John Quincy Adams’s (JQA) diary, which was inspired by his father John Adams (JA) and started as a travel journal, initiated a lifelong writing obsession. In 1779, twelve-year-old JQA made his second trip abroad to accompany his father’s diplomatic mission. While in Europe, he attended various schools and traveled to St. Petersburg as an interpreter during Francis Dana’s mission to Russia. He subsequently served as JA’s secretary at Paris during the final months before the Anglo-American Definitive Peace Treaty was signed in September 1783. Two years later, JQA returned to the US. After graduating from Harvard College in 1787, he moved to Newburyport to read law under Theophilus Parsons and in 1790 he established a legal practice in Boston. JQA’s skill as a writer brought him public acclaim, and in 1794 President George Washington nominated him as US minister resident to the Netherlands.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) entered diplomatic service in September 1794 as US minister resident to the Netherlands. He married Louisa Catherine Johnson (LCA) in July 1797 after a fourteen-month engagement, and their three sons were born in this period. During his father John Adams’s (JA) presidency they moved to Berlin where, as US minister plenipotentiary, JQA signed a new Prussian-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce. JQA returned to the US in 1801 and entered politics, elected first to the Massachusetts senate in 1802 and then to the US Senate in 1803. His contentious relationship with fellow Federalist members over his support of some Democratic-Republican policies led to his removal from office. In May 1808 the Federalist-controlled Massachusetts legislature voted to replace him at the end of his term, prompting JQA’s resignation in June. Between 1806 and 1809 he also served as the first Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) returned to diplomatic service in August 1809 as the US’s first minister plenipotentiary to Russia. In St. Petersburg JQA was well-liked by Emperor Alexander I and closely followed the battles of the Napoleonic Wars then raging across Europe. When the US declared war on Great Britain in 1812, Adams watched from afar as the conflict dragged on for two years. In April 1814, he traveled to Ghent, Belgium, as part of the US delegation to negotiate an end to the war with England; the Treaty of Ghent was signed on Christmas Eve. Subsequently appointed US minister to the Court of St. James’s in May 1815, JQA served in London for the next two years.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) served as the US secretary of state during James Monroe’s presidency. Adams’s duties included organizing and responding to all State Department correspondence and negotiating agreements beneficial to the US. His achievements as secretary of state include the Anglo-American Convention of 1818, which established the US border with Canada along the 49th parallel, and the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 (Transcontinental Treaty), which resulted in the US acquisition of Florida. JQA also formulated the policy that became known as the Monroe Doctrine, in which the US called for European non-intervention in the western hemisphere, specifically in the affairs of newly independent Latin American nations. As Monroe’s presidency came to an end, JQA was among the top candidates in the 1824 presidential election. When no candidate earned the necessary majority, the House of Representatives decided the election in JQA’s favor in February 1825.
John Quincy Adams (JQA) was inaugurated as the sixth president of the US on 4 March 1825 and began his administration with an ambitious agenda of improvements for American society. His presidency was embattled. Supporters of Andrew Jackson, who believed their candidate had unfairly lost the 1824 election, worked ceaselessly to foil JQA’s plans. Domestically, JQA refused to replace civil servants with partisan supporters, and his administration became involved in disputes between the Creek Nation and the state of Georgia. JQA’s foreign policy also suffered, as partisan bickering in Congress failed to provide timely funding for US delegates to attend the 1826 Congress of Panama. Political mudslinging in advance of the 1828 presidential election was particularly fierce, and by mid-1827 JQA knew he would not be reelected.
In 1831 John Quincy Adams (JQA) became the only former president to subsequently serve in the US House of Representatives. As the chairman of the House Committee on Manufactures, he helped compose the compromise tariff bill of 1832. He traveled to Philadelphia as part of a committee that investigated the Bank of the United States, drafting a minority report in support of rechartering the bank after disagreeing with the committee’s majority report. JQA regularly presented the antislavery petitions he received from across the country, and he vehemently opposed the passage of the Gag Rule in 1836 that prevented House discussion of petitions related to slavery. He opposed the annexation of Texas, and in 1838 he delivered a marathon speech condemning the evils of slavery. JQA also chaired the committee that oversaw the bequest of James Smithson, which was used to establish the Smithsonian Institution.
During his final years of service in the US House of Representatives, John Quincy Adams (JQA) continued to oppose the Gag Rule that prevented House discussion of petitions related to slavery. In 1839 he joined the defense team for the Africans who revolted aboard the Spanish slave ship Amistad. The Supreme Court declared the Amistad Africans free on 9 March 1841 after JQA delivered oral arguments in their favor. In 1842 JQA faced a censure hearing and ably defended himself against charges from southern congressmen. He introduced a successful resolution that finally led to the repeal of the Gag Rule in 1844. JQA voted against both the annexation of Texas in 1845 and the US declaration of war with Mexico in 1846. He collapsed on the floor of the House on 21 February 1848 and died two days later.
December 1814
r: Gallatin had prepared a
minute of the alterations and amendments which we wish to obtain to the
British project, and an Article for restoring the British right to
navigate the Mississippi, and our right to the fisheries within the
British Jurisdiction— This minute and Article were to be left with the
British Plenipotentiaries— We agreed
upon the mode in which we should proceed in the Conference; and at
twelve O’Clock went to their house— As soon as we were seated at the
Table, Lord Gambier said he was happy that we had now met again, and
that it was with much fairer prospects of success than when we had met
last. That as we had left to them the option of the place of meeting
they had proposed their own house, supposing it equally agreeable to us.
We had really thought it no mark of civility in them to name their own
house; nor was it even conformable to our agreement at the commencement
of the Negotiation, which was that we should meet alternately at the
houses of each other.— Our last conference had been at their house, and
regularly this should have been at ours. Of this however we took no
notice, and I declared our hearty concurrence in the sentiment of
satisfaction expressed by Lord Gambier, at the improvement in the
prospects of a successful termination to the Negotiation, since our last
meeting.— I then observed that in our Note of Yesterday we had stated
the motives upon which we had requested the present Conference. That we
had agreed to many of the alterations proposed by them to the project of
a Treaty which we had sent to them— That we had consented to wave the
Articles to which they had objected, with the exception of part of one
of them which we still wished to discuss, and with respect to which we
had enclosed to them a provision made by an act of Congress at the
commencement of the War. There were some of the alterations proposed by
them, however, to which we could not agree; we wished to obtain
explanations concerning some others, and also to fill the blanks of
times and places, in several of the Articles— The mode of proceeding
which we had thought it would be proper to adopt, was to take the Projet
and refer in regular order to the passages to which we objected, stating
successively the grounds of our objections. This was accordingly done.—
The first objection we made was to an alteration in the first article
respecting the restoration of territory, places and possessions taken
during the War; our project had made it universal, without exception—
The British proposed alteration was to 175limit the
restoration to territories, belonging to one
party, and taken by the other— I stated that our objection to the
alteration was that it made one party the judge whether any territory
taken by it did or did not belong to the other— It would enable either
party to refuse giving up at its option any portion of the possessions
of the other, taken by it, merely by saying this does not belong to you.
It was contrary to the tenour of the Articles by which a provision was
made for settling all the questions of disputed boundary, and contrary
to the general basis which had been agreed to, of the State before the
War, substituting instead of it, present possession, upon which we had
declined to treat, and which they had explicitly abandoned— Mr Goulburn and Dr Adams insisted upon retaining the alteration— Goulburn said
that he did not know of any part of the territory taken by either party,
which it could hold as not belonging to the other, except the islands in
the Bay of Fundy, which as we had written to our Government, one of them
had said they considered as belonging to Great-Britain as clearly as
Northamptonshire— That there could be no reason for restoring that which
must ultimately be adjudged to them; and if it should finally prove
otherwise the possession could not be long retained as in the next
Article the final decision of the disputed question was provided for—
Mr Gallatin said that our objection was
that the alteration instead of settling disputes only laid the
foundation for a new one— Suppose the Treaty concluded— Each party will
immediately demand the delivery of possession of the places taken from
it.— The other refuses to deliver this or that place and says this does
not belong to you— A new dispute is thus started upon the very execution
of the Treaty. Nor did it apply merely to the case of Moose Island—
There were several Islands in the River, and Lakes in the same
predicament— Mr Goulburn said he did not
know that any of the Islands in the River or Lakes had been taken by
either party from the other during the War— I observed that as to the
question of right our opinions and their’s would of course not be the
same; and in ours the island of Grand Menan in the Bay of Fundy, a
larger and more valuable Island than those they so confidently claimed,
was as much ours as the City of New-York— Mr
Goulburn said that the mass of Evidence they had upon the subject was
immensely voluminous; that he had been prepared at one time to enter
upon the discussion of the question, but there would be no use now in
battling it, upon points for which another mode of settlement was agreed
upon— Dr: Adams said that the objection to
the alteration was one which might be applied to every stipulation of
every Treaty— It was not to be presumed that a Government agreeing to a
stipulation, would not carry it into effect with good faith— That he did
not see that the retaining possession of what belonged to them came at
all within the principle of uti possidetis— That the Status ante Bellum
could mean only the State as of right, and that the restoration of
possession to be required could only be of rightful possession— I said
that possession was in its nature matter of fact, and not of right— That
when therefore the restoration of possession was to be stipulated, the
State before the War, was mere matter of fact— The right of course would
remain the same as before the War without stipulation; and if possession
taken during the War was retained, it could only be on the principle of
uti possidetis, and not on that of Status ante bellum. Mr Bayard said it was not necessary to
suppose bad faith or a disposition to elude the execution of the Treaty
on either side— The alteration would give rise to a new dispute, with
the utmost fidelity and sincerity on both sides— One party claims the
delivery of territory taken from it, and which it sincerely and honestly
believes to belong to it— The other refuses to deliver it, believing
with equal sincerity and confidence that it belongs to itself— Here is
immediately a new dispute— Suppose the case that the place belongs to
neither of the parties— Suppose the case that it belongs to both— On
either of these suppositions you have immediately a new dispute— The
restoration to the state existing before the War, is a plain and simple
principle; a matter of fact about which no dispute can arise— No reply
was made to these remarks, which Mr Bayard
afterwards told me he made, with particular reference to the Settlement
on Columbia river— But as the British Plenipotentiaries manifested no
sign of yielding, I proposed to pass on to the next Article.— This
related to the periods fixed for the cessation of hostilities, and the
restoration of prizes taken at sea— We had in our original project
followed in form the precedents of the Treaty of Peace in 1782, but had
assumed the signature of the Treaty as the date from which the terms for
the cessation of hostilities in the different Latitudes, were to
commence— They had substituted the Exchange of the 176Ratifications as the date, and we had agreed to this Alteration. We
had agreed in our own meetings to propose to shorten the periods for the
cessation of hostilities— I observed that I hoped we should finally
agree upon a Treaty, of the Ratification of which there would be no
doubt; so that it might be considered as a mere formality— The Peace
would then be made, six weeks or two Months before it could be ratified—
We wished that no time might be lost and we had therefore shortened all
the terms—that of the Channel and the North Seas, particularly within a
period even shorter than might be necessary for the exchange of the
Ratifications to be known— The conclusion of the Treaty would however be
known, and we supposed it might be more for the Advantage of
Great-Britain than for that of the United-States that the period of
hostilities should be abridged in this quarter— They said that whenever
the Advantage might be, the orders to the commanders of ships and other
officers could not be issued until the Exchange of the Ratifications was
known— The Ratification of the Treaty would indeed be in England a mere
formality, for they had authority to bind their Government, their
full-power promising to ratify what they should do— They hoped there
would be no doubt of an immediate ratification in America; but our
full-power did not positively promise it— Mr
Gallatin said it could not, because the Ratification of Treaties was by
our Constitution reserved to the President, and the Senate; and required
the consent of two thirds of the latter. We finally took the Article
which they had drawn up on this subject, my Colleagues observing that we
should perhaps on examination find it preferable to our own— The next
Articles were those stipulating the appointment of Commissioners to
ascertain and settle the boundary lines— We had proposed the appointment
of three sets of three Commissioners, following exactly the precedent of
those for ascertaining the St: Croix River,
in Mr Jay’s Treaty— The British project,
proposes only two Commissioners, and if they, one being appointed by
each Government should not agree, then to leave the decision to a
friendly Sovereign— We agreed to this alteration— They had however drawn
an entire new Article in lieu of our third; and they had begun with a
quotation from the Treaty of Peace of 1783—the quotation was incomplete,
and presented no distinct Sense— Mr Goulburn
observed that there had been an omission of one line in the copy sent
us; and Lord Gambier said he had observed it in making out his copy of
the project— I had also observed it, and we were prepared to supply the
omission which was done— But the British project had included in the
description of the disputed boundary only certain Islands in the Bay of
Fundy, which Mr Gallatin thought was
intended to exclude from the judgment of the Commissioners Moose Island;
that being not in the Bay of Fundy, but in the Bay of Passamaquoddy; and
connected with the determination to restore only the territory belonging
to us, he supposed was meant not only to keep possession of
Moose-Island, but to place it without the powers of the Commissioners to
decide upon the title to it— The British Plenipotentiaries however
immediately agreed to the Alteration proposed by Mr Gallatin, including the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy,
and that of Grand Menan in the Bay of Fundy.— This removed one of the
great remaining obstacles to the Peace— Then came the question about
filling the Blanks of the places where the Commissioners were to meet in
the first instance— Mr Goulburn said they
had thought of filling two of the Blanks with places in the British
dominions, and two within the United States— They mentioned St: Johns for the third Article and Montreal
for the fourth— Mr Gallatin proposed St: Andrews in the province of New Brunswick
for both; as being the spot nearest and most convenient to the scene of
operations— It was agreed to be inserted Lord Gambier remarking that
Mr Gallatin by his local knowledge of
that Country knew best what was the fittest place; and Dr: Adams asking whether St: Andrews was a considerable place.— The
blank in the fifth Article was filled with Albany— The eighth Article
was that on which there will be the greatest obstacles in coming to an
ultimate agreement— It is the boundary west from the Lake of the Woods—
In the course of the Correspondence the British Plenipotentiaries had
proposed the line of Mr: King’s unratified Convention of 1803. The
shortest line from the Lake to the Mississippi. We had proposed a line
agreed to in the proposed Convention of 1807. between Messrs:
Monroe and Pinkney, and Lords Aukland and Holland— The British Government now
propose a line due west in the 49th:
parallel of Latitudes with an additional clause that the British shall
have the free Navigation of the Mississippi, and free access to it
through our territories generally with their goods, wares and
merchandize— I observed that we proposed to strike out this clause— That
it consisted of two parts—first the 177navigation of
the river for His Britannic Majesty’s Subjects, and secondly the access
to it for them through out territories. With regard to the first, the
right was stipulated for British Subjects by the Treaty of Peace of
1783. we had stated in our Note sent with our project, that we
considered that Treaty of 1783 as bearing a peculiar character, and that
it was not liable like ordinary Treaties to be abrogated by a subsequent
War— That the American Government had considered the rights and
liberties secured by it to the people of the United States, as requiring
no new and additional stipulation; and had therefore not authorized us
to bring them into discussion— To this part of our Note; the British
Plenipotentiaries had made no reply— We knew not whether their silence
was owing to the acquiescence of their Government in the principle we
had advanced, or to some other cause. . . Lord Gambier said No . . . No.
But, continued I, the British right to navigate the Mississippi, stands
on the same foundation, the Peace of 1783. We admit that if our
principle is good to us for the fisheries within British Jurisdiction;
it is good for the British right to navigate the Mississippi within our
Jurisdiction— If the British Government so considers them there is no
need of a new stipulation in either case— But by asking a new one for
the Mississippi, it was to be inferred that Great-Britain considered the
rights on both sides to be forfeited by the War, and she now asked a new
right to navigate the Mississippi, without offering for it any
equivalent.— If a new engagement was necessary for one of the privileges
it was necessary for the other; and we had prepared an article which we
would leave with them, to restore both.— As to their access to the
Mississippi through our territories; if the right to navigate the river
was granted, access to it by one road must be allowed; but it would
obviously necessary to guard it by a provision for the collection of
duties; and if a general access without limitation of place was to be
granted, we thought a reciprocal right would be necessary for the People
of the United States through the British Territories, to the St: Lawrence; and the free Navigation of that
river— This observation that they were asking for a new right, without
offering an equivalent, appeared to take the British Plenipotentiaries
altogether by surprize— Mr: Gallatin told
them that if they considered the remainder of the Article, the 49th: parallel of Latitude as an equivalent,
we wished them to understand that we attached no importance to it
at-all— It would indeed be a convenience to have the boundary settled—
But the Lands there were of so little value, and the period when they
might be settled was so remote, that we were perfectly willing that the
boundary there should remain as it now is, and without any further
arrangement— If it was agreeable to them we had no sort of objection to
striking out the whole of the eighth Article— Mr Goulburn said that as by agreeing to the West line in the
Latitude of 49. they gave up all claim to the
Navigation of the Mississippi any possessions on the
Mississippi, it was necessary to stipulate for the right of Navigation
on the river, and for access to it through our territories— It was of no
use to them at present, but it might eventually be of some advantage to
them— It was a provision for futurity rather than for the present time—
I said that whatever it might be, it was a privilege to which their
Government appeared to attach considerable importance, and they could
not expect it would be granted by the United States without an
equivalent— Goulburn said they had no authority to agree to our Article;
and they must refer it to their Government— The whole Treaty must be
taken together, and the equivalent must be found in the concessions of
Great-Britain in the other Articles— Dr
Adams expressed the same idea, and Lord Gambier said yes . . . yes . . .
yes. Mr: Gallatin told them, that there was
no concession of Great-Britain in any of the other Articles— We had
insisted upon the mutual restoration of Territory, and had invariably
declined treating on any other basis— We should by that only get back
our own; and we should restore to Great Britain what was hers— As to all
the Articles for the settlement of Boundary, they might be mutually
useful; but we had no particular interest in them— We had accepted the
mode of settlement proposed by Great-Britain, instead of our own, and we
were quite willing if she desired it to strike out every one of those
articles. But we could not admit this unexpected claim without some
equivalent. Mr Goulburn said they had
informed us in their first Note that the claim would be made— Mr Gallatin replied they had— But that in
their Note of 21st: September to which we
had since been expressly referred by them as containing the whole of their demands it was not mentioned.—
We now passed to the Article concerning indemnities— I remarked that we
had consented to wave all claims for them that have arisen subsequent to
the commencement of the War; excepting for Vessels which had been in
British Ports when the War 178commenced, and had
been there seized— We had sent them a copy of a Section of an Act of
Congress, passed immediately after the declaration of War, allowing
British Vessels then in the Ports of the United States six Months to
depart; and our Instructions authorised us to say that the permission
had been extended in the execution of the Law, even beyond the time
limited by its Letter— Dr: Adams and Mr Goulburn have but a feeble controul of
their temper. Adams began by an argument, as if he had been in Doctor’s
commons— He said that he had examined the Section of the Law we had
sent, and it appeared to him not to make out a
case for a claim near so strong as our Note had stated it— That
it only gave authority to the President to give Passports to British
Vessels to depart— Why this was no more than what the King had power to
do, in England, at-all times— That America had declared War against
England, and of course all American Vessels in the English Ports had
been seized— At first they had only laid the hand upon them, and kept
them sequestered until it was seen what was the result of the proposals
made for Peace, by Admiral Warren—
Afterwards they were all condemned, and a claim for indemnities for them
was not only without foundation, but utterly unprecedented among
Nations. I replied that it was not merely the Law, but the execution of
the Law, and the extension of the indulgence granted by it even beyond
the time expressed in it, which we considered as warranting a claim to a
similar liberality on the part of Great-Britain. That so far from its
being unprecedented, we considered it as the common custom of Nations; I
had not at hand any of the writers on the Law of Nations, but I felt the
utmost confidence that the principle was sanctioned by them— That there
was scarcely a Treaty between commercial Nations in modern times that
did not contain it as a stipulation, and it was generally viewed as a
stipulation merely in affirmance of the acknowledged principle— That
with regard to the manner of carrying on a War neither the Law not the
usages of Nations recognized any distinction of right, founded on the
declaration of War, whether made by the one party or the other— Dr: Adams insisted that there was a material
difference in the consideration which party declared the War, and
renewed the assertion that a demand for indemnity on such a ground was
utterly unprecedented— That when war was declared by one party, its
ships in the Ports of the other were of course seized— They were
sometimes kept until it was seen whether peace would be restored, and if
not they were condemned; and if the other party did otherwise, it
mattered not whether from liberality or any other motive, it gave no
claim whatsoever either for indemnity or for restoration— Mr Goulburn said that he remembered having
received at the time a Letter from one of his friends in Liverpool
informing him that he had seized an American vessel there— Mr Gallatin asked what was done with such
vessels when they were condemned— Whether they were considered as droits
of the Admiralty or given to the seizors— Goulburn and Adams said a
portion of them was given to the seizor— Both of them appeared to be
nettled at the question— Goulburn said that it would be humiliating and
disgraceful in Great-Britain to allow any such claim for indemnity. That
it was requiring her to pay a shameful tribute
for Peace— That it had been demanded France in the War of 1756. and
refused— Mr: Gallatin said that was for
vessels taken at sea, before the War was declared— Goulburn said it was
demanded by France in the last War; and had been the pretext upon which
the English prisoners in France when the War commenced had been detained
as prisoners— Mr Gallatin said, looking
earnestly at Goulburn, has it not been considered throughout Europe that
this measure of Buonaparte
was not only extremely harsh in its character but unquestionably in
violation of the Law of Nations? Goulburn hesitatingly said, yes, but it
was done on the pretence of retaliation for our detention of French
property— Thus said I our claim in the present instance is at least not
unprecedented— Ay—said Goulburn with a coarse and insulting tone; but we
do not admit Bonaparte’s construction of the Law of Nations.— Mr: Gallatin afterwards told me that his
object in asking the last question was to obtain an admission from them
that the detention of the British in France was in violation of the Law
of Nations, because the principle applied to their own conduct in
detaining as prisoners the American Seamen they had impressed before the
War— We had now gone through the topics on which we had asked the
conference, and recurred to the points upon which we had not agreed—
Mr Gallatin mentioned the Mississippi
and the fisheries and gave Mr Goulburn the
Article he had prepared for restoring them— Mr Bayard said there was also the Restoration of . . . 179 . . . Dr Adams,
thinking that he meant the Restoration of the ships, or property afloat, which they had said was liable
to immediate seizure on the breaking out of a War, while they admitted
that by the usage of Nations in modern times, all other property was
respected, did not give Mr Bayard time to
finish his sentence— No! as to that, said he, we shall not refer it to
our Government . . . we reject it at once— Mr Bayard said he had meant the Restoration of Territory—
Oh!—aye!—ah! said Adams; yes we can refer that. . . We may as well refer
it, said Goulburn, as we must refer the other—but, Gentlemen; we cannot
say that our Government will not require something else. . . We had
hoped we could have concluded without referring again to our Government—
We mean to say, that we were now authorised to sign the Treaty, as we
sent it to you. . . We made no question, said Mr: Clay, that you would sign the Treaty, if we agreed to it in
your own terms. . . Yes, said Goulburn, very aukwardly; but we only
regret the delay, and should have wished to have
concluded now— We wish the delay may not be imputed to us. . . As we
rose to take leave Dr: Adams expressed a
wish that what had passed between us might be kept at present entirely
secret; and that if we should sign a Treaty it should be not mentioned
or disclosed to any person for at least twenty-four hours, that their
messenger might have a start of that time, to carry the first news to
the Government— He said there was so much commercial speculation upon
our transactions that it was very desirable nothing should be said by
any of us to give advantages to any person— Because you know, said he,
one does not know to whom it might be attributed— We assented to these
observations; but Mr Bayard afterwards said
he thought they were very indelicate— Perhaps they were; but after
Milligan’s expedition to
England in August, and the circumstances attending it, I thought them
quite excusable.— We returned home about three O’Clock, and I wrote
until dinner time, and again all the Evening.
