it was found the parties could then come to an
agreement; and as my two Colleagues were shortened for time, and anxious
to return to America; it was thought best to conclude what we could then
adjust, and notice was given by us, that further proposals might
afterwards be brought forward by me—for negotiation.— The British
Plenipotentiaries told us that their powers would be
terminated by the Convention then signed; and in case of a further
Negotiation they did not know whether it would be committed to them. I
then informed them, that I should not propose any thing further, without
new Instructions from my Government, and in that case, should address
myself through the regular channel of the Foreign Department— Since then
I have received Instructions directing me to make proposals for
arrangements which I presumed could be settled only in the form of a
Treaty— Other proposals of negotiation had been made, in the course of
my Correspondence here, during your Lordships absence in France, by
Lord Bathurst; I wished
therefore now to enquire, what are the Views of His Majesty’s Government
in this respect— Whether they are disposed to enter upon a new
Negotiation—and if they are whether they will consider the Full Power
heretofore produced by my Colleagues and me as competent for concluding
an additional Treaty; or will they expect me to produce a new Power— And
whether I shall treat with the same British Plenipotentiaries with whom
we treated before; or with your Lordship— C. Yes—I remember we thought
it best then, for restoring harmony and good Understanding between the
parties, to get along as far as we could at that time agree; and to
postpone every thing, upon which the different views of the two sides
precluded an agreement— Our dispositions are now the same—we have with
the utmost sincerity the desire to preserve and cultivate Peace and
Harmony with you— But what are the subjects upon which you would propose
a further Negotiation? A— Several—the first and most important is that
relating to Seamen—Impressment—A Subject which had heretofore been the
greatest cause of the unfortunate differences between the two Countries;
about which there is much anxiety in America, and to which the attention
of the Government of the United States is yet strongly rivetted, as
appears by the President’s last Message to Congress, in which he again
recommends a law for confining the Navigation of American Vessels to
American Seamen— C. Why, your Government is taking the right measures
for removing 384the grounds of those differences,
and I am glad to see it— By encouraging your own Seamen which is
certainly a wise and proper policy— But it is a question to be
considered, whether such measures as these tending to take away the
cause of dissension, will not be more effectual as a practical remedy
for the evil, than any arrangement which could be made by Treaty— The
British Government, are and always have been ready and willing to
discuss any proposal that can be offered, for an arrangement by Treaty;
but the Views as to the Right, of the two Governments, are so opposite—
The popular feeling is so strong, and so irritable, on your side in one
direction, and on ours in the other, that while there is no practical
operation of the inconvenience, perhaps it is not the best time, for any
formal stipulation concerning it— A. There is another point of view, in
which the present may be considered as the best time for an arrangement;
as being a time, when the Passions on neither side will be interested to
take part against it— A Time of Peace when the whole subject may be
considered coolly, and no irritable feeling would mingle with the
discussion— C. The public feeling on this subject is yet very keen— It
will be better to wait for the effect of the full disclosure of the
Policy of Your Government— It is a change from its policy heretofore,
when foreign Seamen were rather invited and encouraged into your
Service, and undoubtedly you had a very large body of British Seamen in
your Ships— If the Law passes and is carried into effect, of confining
your Navigation to your own Seamen, we shall have no occasion for taking
our Men from your ships, because there will be none to take. We shall
always be ready to make such regulations as may guard the exercise of
our rights from abuses. A— The Policy of the Government of the United
States cannot be said to be changed— They have not indeed heretofore excluded foreign Seamen from our Service, but
they were never encouraged or invited into it— Whatever number of
British Seamen there may have been it, were led to it by their own
inclinations— C. At least your former Colleague Mr Gallatin told me that your Government had latterly determined to pursue the policy of encouraging your
own Seamen— A. But, My Lord, even this may be counteracted by the
British Government— Since the discharge of the British Navy, it has been
alledged that great numbers of your Seamen, have gone into foreign
Services— Many to the Russian; many to the American; I know not what
foundation there may be for this; but it is notorious that you have vast
numbers of Seamen out of employ, and I have received two official
requisitions from you, to send home from London and Liverpool, destitute
American Seamen, most of whom came from your naval service, and many of
whom have no proofs of being Americans— The second Requisition came to
me, without any reply to the Answer, I had given to the first— I
concluded that your Lordship had not seen my answer— I stated in it that
many of the distressed American Seamen, who were according to the
Lord Mayor’s Representation,
wandering about the Streets of London, had just been discharged from the
British Naval Service, and had stronger claims for relief from the
British than from the American Government— That others, had claims for
small pensions from this Government, and if they went to America, were
compelled to sell their annuities for two years purchase— I had
represented that I thought, if those Persons were to be sent to America,
Great-Britain ought to furnish them the means of receiving their
Pensions there— I had also alledged that the Lord Mayor’s representation
was in general terms—numbers of American Seamen,
and that when I was required to send Americans home, they must be named,
and some proof given that they are really Americans— C. I have not seen
your Note on this subject; for it was received while I was in the
Country— But certainly these are very fair, and proper subjects for
consideration— I will attend to them— It was impossible that so large a
body of men, as was discharged from the British Navy, amounting to Sixty
or Seventy thousand, should be thrown at once out of employment, without
some inconveniences— London and Liverpool being our two principal
Sea-ports, an extraordinary proportion of them naturally resorted there;
and for a time there were multitudes who could not find employment—many
became burdensome upon the public. But commerce is now very flourishing;
those People are gradually finding employment, and the incumbrance which
they have occasioned was very temporary, and has nearly passed over— The
note founded upon the Lord Mayor’s Representation was a circular to the
foreign Ministers— And the statement from the Mayor of Liverpool was of a number
of Americans who had become burdensome to the Parish— A.— Yes, My Lord,
the number mentioned was twenty-six— I immediately wrote to the American Consul, requesting him to take
measures for ascertaining who they were, and what their claims were as
Americans— I have his answer— Of the twenty-six, sent by the Mayor to
his Office, only nineteen presented themselves; and he had no means of
compelling the attendance of the others— Of the nineteen, only five had
any document of any sort, to shew that they were Americans.— It is
obvious therefore that if I am required to send to the United States
every Man who calls himself an American Seaman in distress, the chances
would be that numbers of British Seamen might find their way there,
contrary to the intentions of both Governments— C. I will attend to the
subject; and take the sense of the Government upon it— As to the
question respecting your Power; if you declare that your Government
considers that heretofore produced by you, as yet in force, and you
treat under Instructions from them, I should not suppose there would be
any necessity for you to produce a new Power— A. The next subject, upon
which I am directed to consult with His Majesty’s Government, relates to
Canada; another source of disagreement heretofore; and which may be one
385of great and frequent animosities here after,
unless guarded against by the vigilance, firmness and decidedly pacific
dispositions of the two Governments— There are tendencies to continual
dissensions, and even acts of hostility in that quarter, proceeding from
three causes—the Indians—the temper of the British local authorities;
and the British Armaments on the Lakes— The Post of Michillimackinac was
surrendered, not immediately after the Peace; nor until late in the
Summer, and some of the British Officers in Upper Canada, were so far
from entering into the Spirit of their Government, which had in
substance made a Peace for the Indians, that they took no small pains to
instigate the Indians to a continuance of hostilities against the United
States— The consequence was that it remained long doubtful whether the
Indians in that quarter would accept the Peace that had been secured for
them. Mr
Monroe represented these Circumstances in a Letter to
Mr
Baker— I was instructed to repeat the representation here;
and had interviews with Lord
Liverpool and Lord Bathurst for that purpose— They both
gave me the strongest assurances that the intentions of this Government
were sincerely pacific, and its earnest wish had been that the Indians
should agree to the Peace— That no detention of Michillimackinac had
been authorised by its orders, and no instigation of the Indians against
the United States had been warranted by it— The fort was surrendered in
July, and as soon as the Indians found they would not be supported by
Great-Britain in War, they manifested a readiness for Peace, and I
believe it has been with the tribes in that direction generally
accomplished. Other and more recent instances however of an unpleasant
nature have occurred— A British
Officer, pursued, took and carried away from the Territory
of the United States a Deserter from his Corps— The Officer himself was
afterwards arrested within the American Jurisdiction, tried; and owing
to the absence of a principal witness, was convicted only of a Riot, and
moderately fined— An Indian with a
party trespassing on the property of an American Citizen, at Gros Isle,
was killed in a boat, in the act of levelling his own musket, at the
American— And although this happened on the American Territory, the
British Commandant at Malden
offered a reward of 400 dollars, to any person for apprehending the man,
who had killed the Indian.— An American merchant Vessel upon Lake Erie
has also been fired upon by a British armed Vessel.— But a Circumstance
of still more importance is the increase of the British Armaments since
the Peace, on the Canadian Lakes— Such Armaments on one side, render
similar and counter-armaments indispensible on the other— Both
Governments must thus be subjected to a heavy, and in time of Peace a
useless expence; and every additional armament creates new and very
dangerous incitements to irritation, and acts of hostility— The American
Government anxious above all for the preservation of Peace, have
authorised me to propose a reduction of the armaments upon the Lakes, on
both sides— The extent of this reduction, the President leaves, at the
pleasure of Great-Britain, observing, that the greater it is, the more
it will conform to his preference, and that it would best of all suit
the United States if the Armaments should be confined to what is
necessary for the protection of the revenue— C. Does your Government
mean to include in this proposition, the destruction of the ships
already existing there? As to keeping a number of armed vessells,
parading about upon the lakes, in time of Peace, it would be ridiculous,
and absurd— There can be no motive for it, and every thing beyond what
is necessary to guard against smuggling is calculated only to produce
mischief— The proposition you make is very fair, and so far as it
manifests pacific dispositions, I assure you will meet with the
sincerest reciprocal Dispositions of this Government— I will submit the
proposal to their Consideration— But you know, we are the weaker party
there— Therefore it was that we proposed at Ghent, that the whole lakes,
should belong to one party— All the shores—for then, armaments would not
have been necessary— Then, there would have been a large and wide
natural separation between the two Territories; and those, I think are
the best, and most effectual to preserve Peace. A. But the proposition
at Ghent to which we objected was, that the disarming should be all on
one side— There was indeed afterwards intimated to us by the British
Plenipotentiaries, an intention to make us a proposal, so fair and
reasonable, that it was thought no objection could be made against it—
We did suppose that it was this identical proposition, which I am now
authorized to make— It was not however brought forward— Nor was any
explanation given by the British Plenipotentiaries of what they had
intended by their offer. My Instructions now do not explicitly authorize
me to include in the agreement to keep up no armament, the destruction
of the vessels already there; but if this Government assents to the
Principle, there will be ample time to concert mutually all the details.
What I could 386now agree to, would be to have no
armed force, actually out upon the Lakes, and to build no new Vessels.
C. It so happened that just at the close of the War, we were obliged to
make extraordinary exertions there, and to build a number of new
Vessels, to maintain our footing there. A— But it is the new Armaments,
since the Peace, which have necessarily drawn
the attention of my Government. C. You have so much the advantage of us,
by being there, immediately on the spot, that you can always arm, in a
shorter time than we can be prepared for defence. A— The stipulation to
keep, or build no new armed force during the Peace, would therefore be
in favour of Great-Britain; because, the very act of arming would then
be an act of hostility. C. That is, there could be no arming until the
War actually commenced; and then you would have such an advance of Time
upon us by your position, that we should not stand upon an equal
footing, for defence. A. Still the operation of the engagement, would be
in favour of Great-Britain— We should have our hands tied until the
moment of actual War— A State which it is impossible should suddenly
arise, on our part— It is impossible that War should be commenced by us,
without a previous State of things, which would give ample notice to
this Country to be prepared— She might then have every thing in
readiness to commence her armaments upon the Lakes, at the same moment
with us, and we should be deprived of the advantage arising from our
local position. C. Well—I will propose it to the Government for
Consideration— A— At the other extremity of the United States, the
Indians occur again, in an unpleasant manner— A certain Coll:
Nicolls, undertook, after the Peace, to make a Treaty
Offensive and defensive and a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, with
some runaway Indians, whom he chose to style the Creek Nation and he
formally notified these Treaties to the Agent of the United States with
the Creeks, adding that he should hear more of them when they should be
ratified here— Mr Monroe complained of this
conduct of Coll: Nicolls, in a Letter to
Mr Baker— I was instructed to make the
same complaint here— I mentioned it to Lord Bathurst, who in the most
candid and explicit manner verbally, disavowed to
me the proceedings of Nicolls— He said that Nicolls had made a pretended
Treaty Offensive and defensive with the Indians, and had even brought
some of the Indians; but that he, Lord Bathurst had answered that
assuredly no such Treaty would be ratified or sanctioned by the
Government— I had given my own Government information of this assurance,
which I knew would give them the highest satisfaction— I mentioned the
same affair in a Letter to Lord Bathurst, of which no written notice has
been taken— Whether any more formal disavowal of Coll. Nicolls’s proceedings has been given, in
answer to the complaint through Mr Baker, I
do not know; but I speak of it now, because by the President’s Message,
I perceive that the conduct of the Indians in that part of the United
States, still threatens hostilities, and because there as in the more
Northern parts, the Indians will certainly be disposed to tranquility
and Peace, unless they have encouragement to rely upon the support of
Great-Britain— C. I have no such Treaties as those you mention, among
those that I am to carry down to Parliament. A— This affair has given
the more concern to the Government of the United States, because they
have received strong and confident intimations from various quarters,
that there had been a Cession of Florida, by Spain to Great-Britain— C.
As to that, I can set you at ease at once— There is not, and never has
been the slightest foundation for it, whatsoever— It never has even been
mentioned. A. Your Lordship knows that such rumours have been long in
circulation, and that the fact has been positively and very
circumstantially asserted in your own public Journals. C. Yes, but our
public Journals are so addicted to lying!— No! if it is supposed that we have any
little, trickish policy of thrusting ourselves in, there between you and
Spain, we are very much misunderstood indeed— You shall find nothing
little, or shabby, in our policy. We have no desire to add an inch of
ground to our territories in any part of the world— We have as much as
we know how to manage— There is not a spot of ground upon the globe that
I would annex to our Territories, if it were offered to us to-morrow. A—
What your views, in that respect may be generally, we do not think it
our province to enquire, but we did think that with dominions so
extensive and various as those of Great Britain she could not wish for
such an acquisition as that of Florida, unless for purposes unfriendly
to the United States, and hence it was that these rumours have given
concern to the American Government— I am sure they will receive with
much pleasure the assurance given me by your Lordship, that no such
Cession has been made. C. None whatever. . . It has never been
mentioned; and if it had, it would have been decisively declined by us.—
Military positions may have been taken by us, during the War, of places
which you had taken from Spain; but we never intended to keep them— Do
you only observe the same Moderation— If we should find you hereafter
pursuing a system of encroachment upon your neighbours, what we might
do, defensively, is another Consideration. . . A. I do not precisely
understand what your Lordship intends by this advice of moderation— The
United States have no design of encroachment upon their neighbours, or
of exercising any injustice towards Spain— C— You may be sure that
Great-Britain has no design of acquiring any addition to her possessions
there— Great-Britain has done every thing for Spain— We have saved, we
have delivered her— We have restored her Government to her, and we had
hoped that the result would have proved more advantageous to herself as
well as more useful to the world than it has been— We are sorry that the
Event, has not altogether answered our expectations— We lament the
unfortunate situation of her internal Circumstances; owing to which we
are afraid that she can neither exercise her own powers for the comfort
and happiness of the Nation, nor avail herself of her resources for the
effectual exertion of her Power— We regret this, but we have no
disposition or desire to take advantage of this State of things to
obtain 387from it any exclusive privilege for
ourselves— In the unfortunate troubles of her Colonies in South-America,
we have not only avoided to seek, but we have declined every exclusive
indulgence or privilege to ourselves— We went even so far as to offer to
take upon us that most unpleasant and thankless of all offices, that of
mediating between the parties to those differences. We appointed a
formal mission for that purpose, who proceeded to Madrid; but there the
Court of Spain declined accepting our offer; and we have had the fortune
of displeasing both the parties, by refusing to interfere in support of
either— A.— The policy of the American Government, towards Spain, has
been hitherto precisely the same— They have not indeed made any offer of
their mediation, because the state of the relations between them and the
Spanish Government neither warranted, nor admitted of such an offer— But
they have observed the same system of impartial neutrality between the
parties— They have sought no peculiar, or exclusive advantage for the
United States, and I am happy to hear from your Lordship, that such is
the policy of Great-Britain, as that of the United States may and
probably will be influenced by it, and co-operate with it— C— I have
always avowed it to be our policy, in Parliament. We have never
acknowledged the Governments of the South-Americans, because that would
not have comported with our views of neutrality.
But we have never prohibited the commerce of our People with them,
because that was what Spain had no right to require of us— Our plan in
offering the mediation which Spain rejected was that the South-Americans
should submit themselves to the Government of Spain, as Colonies,
because we thought she had the right to authority over them, as the
mother Country— But that she should allow them commerce with other
Nations— Nothing exclusive to us—we neither asked nor could have
accepted any exclusive privileges for ourselves— We have no little or
contracted policy— But we proposed that Spain should allow a liberal, commercial intercourse, between her
Colonies and other Nations, similar to that which we allow in our
possessions in India. A. And what does your Lordship think will be the
ultimate issue of this struggle in South-America? that Spain will subdue
them, or that they will maintain their Independence? C. Every thing is
so fluctuating in the Councils of Spain, and generally every thing is so
dependent upon Events not to be calculated, that it is not possible to
say what the result may be. Our policy must be founded upon the actual
state of things, and be shaped according to Events as they may happen.—
A. There is another Subject, not indeed for discussion upon a new
Treaty, but relating to the Execution of that of Ghent, upon which my
Instructions are very urgent. . . C. Stay. . . Let me take a minute of
what we have been speaking about. . . There were . . . the
Seamen-Impressment . . . and the Notes, on the distressed Seamen, now at
London and Liverpool . . . Canada; and the proposal to disarm . . .
Coll: Nicolls. . . There was something
else, was there not?. . . A— Only my question, as to the Full-Power. . .
C. Ah! Yes. . . (and after making the minute on the paper) As to what I
have said to you with regard to Spain, and the situation of her internal
affairs and the conduct of her Government, I have spoken with the most
perfect freedom and openness; I wish you therefore to understand it as
confidential; and if you report it to your Government, to give it as
such. A. Certainly, My Lord, and I wish what I have said to you on the
Subject, to be also received as confidential. . . The subject on which I
wish now to urge the further Consideration of this Government, relates
to the Slaves— There are three branches of it, which have formed points
of discussion between the two Governments— First the Slaves carried away
from the United States by the British Commanders, contrary, as the
American Government holds to the express stipulation of the Treaty of
Ghent— It was complained of by Mr Monroe to
Mr Baker— I spoke of it to your
Lordship, before you went to France— I afterwards addressed a Letter to
you concerning it; to which I have received an answer from Lord
Bathurst— It came to me at a time when I was confined by illness, and
for several weeks could not write— I have not yet replied to it, but
shall shortly. . . It seems indeed to intimate that this Government has
taken its final determination, on the matter . . . but I hope it is not
so . . . I hope they will give it further Consideration— It has given so
much anxiety to my Government— It is urged so constantly and so
earnestly in my Instructions—the language of the Treaty, appears to us
so clear, and unequivocal—the violation of it in the carrying away of
the Slaves so manifest; and the losses of property occasioned by it to
our Citizens, is so considerable and so serious, that I cannot abandon
the hope that you will give it further consideration, and ultimately to
the United States, Satisfaction. C— I have not seen the Correspondence
that has passed relating to it— I will have it looked up; and examine
it. (he made a minute of it, on his paper.) A. There is a special
Representation concerning eleven Slaves taken away from a Mr
Downman, by the violation of a flag of truce sent ashore
by Captain Barrie. I have also
received from Lord Bathurst, an answer to this complaint, to which I
shall reply— The answer states that the 388complaint
was referred to Captain Barrie, to report upon it, and gives the
substance of Captain Barrie’s Report.— It does not disprove any of the
facts alledged by Mr Downman— But Captain
Barrie was himself the person who sent the flag of truce, and
responsible for the violation if it— As a general principle, it can
scarcely be expected that Satisfaction for an injury can ever be
obtained, if the report of the person upon whom it is charged is
received as a conclusive answer to the complaint. C— I suppose the
complaint itself was only the allegation of an individual; and naturally
reference must be made to the officer complained of for his answer to
the charge. A— The documents that I furnished in Downman’s case, did not
consist of his allegations only— There are affidavit’s of several other
persons— Taken indeed ex parte, because they could not be taken
otherwise— But they are full, and strong to the points, both of the
violation of the flag, and of the carrying away of the Slaves. C. I do
not know how we could proceed otherwise; unless, if the matter were of
sufficient importance, a Commissioner from each of the two Governments
might be authorized to examine . . . but I have not seen the papers. . .
I will look into them. A. The other point, concerning Slaves, relates to
the charge contained in the Instructions from the American Secretary of
State to the Plenipotentiaries at Ghent, that Sales had been made in the
West Indies, of Slaves taken in the United States— C. I do not think it
was possible— The law prohibits it expressly— A— I am not now speaking
with regard to the fact, but respecting the allegation of it— On the
publication of the Instructions, the British Plenipotentiaries, applied
to those of the United States, for the Evidence in support of the
charge— Admiral Cochrane
addressed a Letter to Mr Monroe containing
the same requisition— There was a Correspondence on the Subject, between
Mr Monroe and Mr Baker, and it was noticed here in Parliament— As the charge
itself had been made in the midst of the War, the American Government
had not expected that it would be a subject of discussion after the
Peace— And as it involved many circumstances of an unpleasant nature and
irritating tendency, they would have preferred that as between the two
Governments it should be by mutual consent laid aside, and nothing
further said about it— At the same time they were ready to communicate
such Evidence, as they could collect, of the fact; if that course should
be preferred by this Government— I made the proposal of both
alternatives last Summer to the Earl of Liverpool, who appeared to
prefer that the Evidence should be produced— I have now received a
considerable mass of it, and if your Lordship also thinks it the best
course I will furnish copies of it— But I would rather repeat the
proposal of dropping the subject altogether. C. So far as there may be
any thing of an irritating Nature in it, we have no wish or intention to
pursue the enquiry any farther— If the American Government, in the heat
of War, and under the feelings of that State have advanced a charge upon
our Officers, beyond what the proof of facts will bear them out, we have
no thought or wish to carry the discussion of it into the State of
Peace, and in that point of view would willingly dismiss it— As between
the Governments therefore, we set it altogether aside; and assure you
that it shall have no effect whatever on our friendly dispositions. But
with regard to the fact, we are obliged to ask for the Evidence of it;
because if established it affects the character of our officers, and the
observance of our Laws— Perhaps it may be well, if you and Mr
Hamilton, would go over the Evidence together— If the fact
is ascertained, the Officers who have been guilty of it, should be
punished; if otherwise it should be known for the vindication of their
individual characters. A. In the charge, as made, by the American
Secretary of State, no Individual Officer was named— In the Documents
which I have received, several Officers are named—the Papers are
voluminous, but I will have the copies of them made out as soon as
possible. From one of the Papers it appears that Slaves taken as Prize,
are actually sold. C. They are not sold as Slaves— By the Act of Parliament, all those that are taken in the
Vessels that carry on the Slave Trade by contraband, are committed to
the care of certain Conservators; but they are not Slaves A. The
Documents that I possess may perhaps induce His Majesty’s Government, to
pursue the investigation further. That which the American Government,
can obtain, in the places where the Sales
were alledged to have been made, must be imperfect. It has no controul
over the local authorities; but for a full and satisfactory
investigation, the co-operation, of both Governments is necessary— The
mode suggested to me, and already proposed by Mr Monroe to Mr Baker was that the
American Government would furnish lists of the Slaves, taken, during the
War, and in most instances the names of the Vessels, into which they
were taken; and then. . . C. We can shew what disposal was made of them.
Yes. I see no objection to that course. A. Another subject which I
barely mention now, is that concerning the Fisheries— I left here a day
or two since a Note in reply to one from Lord Bathurst, received while I
was confined, and unable to write. C. I have received your Note and read
it last Evening. A. I speak of it, because there was in Lord Bathurst’s
Note a proposal to negotiate 389on this subject. C.
Yes. . . We adhere to our Construction and Understanding in regard to
the Treaty; because it involves our rights of territorial jurisdiction.
But we do not wish you to be prevented from fishing, and shall readily
enter into arrangements on this point.—* A. I have been requested to
obtain authenticated copies, of certain papers in the Colonial Office—
The Commission and Instructions issued to Arthur Dobbs as Governor of North-Carolina, some time
before the American Revolution. C. Write me a private Note, mentioning
what the Papers are, and I will speak to Lord Bathurst about it— A.
Mr Smith, has
lately arrived here, and will be desirous of being presented at Court,
when the Prince Regent returns to
town. Will it be necessary to make a written application for that
purpose? C. No! Bring him on the first levee-day with you to Carlton
House. A. There may perhaps be other American Gentlemen, desirous of
being presented. Will any application be necessary for them? C— None
at-all. Bring them with you to the levee, and you may be always sure
that any person presented by you will be well received.— To this I made
my acknowledgments and took my leave, after a conference of nearly two
hours. I walked to the Westminster Library, N 44. Jermyn Street, paid my
annual subscription there of two guineas, and enquired for several books
and Reviews; all of which were out, excepting two small Volumes of
Foster’s Essays which I took
with me. (* A. I wrote your Lordship a Note, respecting, a
discrimination made in the Ports of Ireland, between British and
American Vessels, in respect to the number of Passengers they are
allowed to take. I received a Note from you in answer; to which I
replied— C. Probably the regulation to which you refer may have been
adopted before the Commercial Convention was concluded. We might however
question the application of it to the case, as the Convention was not
intended to interfere with any restrictions under which we may think
proper to prevent emigration from Ireland. A. I hope I have not been and
shall not be understood as objecting to the regulation at-all, as a
restriction upon emigration— That must be entirely discretionary with
the British Government. We have nothing to say about it— But it is the
discrimination between the shipping of the two Countries, of which I
complained— The allowance to British vessels to take five Passengers,
for the same tonnage, which in American vessels is limited to two— I
presume that an order to the Port-Officers, would remove the
distinction. C. I dont know that— It may be made by act of Parliament—
And we might question your right to consider Passengers, as Articles of
Merchandize.— We may regard the discrimination itself, as a mode of
restriction upon emigration. You do not want our people. A.— Not at-all.
We increase fast enough, by the progress of our own native population.
C. No! Our Seamen, and our People . . . you really do not want them; and
when they do go, you get only the worst part of
them. A. Why, in that case, My Lord, you ought to be much obliged to us,
for relieving you from them. C. I don’t know . . . however, we shall see
what there is to be done.) N.B. This part of the Conference immediately
followed that relating to the fisheries. I remained at Craven Street
till four O’Clock— Sent Richard
to engage five tickets at Covent Garden Theatre to see the Midsummer
Night’s dream, next Monday. Read for the first time two or three
Speeches of Mr Charles Phillips, a young Irish Orator, and a
Criticism upon one of them, from the Edinburgh Review. Home about six
O’Clock— Walked from Kew-Bridge— In the Evening I read part of Foster’s
Essay, on a Man’s writing Memoirs of himself.— Settled the account of
Messer and Page, the Coachmakers, at the Office.
